Thakuri v. Lynch , 617 F. App'x 69 ( 2015 )

14-2276
Thakuri v. Lynch
BIA
Vomacka, IJ
A089 255 599
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 13th day of July, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
JON O. NEWMAN,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
NIRMALA SINGH THAKURI,
Petitioner,
v. 14-2276
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New
York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Nancy Friedman,
Senior Litigation Counsel;
Virginia Lum, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Nirmala Singh Thakuri, a native and citizen
of Nepal, seeks review of a May 27, 2014, decision of the
BIA affirming a January 13, 2012, decision of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”), denying Thakuri’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Nirmala Singh Thakuri, No.
A089 255 599 (B.I.A. May 27, 2014), aff’g No. A089 255 599
(Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Jan. 13, 2012). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of
completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448
F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of
review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu
Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances,” base a credibility finding on an asylum
applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of her account, and
inconsistencies in her statements and other record evidence
“without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the
applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. Substantial evidence supports the
agency’s determination that Thakuri was not credible.
The agency reasonably relied on Thakuri’s inconsistent
evidence regarding whether she missed nine days or more than
one month of a taxidermy certification program after she was
purportedly kidnapped by Maoists. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d
at 164-67. Her explanations for this inconsistency were not
compelling, and her testimony concerning the school’s
certificate and letters of completion (received despite her
failure to complete the program) was evasive and
inconsistent. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 &
n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). These inconsistencies reasonably call
into question whether Thakuri was, as she alleged, in hiding
during this time.
Thakuri also made inconsistent statements regarding
whether her parents remained in fear of Maoists in Nepal or
whether they were living safely in England. And the agency
reasonably found implausible that Thakuri had not learned
her parents’ whereabouts from her sister when they discussed
their parents’ well-being. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d
160, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (implausibility finding
reasonable if supported “by record facts, or even a single
fact, viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary
experience”).
The agency’s adverse view of Thakuri’s credibility was
also reasonably supported by the suspicious circumstances
concerning two letters she presented that purported to
support her claim of being kidnapped by Nepal Communist
Party Maoists. One letter (CAR 282) was allegedly signed by
a Deputy General Secretary of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party
Nepal; the other letter (CAR 283) was allegedly signed by
the President of the Himalayan Fauna & Taxidermy museum.
Both letters misspelled “Maoists”, rendering it in identical
spelling and capitalization as “(MOISTS)”.
The IJ rhetorically asked, “How could two separate
people, one of them the leader of a political party that is
desperately opposed to the Maoists, the other a
schoolteacher, manage to misspell this word in exactly the
same way?” The IJ then reasonably answered, “The Court
thinks the clear answer for most people would be that, in
fact, these letters were written by the same person, not the
party secretary and not the schoolteacher, but someone else
who prepared these letters as evidence of the respondent's
claim.” CAR 91-92.
Having questioned Thakuri’s credibility, the agency
reasonably relied further on her failure to provide credible
evidence corroborating her claims. See Biao Yang v.
Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Given the
inconsistency, implausibility, and corroboration findings,
the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported
by substantial evidence, and is dispositive of Thakuri’s
claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Paul v. Gonzales, 444
F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk