United States v. Nathaniel Manning , 605 F. App'x 189 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4947
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NATHANIEL SHAREEF MANNING,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:98-cr-00128-JAB-1)
Submitted: May 19, 2015 Decided: June 1, 2015
Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Eric Lloyd Iverson,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Nathaniel Shareef Manning appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing
him to 12 months’ imprisonment and 12 months of supervised
release. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the
sentence is substantively unreasonable. Following our careful
review of the record, we affirm.
A district court’s judgment revoking supervised release and
imposing a term of imprisonment is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th
Cir. 1999). The district court need only find a violation of a
condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the
evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); United States v.
Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Manning violated the conditions of his supervised release, as
the evidence presented at the hearing supported the district
court’s finding that Manning committed two new state crimes.
Counsel questions whether the sentence imposed is
reasonable. “A district court has broad discretion when
imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.”
United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We
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will affirm a revocation sentence if it falls within the
prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. Id.
In making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively unreasonable,
applying the same general considerations employed in review of
original criminal sentences. United State v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). Only if we find the sentence
unreasonable will we consider whether it is “plainly so.” Webb,
738 F.3d at 640 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
district court considered the Guidelines’ Chapter Seven advisory
policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors
applicable to the supervised release revocation context, see 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e); Webb, 738 F.3d at 641, and provided sufficient
explanation for the sentence imposed, see United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Our
review of the record reveals no procedural or substantive error
by the district court. We thus conclude that Manning’s sentence
is not plainly unreasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Manning, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Manning requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Manning.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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