United States v. Manuel Aguilar , 617 F. App'x 603 ( 2015 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 14-3229
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Manuel Maldonado Aguilar
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock
    ____________
    Submitted: May 11, 2015
    Filed: July 2, 2015
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Manuel Maldonado Aguilar (Maldonado) was convicted by a jury of conspiracy
    to possess with intent to distribute at least five but less than fifty grams of
    methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A).1
    On appeal, Maldonado argues that the district court2 erred in denying his motion for
    judgment of acquittal and in calculating the amount of methamphetamine attributable
    to him. We affirm.
    The facts elicited at Maldonado’s trial are presented in the light most favorable
    to the jury’s verdict. See United States v. Castillo, 
    713 F.3d 407
    , 411 (8th Cir. 2013).
    In August 2011, Arkansas police conducted a traffic-violation stop of a Jeep being
    driven by Julio Rapan. Rapan consented to a search of the Jeep, and officers
    discovered approximately 4.6 kilograms of methamphetamine hidden in the vehicle’s
    spare tire.     Rapan agreed to cooperate in a controlled delivery of the
    methamphetamine. Rapan was fitted with a recording device and was told by his
    supplier in a recorded call to meet Oswaldo Larranaga Lizarraga (Larranaga) in a
    drug-store parking lot in Little Rock, where officers were positioned to observe the
    transaction. Rapan drove to the meeting place and parked the Jeep. Shortly thereafter,
    officers observed two Hispanic males, later identified as Maldonado and Larranaga,
    arrive in a Dodge and park next to Rapan. Officers ran the license plate of the Dodge
    and learned that it was registered to Maldonado at a residence on Mansfield Drive.
    Additional officers were dispatched to monitor the Mansfield Drive residence.
    In the meantime, Larranaga exited the Dodge and entered the Jeep, while
    Maldonado remained behind the wheel of the Dodge. Rapan then complied with
    Larranaga’s direction to drive the Jeep to a nearby restaurant, with Maldonado
    1
    This was Maldonado’s second jury trial on these charges. Maldonado appealed
    the guilty verdict in his first trial, and a panel of this court reversed his conviction and
    remanded for a new trial after concluding that Maldonado was prejudiced by an
    alternate juror’s presence in the jury room during deliberations. See United States v.
    Aguilar, 
    752 F.3d 1148
    , 1149 (8th Cir. 2014).
    2
    The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the Eastern District of Arkansas.
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    following them in the Dodge. During this short drive, Rapan’s recording device
    captured Larranaga explaining that he was going to “unload the [Jeep]” and
    instructing Rapan to wait at the restaurant for Larranaga to return with the Jeep.
    When the Jeep and the Dodge arrived at the restaurant parking lot, Rapan exited the
    Jeep and went into the restaurant, and Larranaga moved into the driver’s seat of the
    Jeep and drove away from the restaurant. Maldonado followed in the Dodge.
    The two vehicles traveled in tandem for several miles, until their paths diverged
    at a stop sign. Although both vehicles eventually arrived at the Mansfield Drive
    residence and parked in the driveway, the Jeep took a more direct route to the
    residence and arrived first, while the Dodge took a more circuitous route through the
    surrounding neighborhood before pulling into the driveway behind the Jeep. An
    officer explained at trial that by taking this indirect route to the Mansfield Drive
    residence, Maldonado engaged in a “heat run,” the purpose of which was to try and
    detect whether he was being followed by law enforcement.
    Shortly after Maldonado arrived at the Mansfield Drive residence, officers
    converged on the scene, entered the residence to secure it, and arrested Larranaga and
    Maldonado. Maldonado consented to a search of the residence, and officers recovered
    approximately $46,000 from a shoebox in the master bedroom closet; a loaded .22-
    caliber revolver from a master bedroom night stand; an electronic scale from a kitchen
    utility closet, later testing of which revealed the presence of methamphetamine; and
    several spare tires and tire-disassembly tools from the back yard. Maldonado
    disavowed ownership of the $46,000, telling officers that he was holding the money
    for a friend whose name he could not recall.
    Maldonado moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s
    evidence and again at the close of all the evidence, arguing that the government had
    failed to prove that he had conspired with Rapan and Larranaga to possess with intent
    to distribute the methamphetamine recovered from the Jeep. The district court
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    overruled both motions, concluding that “the government has put on enough evidence
    for the case to go to the jury.” After several hours of deliberation, the jury found
    Maldonado guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five but
    less than fifty grams of methamphetamine. Based on the jury-found quantity of
    methamphetamine, Maldonado faced a statutory minimum sentence of five years and
    a statutory maximum sentence of forty years in prison under § 841(b)(1)(B). The
    Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), however, attributed to Maldonado the entire
    4.6-kilogram quantity of methamphetamine recovered from the Jeep, leading to a base
    offense level of 38 under § 2D1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
    (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines), which, coupled with a Category I criminal history score,
    resulted in an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 235 to 293 months’
    imprisonment. Neither party objected to the facts set forth in the PSR, and the district
    court “adopt[ed] the report as written.” Maldonado argued for a departure or variance
    from the Guidelines range, asserting as relevant here that his role in the conspiracy
    was limited and that the entire 4.6-kilogram quantity of methamphetamine was not
    foreseeable to him. The district court rejected Maldonado’s arguments and sentenced
    him to 235 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the advisory Guidelines sentencing
    range.
    Maldonado first argues that the district court erred in denying his motions for
    judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence on which a reasonable
    juror could find him guilty of conspiracy. We review de novo the denial of a motion
    for judgment of acquittal and will affirm if any rational jury could have found the
    evidence sufficient to prove the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a
    reasonable doubt. United States v. Aponte, 
    619 F.3d 799
    , 804 (8th Cir. 2010). We
    view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and accept all
    reasonable inferences that support the verdict. 
    Id. To prove
    the conspiracy, the
    government was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Maldonado
    reached an agreement with at least one other person to possess the methamphetamine
    with intent to distribute, that Maldonado voluntarily and intentionally entered into the
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    agreement, and that Maldonado knew the essential purpose of the agreement when he
    entered into it. United States v. Jackson, 
    610 F.3d 1038
    , 1044 (8th Cir. 2010).
    Conspiracy may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence, see 
    id., and a
    defendant who played only a minor role may nevertheless be convicted “so long as the
    government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he . . . was a member of the
    conspiracy,” United States v. Lopez, 
    443 F.3d 1026
    , 1030 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
    The evidence set forth above was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude
    that Maldonado, Rapan, and Larranaga had a common purpose and plan to deliver the
    methamphetamine in the Jeep to Maldonado’s residence and to “unload” the
    methamphetamine there for further distribution. Contrary to his assertions on appeal,
    Maldonado did more than simply provide Larranaga with a ride to pick up the Jeep
    at the drug store. Maldonado followed the Jeep from the drug-store parking lot to the
    restaurant, waited for Larranaga to take control of the Jeep, followed the Jeep for
    several miles after it left the restaurant, and engaged in a “heat run” before eventually
    parking behind the Jeep at his Mansfield Drive residence. Moreover, the spare tires
    and tire-disassembly tools, the electronic scales with methamphetamine residue, and
    the dubiously explained $46,000 in cash recovered from Maldonado’s residence
    constitute further evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
    Maldonado was a knowing participant in the conspiracy to possess and distribute the
    methamphetamine. Considering the evidence presented at Maldonado’s trial in its
    entirety, see 
    Jackson, 610 F.3d at 1044
    , and keeping in mind our “very strict” standard
    of review, United States v. Malloy, 
    614 F.3d 852
    , 861 (8th Cir. 2010) (citations
    omitted), we cannot say that no reasonable jury could have found Maldonado guilty
    of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court thus did not err
    in denying Maldonado’s motions for judgment of acquittal.
    Maldonado next argues that his sentence is “invalid” because the government
    presented no evidence and the district court made no finding that the conspiracy’s 4.6
    kilograms of methamphetamine were foreseeable to him. This argument is without
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    merit. A conspiracy defendant’s drug-quantity objection requires the district court to
    determine whether the quantity attributed by the PSR was reasonably foreseeable to
    him. United States v. Montanye, 
    996 F.2d 190
    , 192 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). In the
    absence of such an objection, the district court is under no obligation to make
    foreseeability findings. 
    Id. Similarly, “the
    Government’s obligation to present
    evidence in support of a PSR’s factual statements,” including drug quantity, “only
    arises for the facts the defendant disputes.” 
    Id. at 193.
    As noted above, Maldonado
    did not object to the drug quantity attributed to him in the PSR, and the district court
    adopted the PSR—including the drug quantity attributed to Maldonado—in its
    entirety. We conclude that the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in
    sentencing Maldonado. See 
    id. at 192
    (noting that plain-error review applies when
    issues are not raised in district court); United States v. Douglas, 
    646 F.3d 1134
    , 1137
    (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that a court may accept as true facts in PSR to which defendant
    did not object).
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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