William Ackerman v. Mercy Behavior Health , 617 F. App'x 114 ( 2015 )


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  • DLD-257                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 15-1822
    ___________
    WILLIAM J. ACKERMAN,
    Appellant
    v.
    MERCY BEHAVIOR HEALTH; RAYMOND WOLFE
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 2:15-cv-00304)
    District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    June 25, 2015
    Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: June 30, 2015)
    _________
    OPINION*
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    Pro se appellant William James Ackerman appeals from the District Court’s order
    dismissing his complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Because
    we agree with the District Court and conclude that this appeal lacks arguable merit, we
    will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
    On March 4, 2015, Ackerman commenced this civil action by filing a motion to
    proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and attaching a form complaint which named Mercy
    Behavior Health and Raymond Wolfe as Defendants. This civil action is the sixth civil
    action Ackerman has instituted in the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Pennsylvania since December of 2012, 1 and the third suit brought against these
    Defendants. The District Court evaluated Ackerman’s financial status and, after
    determining that Ackerman was unable to pay the requisite filing fee, granted
    Ackerman’s motion to proceed IFP.
    The District Court then screened Ackerman’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
    1915(e)(2). As with previous complaints Ackerman had filed, the District Court
    1
    Ackerman initiated the following civil actions between December of 2012 and
    March of 2013: (1) Ackerman v. Mercy Behavior Health, et al., Civ. No. 2:12-cv-01807-
    TFM; (2) Ackerman v. Mental Health Court, Civ. No. 2:13-cv-00173-TFM; (3)
    Ackerman v. Western Psychiatric Institute Clinic, et al., Civ. No. 2:13-cv-00388-TFM;
    (4) Ackerman v. Office of Behavior Health, et al., Civ. No. 2:13-cv-00417-TFM; and (5)
    Ackerman v. Mercy Behavior Health, et al., Civ. No. 2:14-cv-01199.
    The complaint in No. 12-1807 was dismissed without prejudice for failure to serve
    the defendants within 120 days pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The
    complaints in Nos. 13-173, 13-388, 13-417, and 14-1199 were all dismissed without
    prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Ackerman’s appeal from
    the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint as frivolous in No. 14-1199 was
    pending when he filed this civil action. See C.A. No. 14-4036.
    2
    concluded that there was “no logical construction of the [c]omplaint from which to derive
    a viable legal claim against the named Defendants[.]” Accordingly, the District Court
    dismissed Ackerman’s complaint without prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
    1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
    Ackerman filed a timely notice of appeal. When he was granted leave to proceed
    in forma pauperis on appeal, Ackerman was notified that his appeal was subject to
    dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or summary affirmance pursuant to Third Circuit
    Local Appellate Rule 27.4 and I.O.P 10.6. Ackerman was invited to submit written
    argument in support of his appeal, and he has done so. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1291, 2 and we review the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint as
    frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for abuse of discretion. See Denton v.
    Hernandez, 
    504 U.S. 25
    , 33 (1992).
    The “prescreening” provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act authorize a
    district court to dismiss an action sua sponte under the federal IFP statute, codified at 28
    U.S.C. § 1915, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
    2
    “Generally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final
    nor appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting
    the cause of action. Only if the plaintiff cannot amend or declares his intention to stand
    on his complaint does the order become final and appealable.” Borelli v. City of
    Reading, 
    532 F.2d 950
    , 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Although the dismissal in
    this case was without prejudice, the District Court specifically found that Ackerman
    could not cure the deficiencies of the complaint by amendment. See Grayson v.
    Mayview State Hospital, 
    293 F.3d 103
    , 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, we have jurisdiction
    over this appeal.
    3
    relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
    such relief. Ball v. Famiglio, 
    726 F.3d 448
    , 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. §
    1915(e)(2)(B). Generally, a complaint may be dismissed as frivolous “where it lacks an
    arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 325 (1989).
    A claim is considered factually frivolous where “the facts alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’”
    a standard that encompasses allegations that are “‘fanciful,’ … ‘fantastic,’ … and
    ‘delusional[.]’” 
    Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33
    (citing 
    Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325
    , 327-28). It
    is appropriate to make a finding of factual frivolousness “when the facts alleged rise to
    the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]” 
    Denton, 504 U.S. at 33
    .
    We agree that the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, and we
    therefore hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Ackerman’s
    complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See 
    Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325
    . The complaint asserts that the District Court had federal question jurisdiction
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the basis of “all the mental health, whistleblower laws,
    civil rights, ADA act [sic], labor laws, [and] any laws Mercy thinks they can get away
    with[.]” Ackerman broadly alleges that his claims arise from the manner in which he and
    other patients are treated while in the care of Mercy Behavior Health. However,
    Ackerman does not provide factual allegations from which we can infer a viable legal
    claim. While he asserts that he has witnessed staff from Mercy Behavior Health mentally
    abuse patients and have sex with patients, Ackerman does not provide names, dates, or
    4
    any further details to support those allegations, nor does he allege that he has been
    harmed in any way by staff at Mercy Behavior Health. Rather, he moves on to describe
    Mercy’s alleged failure to provide patients with voting rights, job rights, a newspaper,
    and a new building. Ackerman also states that he seeks to end all of Mercy’s acts of
    slavery toward patients. As relief, he seeks five to twenty-five million dollars, as well as
    a new building, new vans, a smoke room, back pay, a patient advocate, a church, a mental
    health library, a patient leadership program, staff training on sexual abuse, voluntary
    polygraph testing, and the formation of a patient union.
    The precise legal claim Ackerman is attempting to assert in the complaint is
    difficult to decipher. The complaint is unfocused and disjointed; even construing the
    complaint liberally, we find no factual allegations from which we can reasonably infer
    that Ackerman has (or could have) an actionable claim for relief. 3 Rather, his allegations
    squarely fit within the class of “clearly baseless” allegations that a District Court may
    dismiss as factually frivolous. See 
    Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33
    . Accordingly, we agree
    with the District Court that there is no logical construction of the complaint from which
    to derive a viable legal claim, and we hold that the District Court did not abuse its
    3
    We have thoroughly reviewed all of the submissions filed by Ackerman in support
    of his appeal and find that none of these documents address the issues relevant to the
    appeal, which concerns the propriety of the District Court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
    1915(e)(2)(B)(i). One of Ackerman’s submissions is almost entirely a list of proposed
    polygraph questions for employees of Defendant Mercy Behavior Health. The remaining
    submissions are rambling, disjointed, and difficult to decipher – much like the complaints
    and written submissions Ackerman has filed in the District Court and in this Court in
    each of his various civil actions and appeals.
    5
    discretion by dismissing the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
    As there is no arguable basis for this appeal, we will dismiss the appeal pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-1822

Citation Numbers: 617 F. App'x 114

Filed Date: 6/30/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023