Lester E. Rollins, Jr. v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections , 613 F. App'x 869 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-13318
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cv-02801-EAK-TGW
LESTER E. ROLLINS, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(June 3, 2015)
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Lester E. Rollins, Jr. appeals an order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.
In support, he argues that the state court threatened him at his change-of-plea
hearing by telling him that, if he chose not to plead guilty and went to trial, he
would face a 60-year maximum possible sentence, which would have been an
illegal sentence. Accordingly, he contends that the trial court coerced him into
pleading guilty, in violation of his right to due process.
We review the district court’s decision de novo, but we review the state
habeas court’s decision with deference. Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 593
F.3d 1217, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010). We may affirm the denial of a habeas petition
on any ground supported by the record. Trotter v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 535 F.3d
1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Under § 2254(d), a federal court may not grant habeas relief on claims that
were previously adjudicated in state court on the merits unless the state court’s
adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court holdings or
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A
state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent if
it arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a
question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme
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Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d
785, 817 (11th Cir. 2011).
When reviewing a state court’s decision applying federal law, a federal court
must not determine the accuracy of the result, but rather, whether the result was
unreasonable, which is “a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan,
550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1939, 167 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2007). A state court’s
determination of a factual issue is presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A summary disposition on the merits is entitled
to the same deference as if the state court had entered written findings to support
its decision. See Wright v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir.
2002).
Because a plea of guilty waives several constitutional rights, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the plea to be both
voluntary and knowing. Gaddy v. Linahan, 780 F.2d 935, 943 (11th Cir. 1986).
Before the district court accepts a guilty plea, there must be an affirmative showing
that the plea was intelligent and voluntary, and the waiver of constitutional rights
will not be presumed from a silent record. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-12, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). A guilty plea that is not
knowingly and voluntarily entered violates the Due Process Clause, and is,
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therefore, invalid. Id., 395 U.S. at 243 n.5, 89 S. Ct. at 1712 n.5. For a guilty plea
to be knowing and voluntary, the accused must understand the significance of the
waiver and the consequences of the plea. Id. at 243-44, 89 S.Ct. at 1712.
“Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant
threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality. The question of an
effective waiver of a federal constitutional right . . . is . . . governed by federal
standards.” Id. at 242-43, 89 S.Ct. at 1712. In order to ensure that a plea is
knowing and voluntary, the Court stated that trial courts should conduct an
“examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to
satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a
jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and
the permissible range of sentences.” Id. at 244 n.7, 89 S. Ct. at 1713 n.7.
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that multiple sentences imposed
pursuant to statutory habitual offender enhancement provisions cannot be ordered
to run consecutively if the underlying offenses arose from the same criminal
episode. Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521, 524-35 (Fla. 1993); see also Jackson v.
State, 659 So. 2d 1060, 1062-63 (Fla. 1995) (holding that courts could not impose
consecutive sentences for offenses rising out of a single criminal episode when one
sentence was enhanced under statutory habitual offender provisions and the other
sentence was enhanced under a different statutory section). A sentence imposed
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under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, Fla. Stat. § 775.082(9)
(“PRR”) is not “enhanced” within the meaning of Hale and Jackson, however, and
Florida trial courts may impose consecutive sentences when one sentence is
enhanced under the habitual offender statutory provisions and the other is imposed
as a PRR sentence. Cotto v. State, 139 So. 3d 283, 288-90 (Fla. 2014) (discussing
both Hale and Jackson in distinguishing PRR sentences from statutorily enhanced
sentences).
Contrary to Rollins’s argument, the state court correctly advised him that a
PRR sentence could be ordered to run consecutively to a sentence enhanced under
the habitual offender statute, and, therefore, the state court’s conclusion that the
court did not coerce him was reasonable. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44, 89 S. Ct. at
1712; Cotto, 139 So. 3d at 289-90. As such, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Rollins’s § 2254 petition.
AFFIRMED.
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