Jones v. Givens ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 19-50465     Document: 00515999033          Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/30/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 30, 2021
    No. 19-50465
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Joshua Jones,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Ronald Givens; Frank Stengel; Rhonda Hackett; James
    Tanner; James Green; Donnie Todd; Roberto Alexandre,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:18-CV-1270
    Before Elrod, Southwick, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Joshua Jones, a Texas state prisoner, filed a complaint pro se under 42
    U.S.C. § 1983 against the warden and officers of the prison at which he was
    detained. Jones sought damages to compensate for lost property and for
    injuries he sustained because of the officers’ use of excessive force and the
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-50465          Document: 00515999033         Page: 2      Date Filed: 08/30/2021
    No. 19-50465
    officers’ failure to provide medical attention when Jones had a seizure. The
    district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants because
    Jones had not pursued administrative remedies on his claims before
    presenting them in his § 1983 complaint. The district court, however, did
    not account for Jones’s contention that the defendants’ threats of further
    violence and retaliation deprived him of an available administrative remedy.
    We therefore VACATE the summary judgment and REMAND.
    I.
    In November 2018, Jones filed his § 1983 complaint against Ronald
    Givens, then warden of the John B. Connally Unit, as well as assistant warden
    Frank Stengel and officers Rhonda Hackett, James Tanner, James Green,
    Donnie Todd, and Roberto Alexandre.                  Jones sought damages and
    declaratory judgment for injuries, including a broken shoulder, and for loss
    of property. Jones also emphasized that Hackett, Green, Tanner, and
    Alexandre each threatened him should he use the prison grievance system to
    complain about their actions.
    A.
    According to a document titled “Declaration under Penalty of
    Perjury,” which Jones attempted to file with the district court, Jones suffered
    harms from four groups of interrelated incidents over the course of a year and
    a half. 1
    First, in August 2017, Jones was moved to a medical unit—previously
    identified in his complaint as the Jester IV Psychiatric Facility. While he was
    away, Alexandre packed up and then lost his property. Upon his return to
    1
    In his declaration, Jones recounts the events giving rise to his injuries non-
    sequentially. The following paragraphs reorder the content of Jones’s statements
    chronologically.
    2
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    Connally, Jones discussed this with Warden Givens and wrote a grievance
    against Alexandre. The property was not returned nor was Jones reimbursed.
    Second, in November 2017, Hackett witnessed Jones having a seizure
    in his cell. Hackett refused to render aid or call for medical assistance.
    Instead, she said that if Jones had another seizure, she would leave Jones on
    the floor of his cell. Jones did have another seizure the next week—Hackett,
    true to her word, told Jones she was “not put[t]ing up with this tonight” and
    left him. Jones wrote up a complaint against Hackett for these incidents.
    Third, in December 2017, Green falsified documents in connection
    with a disciplinary proceeding. He also falsely stated that he had taken
    Jones’s statement for the proceeding, even though he had not.
    Finally, in January 2018 Jones complained to officers in the common
    dayroom that the water in his cell was not working. Hackett and Green both
    came to the dayroom in response. Green falsely told Jones that a plumber
    was in the building to fix the problem. Hackett ordered Jones back to his cell,
    otherwise she would “run my team on you and gas your a**.” Hackett
    further exclaimed “you don’t think I [re]member when you wrote me up”
    regarding the seizures. Jones explained once more that the water in his cell
    was not working, but Green, at Hackett’s signal, sprayed Jones in the face
    with mace. Jones was then slammed to the ground, injuring his shoulder.
    On January 26, Jones complained about the water issue once more to
    Tanner. Jones also related to Tanner how Hackett and Green had responded
    to his earlier complaints. Tanner “refuse[d] to listen” and instead ordered
    Jones back to his cell. Jones reiterated his complaint about the water.
    Another officer then slammed a handcuffed Jones to the ground, further
    injuring his shoulder. While Jones was lying on the ground, Tanner went to
    Jones’s cell, threw out all of his possessions, and took his identification card.
    3
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    A medical examination later revealed that a bone in Jones’s shoulder
    had been broken and would require surgery to be repaired.
    B.
    After filing his complaint, Jones filed a motion for production of
    documents. In it Jones sought, among other things, his prison medical
    records, his mental health records, maintenance records for his cell from
    January of 2018, an allegedly falsified document involving Green, video
    footage showing the alleged instances of use of force, certain documents
    called “I-60’s” filed by Jones, and the disciplinary and work-history files of
    Hackett and Tanner. The defendants moved for a protective order in
    response.
    The defendants then moved for summary judgment, contending that
    Jones had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him in the
    Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The defendants explained that the
    Department “provides a two-step procedure for processing administrative
    grievances.” An inmate must first file a “Step One” grievance within fifteen
    days of the alleged incident. Prison administration handle grievances at Step
    One. If the inmate does not prevail, he can file a “Step Two” grievance with
    the State of Texas within ten days of an adverse Step One decision.
    The defendants attached to their motion for summary judgment
    approximately 200 pages of grievances filed by Jones Between May 1, 2017
    and April 1, 2018.     The defendants contended that, amidst all these
    grievances, Jones had not filed a single Step One grievance naming any of the
    defendants or mentioning any of the allegations in his complaint.
    In response, Jones moved for an evidentiary hearing. In that motion,
    he asserted that he did not file grievances on these claims against these
    defendants because he “was in fear of his life.” Because of threats made by
    the defendants, Jones felt “like his life is in danger if he goes through the
    4
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    grievance process.” 2 Jones then re-urged his request for production of
    documents to further substantiate his allegations.
    The district court reviewed the 200 pages of grievances offered by the
    defendants and concluded that Jones had not exhausted his administrative
    remedies. The district court also dismissed “Plaintiff’s concerns about
    retaliation” as irrelevant and incredible. The district court deemed the
    concerns irrelevant because the exhaustion requirement is mandatory, even
    in “‘special’ circumstances.” The district court doubted the credibility of
    Jones’s concerns because Jones’s “impressive record of filing grievances
    defies his claim he feared retaliation.” The district court granted summary
    judgment to the defendants and denied all pending motions—including
    Jones’s motion for discovery and for an evidentiary hearing—as moot. It
    dismissed the case with prejudice.
    The same day that the district court granted summary judgment,
    Jones’s response in opposition to summary judgment was stamped as filed by
    the district court clerk. The response, however, was recorded on the docket
    after the summary-judgment order. Compare Pro se Response to Motion,
    Jones v. Givens, No 5:19-CV-1270 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2019), ECF No. 30,
    with Memorandum Decision Order, id., ECF No. 27. The response once
    more emphasized Jones’s fear of retaliation should he pursue the grievance
    process. The response also re-urged Jones’s request for production of
    documents.
    2
    Jones raised his fear of retaliation to the district court several times. In his
    response to the defendants’ summary judgment motion—filed the same day as the district
    court’s order, April 24, 2019, twenty-five days after the defendants filed their motion for
    summary judgment—Jones argued that he did not exhaust administrative remedies
    because he feared retaliation. Jones then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the judgment,
    re-urging once more his fear of retaliation. The district court denied the Rule 59(e) motion
    for the reasons set forth in its summary-judgment order.
    5
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    Jones timely appealed. 3
    II.
    We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
    legal standards as the district court. Lexon Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
    No. 20-30173, 
    2021 WL 3282023
    , at *2 (5th Cir. 2021); Arnold v. Williams,
    
    979 F.3d 262
    , 271 (5th Cir. 2020). A party is not entitled to summary
    judgment unless “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    Accordingly, we will reverse summary judgment if the district court applied
    the wrong legal standard when determining whether the movant was
    “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; Nowlin v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 
    33 F.3d 498
    , 506 (5th Cir. 1994).
    The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires all federal or state
    prisoners to exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” for a
    claim before bringing that claim to federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This
    “exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether
    they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they
    allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 
    534 U.S. 516
    ,
    532 (2002). Jones alleges various forms of mistreatment by officers in the
    Connally state prison, and so his claims are subject to the exhaustion
    requirement. Cf. Alexander v. Tippah Cnty., 
    351 F.3d 626
    , 629–30 (5th Cir.
    2003).
    As the district court correctly noted, the exhaustion requirement in
    § 1997e is “mandatory,” “foreclosing judicial discretion” to excuse failure
    3
    The district court denied Jones’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
    A judge of this court, however, determined that Jones’s appeal was taken in good faith and
    granted in forma pauperis status to Jones.
    6
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    to exhaust, “irrespective of any ‘special circumstances.’” Ross v. Blake, 
    136 S. Ct. 1850
    , 1856–57 (2016). On this basis, the district court concluded that
    Jones’s “concerns about retaliation . . . , even if true, do not excuse his failure
    to utilize the grievance procedure.” This was error.
    Prisoners must exhaust all “administrative remedies [that] are
    available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has
    held that otherwise viable grievance procedures can be rendered
    “unavailable” to prisoners by the “machination, misrepresentation, or
    intimidation” of prison administrators. 4           Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1860.
    “[A]ppellate courts,” including ours, “have addressed a variety of instances
    in which officials misled or threatened individual inmates so as to prevent
    their use of otherwise proper procedures.” Id. at 1860 & n.3 (citing Davis v.
    Hernandez, 
    798 F.3d 290
    , 295 (5th Cir. 2015)).
    This case presents facts that, if true, very well might render the
    grievance system unavailable to Jones—i.e., that Hackett had already
    retaliated against him for reporting her and that the defendants have
    threatened harm against Jones should he use the prison grievance system to
    complain about their actions. Nevertheless, “[t]he district court did not
    apply the standard set forth in Ross for determining whether the
    administrative remedies unexhausted by [Jones] were ‘available’ to him.”
    Hinton v. Martin, 742 F. App’x 14, 15 (5th Cir. 2018). Nor did it allow any
    discovery on the issue, despite Jones’s repeated and specific requests for
    4
    The Supreme Court in Ross defined three categories of instances in which
    administrative remedies become unavailable: (1) “when (despite what regulations or
    guidance materials may promise) [the prison grievance procedure] operates as a simple
    dead end;” (2) when “an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes,
    practically speaking, incapable of use”; and (3) “when prison administrators thwart
    inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
    misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859–60.
    7
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    documents and video footage. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 324
    (1986) (noting that parties need not “produce evidence in a form that would
    be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment”); cf. Washington
    v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    901 F.2d 1281
    , 1287 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring specificity
    in discovery requests made in opposition to summary judgment). The
    district court’s incomplete analysis of the legal question before it “requires
    that we vacate the judgment below and remand to allow the District Court”
    to conduct the Ross analysis in the first instance “and, if necessary, hold an
    evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of [Jones’s] assertions.” Henry
    v. Van Cleve, 
    469 F.2d 687
    , 687–88 (5th Cir. 1972). 5
    *        *         *
    For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is
    VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    5
    The defendants ask that we affirm summary judgment on Jones’s due-process
    claim related to the alleged falsification of documents by Green on the alternative ground
    that “Jones[] has no free-standing constitutional right to be free from false disciplinary
    charges.” “The district court did not address this issue, and we decline to do so in the first
    instance,” particularly because of the scant record before us. Harrison v. Quarterman, 
    496 F.3d 419
    , 429 (5th Cir. 2007); Casados v. United States, 
    425 F.2d 723
    , 724 (5th Cir. 1970)
    (“On the scant record of the present appeal we are unable to resolve these questions, and
    conclude that the case should be remanded to the district court.”).
    The defendants also ask us to affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss Jones’s
    claims with, rather than without, prejudice. Because we vacate the district court’s
    summary-judgment order, we need not reach that issue.
    8