United States v. Stringer ( 2003 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-40936
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID STRINGER, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:01-CR-20-1
--------------------
January 21, 2003
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
David Stringer, Jr., appeals his jury convictions for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and
for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. He argues
that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence because the officers executing the search warrant
violated the “knock and announce” rule. The district court did
not err in determining that circumstances existed which permitted
officers to enter Stringer’s residence without knocking and
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-40936
-2-
announcing themselves, including information that Stringer
carried a handgun on his person during drug transactions, that
Stringer had a prior conviction for kidnaping, and that officers
reasonably believed that Stringer would have destroyed evidence
if the officers had announced their presence. See United States
v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 151 (5th Cir. 2000).
Stringer argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions. In view of the evidence presented at
trial, a rational jury could have found that Stringer conspired
with others to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and
that he possessed cocaine base with intent to distribute. See
United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1998).
Stringer argues that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence that Ahaa Williams, a Government witness,
tested positive for drug use on the day that she testified.
Because Williams’ trial testimony was cumulative and because
Williams has not shown that the newly discovered evidence would
probably have produced an acquittal, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Stringer’s motion for a new
trial. See United States v. Bowler, 252 F.3d 741, 747 (5th Cir.
2001).
AFFIRMED.