United States v. Rodriguez ( 1996 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 95-20534
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    TERESA RODRIGUEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. CR-H-94-216-1
    - - - - - - - - - -
    July 15, 1996
    Before SMITH, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Teresa Rodriguez appeals her conviction of mail and wire
    fraud and money-laundering.   She contends that the district court
    erred by rejecting her instructions regarding usury; that her
    conviction violated double jeopardy because of the civil
    forfeitures of her ranch and her residence; and that the district
    court erred by basing her offense level on $65 million rather
    than $12 million.
    *
    Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
    47.5.4.
    No. 95-20534
    - 2 -
    The district court’s instruction that a scheme to defraud
    must be reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary
    prudence and comprehension adequately addressed Rodriguez’s
    theory that her scheme could not have deceived a reasonable
    person.   The district court’s instruction also reflected a
    correct statement of the law.    See United States v. Finney, 
    714 F.2d 420
    , 423 (5th Cir. 1983).   The denial of Rodriguez’s
    proposed instructions was not an abuse of discretion.   See United
    States v. Pettigrew, 
    77 F.3d 1500
    , 1510 (5th Cir. 1996).
    Rodriguez has failed to brief whether the district court
    erred by denying her double jeopardy motion relative to the ranch
    property because the bankruptcy trustee was not an agent of the
    sovereign.   Nor has she briefed whether the district court erred
    by denying her motion relative to her residence because the
    forfeiture order was nonfinal.   She has abandoned any such
    contentions, Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987); because she has failed to brief
    these dispositive grounds for the denial of her motions, we need
    not consider the double jeopardy contentions she does raise.
    Finally, the district court did not err by applying the
    money-laundering guideline to determine her base offense level.
    See United States v. Leonard, 
    61 F.3d 1181
    , 1185 (5th Cir. 1995).
    AFFIRMED.