Obadiah Fontaine v. Sport City Toyota , 544 F. App'x 529 ( 2013 )


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  •      Case: 13-10304      Document: 00512432504         Page: 1    Date Filed: 11/06/2013
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 13-10304                               November 6, 2013
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    OBADIAH LEVI FONTAINE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    SPORT CITY TOYOTA,
    Defendant-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:11-CV-2400
    Before JOLLY, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Obadiah Levi Fontaine filed a Title VII civil rights complaint alleging
    that the defendant wrongfully terminated him for expressing his Christian
    beliefs.    Fontaine’s complaint was arbitrated pursuant to the Federal
    Arbitration Act, and the arbitrator determined that Fontaine had not
    demonstrated that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for his
    termination was pretextual. The district court denied Fontaine’s motion to
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-10304     Document: 00512432504      Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/06/2013
    No. 13-10304
    vacate the award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2), rejecting Fontaine’s claim that
    there was evident partiality on the part of the arbitrator. Fontaine now moves
    for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal to challenge the district
    court’s denial of his motion to vacate the award.
    When, as in this case, a district court certifies that an appeal is not taken
    in good faith, the appellant may either pay the filing fee or challenge the court’s
    certification decision. See Baugh v. Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997).
    Our inquiry into an appellant’s good faith “is limited to whether the appeal
    involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).”
    Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted). If we uphold the district court’s certification that the
    appeal is not taken in good faith, the appellant must pay the filing fee or,
    alternatively, we may dismiss the appeal sua sponte under 5th Circuit Rule
    42.2 if it is frivolous. 
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    & n.24.
    For the first time on appeal, Fontaine argues that the district court erred
    in denying his motion to vacate the arbitration award because the arbitrator
    was guilty of misconduct, see § 10(a)(3), and had exceeded her authority, see
    § 10(a)(4). We will not consider these newly raised issues. See Alford v. Dean
    Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
    975 F.2d 1161
    , 1163 (5th Cir. 1992).
    Fontaine reiterates his claim that the award should have been vacated
    under § 10(a)(2) because the arbitrator was not impartial. He contends that
    he provided the district court with 66 pages of “irrefutable documented
    evidence” of the arbitrator’s bias. Fontaine’s evidence, however, related to the
    merits of his claim, not the arbitrator’s bias. His belief that the weight of his
    evidence established the arbitrator’s bias fails to satisfy his “onerous burden”
    of demonstrating evident partiality. Householder Group v. Caughran, 354
    2
    Case: 13-10304    Document: 00512432504     Page: 3   Date Filed: 11/06/2013
    No. 13-10304
    F. App’x 848, 852 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v.
    New Century Mortg. Corp., 
    476 F.3d 278
    , 281-83 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
    Because Fontaine has failed to raise a nonfrivolous issue for appeal, see
    
    Howard, 707 F.2d at 220
    , we DENY his motion for leave to proceed IFP on
    appeal and DISMISS his appeal as frivolous, see 
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    n.24;
    5th Cir. R. 42.2.
    3