Charles Rollison D O v. Joseph a Kingsbury D O ( 2015 )


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  •                            STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    CHARLES ROLLISON, D.O.,                                               UNPUBLISHED
    June 18, 2015
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                     No. 320599
    Genesee Circuit Court
    JOSEPH A. KINGSBURY, D.O.,                                            LC No. 11-096709-CZ
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: JANSEN, P.J., and SAWYER and FORT HOOD, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Defendant appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion
    for summary disposition, which would have dismissed the two remaining counts of plaintiff’s
    five-count complaint. We reverse and remand.
    Plaintiff was employed at Genesys Regional Medical Center as the Obstetrics and
    Gynecology Residency Program Director from 2006 until 2011. His most recent contract,
    covered the time period from 2009 until June 30, 2011. It provided for successive one-year
    renewals upon mutual agreement of the parties. In October 2010, he was notified by Dr. Linda
    Hotchkiss, Genesys’s Chief Learning Officer, that his contract was not going to be renewed.
    Thereafter, on January 15, 2011, plaintiff was informed that he was relieved of his duties and
    was not to return to the hospital, although he would be paid until the end-date of the contract.
    Meanwhile, after learning in October 2010 that his contract with the hospital would not
    be renewed, plaintiff began preparing to open his own private practice. He began the process to
    lease office space from Genesys on the first floor, referred to as Suite 1805. But, shortly after
    being relieved of his hospital responsibilities in January 2011, he was informed that Genesys
    could not lease that particular space to him because that area of the building had been financed
    by a public bond issue and could only be used for hospital purposes, not leased to a private
    practitioner.
    Plaintiff commenced this action, filing a five-count complaint. But only Counts II and III
    remain relevant to this appeal. Count II alleges tortious interference with contract and Count III
    alleges tortious interference with a business relationship. Turning first to Count II, while the trial
    court is correct that there is a great deal of facts presented by both sides, often contradictory, and
    that this is a very fact-intensive case, it is nevertheless easily resolved. As this Court stated in
    Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Services, Inc, 
    268 Mich. App. 83
    , 89-90;
    -1-
    706 NW2d 843 (2005), the “elements of tortious interference with a contract are (1) the existence
    of a contract, (2) a breach of the contract, and (3) an unjustified instigation of the breach by the
    defendant.” As defendant points out in his brief, this claim must fail because there was no
    breach of the contract. Although plaintiff was relieved of his responsibilities at the hospital
    before the end of the contract, he was continued to be paid under the contract. That is, plaintiff
    points to no benefit that was due him under the contract that he did not receive. His only claim
    of tortious interference was in the non-renewal of the contract.
    As this Court observed in Health 
    Call, 268 Mich. App. at 91
    n 3, a claim of tortious
    interference with a contract requires a breach of the contract:
    To the extent that plaintiff claims tortious interference with a contract, as
    opposed to interference with a business relationship or expectancy, against
    Atrium and Borner as it relates solely and directly to the home nursing contract,
    the claim cannot survive because there is no assertion that Williams breached the
    home nursing contract.
    Thus, even accepting that plaintiff in this case can establish that defendant acted wrongfully in
    preventing the renewal of plaintiff’s contract with Genesys, there was no breach of the contract.
    Thus, at most, such conduct by defendant could potentially support a claim for tortious
    interference with a business relationship or expectancy, but not with tortious interference with a
    contract. Accordingly, the trial court should have granted summary disposition as to Count II.
    Thus, we must turn to Count III and plaintiff’s claim of tortious interference with a
    business relationship or expectancy. Health 
    Call, 268 Mich. App. at 90
    , sets forth the
    requirements to establish this claim:
    The elements of tortious interference with a business relationship or
    expectancy are (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy
    that is not necessarily predicated on an enforceable contract, (2) knowledge of the
    relationship or expectancy on the part of the defendant interferer, (3) an
    intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach or
    termination of the relationship or expectancy, and (4) resulting damage to the
    party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted.
    With respect to this claim, plaintiff only pled tortious interference with his seeking to rent Suite
    1805 as well as not receiving “staff call” work. He made no allegations under this count with
    respect to the non-renewal of the employment contract. Therefore, we will examine only
    whether summary disposition was appropriate with respect to the rental of Suite 1805 and the
    staff call work.
    And in this regard, plaintiff points to no evidence that establishes such a claim. Plaintiff
    offers a motive, that the office space was directly across the hall from defendant’s own practice
    and would not want the competition from plaintiff, but little else. Plaintiff points to no evidence
    to establish that defendant even knew about plaintiff’s efforts to rent Suite 1805, much less any
    evidence to establish that defendant took action to prevent it. But, contrary to plaintiff’s
    argument, a motive alone does not establish circumstantial evidence from which a jury could
    -2-
    reasonably conclude that defendant tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s attempts to rent Suite
    1805. Indeed, even if we accept plaintiff’s argument that Genesys’s stated reason for being
    unable to rent the space to him, because of the public financing of the space, was untrue, one
    could also make the argument that perhaps Genesys, having terminated its employment
    relationship with plaintiff, simply did not want to establish his practice on the premises.
    Similarly, with respect to not receiving “staff call” work, plaintiff points to no evidence
    regarding defendant’s role in denying any staff call work. Indeed, defendant alleges that plaintiff
    never actually made a request to take staff call work.
    Accordingly, the trial court should have dismissed Count III as well.
    For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant
    summary disposition on Counts II and III. We reverse the trial court and remand the matter for
    entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction. Defendant
    may tax costs.
    /s/ Kathleen Jansen
    /s/ David H. Sawyer
    /s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 320599

Filed Date: 6/18/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021