Arthur Brennan Malloy v. USA , 609 F. App'x 626 ( 2015 )


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  •            Case: 14-15298   Date Filed: 07/09/2015   Page: 1 of 3
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-15298
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-01777-SLB-TMP
    ARTHUR BRENNAN MALLOY,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF NAVAL RECORDS,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (July 9, 2015)
    Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 14-15298     Date Filed: 07/09/2015    Page: 2 of 3
    Arthur Malloy, an Alabama prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
    court’s dismissal of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     habeas corpus petition related to his other
    than honorable discharge from the military in 1965. Malloy asserts the district
    court erred in dismissing his § 2241 petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
    because he did not meet the “in custody” definition of § 2241.
    We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a habeas petition for lack
    of jurisdiction. Taylor v. United States, 
    396 F.3d 1322
    , 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). To
    bring a federal habeas action, a petitioner must be “in custody in violation of the
    Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    (c)(3). The
    Supreme Court has interpreted § 2241 as requiring that a habeas petitioner be “in
    custody” under the conviction or sentence that he seeks to attack at the time when
    his petition is filed. Carafas v. LaVallee, 
    391 U.S. 234
    , 238 (1968). The Supreme
    Court has also recognized habeas actions brought pursuant to § 2241 may be
    appropriate where “members of the armed services . . . have been unlawfully
    detained, restrained, or confined” by the military. Schlanger v. Seamans, 
    401 U.S. 487
    , 489 (1971). Although a petitioner can challenge his other than honorable
    discharge from the military in district court and seek declaratory judgment, § 2241
    is not the proper vehicle for bringing such a claim. See Harmon v. Brucker, 
    355 U.S. 579
    , 580-83 (1958) (finding the district court had jurisdiction to review
    petitioners’ actions seeking declaratory judgments that the Secretary of Army’s
    2
    Case: 14-15298    Date Filed: 07/09/2015   Page: 3 of 3
    issuance of other than honorable discharge certificates were void and in excess of
    his powers).
    The district court did not err in dismissing Malloy’s claim for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction. Malloy is not challenging his conviction or sentence related to
    his confinement in Alabama state prison, and he is not detained, restrained, or
    confined by the military. Thus, he does not meet the “in custody” definition of
    § 2241. Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-15298

Citation Numbers: 609 F. App'x 626

Filed Date: 7/9/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023