Emerald City Management, L.L.C v. Jordan Ka , 624 F. App'x 223 ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-40856      Document: 00513304040         Page: 1    Date Filed: 12/11/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT     United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 11, 2015
    No. 14-40856
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    EMERALD CITY MANAGEMENT, L.L.C.; EMERALD CITY BAND,
    INCORPORATED,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees
    v.
    JORDAN KAHN; JORDAN KAHN MUSIC COMPANY, L.L.C.,
    Defendants - Appellants
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:14-CV-358
    Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Jordan Kahn appeals the district court’s grant of a preliminary
    injunction preventing Kahn from using the name, “Downtown Fever,” in the
    state of Texas. Kahn first operated a band under the name Downtown Fever
    in Boston, Massachusetts. Subsequently, he moved to Dallas, Texas, to work
    for plaintiff-appellee Emerald City Management, L.L.C. (“Emerald City”).
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-40856     Document: 00513304040    Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/11/2015
    No. 14-40856
    Emerald City hired Kahn to serve, among other things, as the band leader of
    a new band Emerald City had decided to form. Kahn suggested the new band
    be named Downtown Fever and Emerald City agreed, later registering the
    name as a trademark in Texas. After several years, Kahn resigned from
    Emerald City and attempted to market his own Downtown Fever band in the
    Dallas area, directly in competition with Emerald City’s Downtown Fever
    band. Emerald City petitioned the district court for a preliminary injunction
    to block Kahn from using the name Downtown Fever in Texas and the district
    court granted the injunction. This appeal followed.
    We review a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse
    of discretion and its findings of fact for clear error. Paulsson Geophysical
    Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 
    529 F.3d 303
    , 306 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). A
    preliminary injunction requires a showing of (1) a substantial likelihood of
    success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm absent an
    injunction; (3) a balance of hardships favoring an injunction; and (4) no
    detriment to the public interest. Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular
    Health Scis., L.L.C., 
    710 F.3d 579
    , 582 (5th Cir. 2013). We see no abuse of
    discretion or clear error in the district court’s determination that each
    requirement is satisfied here.
    Kahn’s principal argument on appeal is that the district court improperly
    presumed a threat of irreparable harm solely from a likelihood of confusion in
    the Texas market. We need not consider the validity of that presumption,
    however, because the record before us supports a finding of a substantial threat
    of irreparable harm.    See 
    Paulsson, 529 F.3d at 313
    (declining to decide
    whether presumption applies because record indicated that district court’s
    finding of irreparable harm was not clear error). “The absence of an available
    remedy by which the movant can later recover monetary damages may be
    sufficient to show irreparable injury.” 
    Id. at 312
    (alterations and quotation
    2
    Case: 14-40856    Document: 00513304040     Page: 3   Date Filed: 12/11/2015
    No. 14-40856
    marks omitted). In Paulsson, we held that damage could not be fully repaired
    by monetary remedies where the small community of the plaintiff’s potential
    customers may have been confused by the defendants providing services under
    the plaintiff’s mark; there was a threat to the goodwill and value of the
    plaintiff’s mark because the defendants were continuing to use the mark while
    modifying the product associated with it; and any damage to goodwill could not
    be quantified. 
    Id. at 313;
    see also Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 
    369 F.3d 700
    , 726 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Grounds for irreparable injury include loss of control
    of reputation, loss of trade, and loss of goodwill.” (citation omitted)); Re/Max
    N. Cent., Inc. v. Cook, 
    272 F.3d 424
    , 432 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The most corrosive
    and irreparable harm attributable to trademark infringement is the inability
    of the victim to control the nature and quality of the defendants’ goods.”
    (citation omitted)). Here, the evidence supports finding that Emerald City has
    developed goodwill for the Downtown Fever name in Texas over the course of
    several years; that Kahn intends to play as Downtown Fever in the Dallas area
    in the immediate future; and that Kahn has contacted customers of Emerald
    City informing them of his band by the same name and has sought business
    from those customers. Not only has the existence of two bands by the name
    Downtown Fever in the Dallas area caused confusion, but Emerald City has no
    means of managing the content and quality of Kahn’s Downtown Fever band,
    and thereby has lost control over the mark’s reputation and goodwill. Since
    the damage caused by Emerald City’s loss of control over the Downtown Fever
    mark cannot be quantified, the district court did not clearly err in finding a
    substantial risk of irreparable harm.
    Kahn also argues that Emerald City has not shown a likelihood of
    success on the merits because Emerald City did not adopt the Downtown Fever
    mark in good faith, as is required when a junior user seeks to enjoin a senior
    user’s use of a mark. See Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co.,
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    332 F.3d 264
    , 271 (4th Cir. 2003). The record, however, abundantly supports
    a finding of good faith. There is credible evidence that Kahn agreed to Emerald
    City’s use of the name Downtown Fever in Texas and there is no evidence
    Emerald City intended to benefit from any goodwill Kahn may have
    established for the name Downtown Fever in Boston. The district court did
    not err in finding a likelihood of success on the merits.
    After considering the written and oral arguments of the parties and the
    evidence of record, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for the
    reasons described above.
    4