McQueen v. Baker ( 1996 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-50836
Summary Calendar
SYNNACHIA McQUEEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CLARENCE BAKER, CO III Officer;
RICHARD HARVEY, CO III Officer,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 93-CV-359
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May 20, 1996
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHE’ and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Synnachia McQueen’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP) on appeal and for preparation of a transcript at
government expense is DENIED.
McQueen has not shown that the magistrate judge abused his
discretion by denying his motion to amend his complaint. See
Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1993); Union City
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
No. 95-50836
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Barge Line, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 823 F.2d 129, 135 (5th
Cir. 1987). The record does not contain a copy of McQueen’s
proposed supplemental complaint; it is McQueen’s duty to provide
us with those portions of the record he contends contain error.
United States v. Narvaez, 38 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1803 (1995). We therefore do not consider
McQueen’s contentions that the magistrate judge erred by denying
him leave to file his supplemental complaint and by sanctioning
him $50 for attempting to file the supplemental complaint.
McQueen has not indicated how the information he wished to
obtain through discovery would have assisted him or how he was
harmed because he did not obtain the information. He has not
demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his discovery requests. See Scott v. Monsanto Co., 868
F.2d 786, 793 (5th Cir. 1989); Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787
F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1986).
McQueen has not provided us with the records or transcripts
of the other cases in which he alleges the district court and
magistrate judge have excluded minorities from jury service. We
do not consider his allegations regarding those other cases. See
Narvaez, 38 F.3d at 167. McQueen thus is left with the jury
selection in his own trial, on which he cannot rely to prove
underrepresentation or systematic exclusion of jurors. Timmel v.
Phillips, 799 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1986).
No. 95-50836
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McQueen does not indicate how any previous acts of
retaliation might reflect on the defense witnesses’ character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Nor does
he indicate how his filing of grievances or complaints alone
would have motivated a particular defense witness to retaliate
against him by testifying at McQueen’s federal trial. Nor does
he indicate that he would have used evidence of previous
retaliation for a purpose permitted by FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
McQueen has not shown that the district court abused its
discretion by granting the defendants’ motion in limine. United
States v. Triplett, 922 F.2d 1174, 1180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 945 (1991).
McQueen does not contend that the district court failed to
determine that the probative value of his witnesses’ felony
convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect. Indeed, he does
not contend that the admission of the convictions was error; he
challenges only the district court’s instruction to the jury that
felony convictions are relevant for determining the credibility
of witnesses. Because McQueen does not challenge the admission
of the evidence or provide any argument that we so construe, his
jury-instruction contention fails.
Because the jury found that the defendants did not retaliate
against McQueen for exercising his First Amendment rights, the
jury did not need to reach the issue of the defendants’ qualified
immunity. See Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 105 (5th Cir.
No. 95-50836
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1993). McQueen’s contention that the district court erred by
instructing the jury on qualified immunity is unavailing.
Finally, we remind McQueen that he has been barred
indefinitely by this court from filing any pro se, in forma
pauperis civil appeal in this court, or any pro se, in forma
pauperis initial civil pleading in any court which is subject to
this court’s jurisdiction, without the advance written permission
of a judge of the forum court or of this court, and that the
clerk of this court and the clerks of all federal district courts
in this Circuit are directed to return to McQueen, unfiled, any
attempted submission inconsistent with this bar. We considered
the current appeal only because it was submitted to this court
before we sanctioned McQueen. To avoid additional sanctions,
however, McQueen should review any pending appeals and withdraw
any frivolous appeals immediately.
APPEAL DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.