Karren v. EOG Resources Inc. , 170 F. App'x 926 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    March 24, 2006
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    __________________________                          Clerk
    No. 05-20254
    __________________________
    HOWARD KARREN; WALTER WILSON,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    EOG RESOURCES INC
    Defendant-Appellee.
    -----------------------------------------------------------------
    --
    CHRIS BRYAN; GEORGE UTHLAUT
    Plaintiffs-Appellants
    versus
    EOG RESOURCES INC
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ___________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the Southern District of Texas
    (No. 4:04-CV-1783)
    ___________________________________________________
    Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    1
    PER CURIAM:*
    The Appellants Harold Karren, Walter Wilson, Chris Bryan, and George Uthlaut were
    employees of Enron Oil & Gas Co., which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Enron until late 1995,
    at which time Enron deconsolidated Enron Oil & Gas Co. In 1999, Enron divested itself of its
    majority interest in Enron Oil & Gas Co. and the former subsidiary became EOG Resources, Inc.
    (“EOG”). While employed at Enron Oil & Gas Co. and EOG, The Appellants participated in various
    Enron Deferral Plans and the Enron Executive Supplemental Survivor Benefits (“ESB”) Plan.
    After their retirements, Karren and Wilson received benefits from Enron pursuant to the
    Deferral Plans until November 2001. They then received notices that no further benefits payments
    would be made due to Enron’s bankruptcy. EOG refused to make payments to the Appellants. Bryan
    also was informed that he would no longer receive payments under the Deferral Plans. Karren,
    Wilson, and Uthlaut later received information from the Enron bankruptcyproceedings indicating that
    their executive survivor benefits would not be paid to their beneficiaries after their deaths.
    In December 2003, Karren and Wilson brought suit against EOG for breach of contract,
    anticipatory breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and attorney’s fees. In April
    2004, Bryan and Uthlaut filed an identical suit. EOG removed both cases to the Southern District of
    Texas in 2004, and the district court granted an unopposed motion to consolidate the cases. The
    Appellants filed an amended complaint raising a claim that EOG has a duty to pay benefits under
    ERISA. In addition, they sought declaratory relief to ensure that their survivors would be paid death
    benefits under the ESB Plan. EOG filed a motion to dismiss all claims except those for Plan benefits,
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published
    and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    2
    which the district court granted on November 22, 2004. Both parties then filed motions for summary
    judgment on the remaining claims under ERISA. The district court granted EOG’s motion for
    summaryjudgment, denied the Appellants’ motion for summaryjudgment, and denied the Appellants’
    motion for reconsideration.
    The Appellants appeal only the grant of summary judgment on the ERISA claims and not the
    dismissal of their other claims. See Adams v. Unione Mediterranea di Sicurta, 
    364 F.3d 646
    , 653 (5th
    Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised or inadequately briefed on appeal are waived.”).
    DISCUSSION
    On appeal, the Appellants argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
    in favor of EOG with respect to the Deferral Plans and the ESB Plan because the record evidence
    raises a genuine fact issue concerning whether the term “employer” appearing in the Plans is
    ambiguous. However, the Appellants are precluded from raising this argument on appeal because they
    did not present this argument to the district court. Rather, when EOG filed a motion for summary
    judgment, the Appellants filed their own motion for summary judgment, arguing that the language
    of the Plans was clear, unambiguous, and dictated that the proper legal interpretation of the plan was
    that EOG is the employer responsible for paying the Appellants benefits. In particular, in their
    summary judgment motion, the Appellants stated that they were entitled to “benefits as a matter of
    law,” and EOG is “clearly” designated as responsible for funding the plans. Had the Appellants
    pursued their ambiguity claim, they would not have moved for summary judgment and would have
    argued that the interpretation of the terms was a question of fact for the fact finder. See Henley v.
    Edlemon, 
    297 F.3d 427
    , 430 (5th Cir. 2002) (“If a court determines that a contract is ambiguous,
    ‘summary judgment is inappropriate because the interpretation of a contract is a question of fact.’”
    3
    (quoting Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Murchison, 
    937 F.2d 204
    , 207 (5th Cir. 1991)).
    We see no “miscarriage of justice” in declining to review this issue not raised before the
    district court because we agree with the district court that the terms were unambiguous and did not
    provide that EOG was responsible for paying benefits under the Plans. See In re Goff, 
    812 F.2d 931
    ,
    933 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that the court “will consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal
    only if the issue is purely a legal issue and if consideration is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of
    justice”). At the district court, the Appellants had an opportunity to oppose EOG’s motion for
    summary judgment and pursue their argument that the terms were ambiguous and, therefore, a
    question of fact. They, instead, sought summary judgment, necessarily conceding that the terms were
    unambiguous and subject to one interpretation as a matter of law. On appeal, they had the
    opportunity to argue that the district court erred in its interpretation of the unambiguous terms of the
    Plans, and they chose not to do so. Instead, they argued a theory that they had never put before the
    district court.
    CONCLUSION
    Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s holding that the terms of the Deferral Plans and
    ESB Plan were unambiguous, and that the unambiguous meaning of the terms designated Enron, not
    EOG, as the entity responsible for paying benefits due under those Plans.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-20254

Citation Numbers: 170 F. App'x 926

Judges: Clement, DeMOSS, Jones, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 3/24/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023