People v. Aguilera CA2/5 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Filed 9/13/21 P. v. Aguilera CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    THE PEOPLE,                                                      B308311
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BA352700)
    v.
    EDUARDO AGUILERA,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Affirmed.
    Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
    Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    __________________________
    Eduardo Aguilera appeals from the trial court’s order
    denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
    1170.95 for his prior convictions of attempted murder and
    voluntary manslaughter.1 He contends the trial court erred in
    concluding section 1170.95 does not apply to his attempted
    murder and voluntary manslaughter convictions. He also argues
    the court’s denial of his petition violated his rights to equal
    protection and due process under the federal and California
    constitutions. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In 2009, appellant was charged with murder and other
    crimes based on a drive-by shooting. Appellant later pled no
    contest to attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and
    voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), and admitted to gang
    (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and principal gun use allegations
    (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). The trial court sentenced him to 20 years
    in state prison.
    In 2019, appellant petitioned for resentencing under section
    1170.95. The petition stated appellant “pled guilty or no contest
    to 1st or 2nd degree murder in lieu of going to trial . . . .” The court
    appointed counsel for appellant. The People filed an “opposition
    to prima facie finding of eligibility for resentencing,” and pointed
    out that contrary to the petition, defendant pled guilty to
    attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter. Appellant’s
    counsel filed a reply. The trial court denied the petition on the
    ground that “section 1170.95 does not apply to either the offense
    of attempted murder or the offense of manslaughter, and
    [appellant] is therefore ineligible for relief.”
    1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    Appellant timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    1.     Section 1170.95 does not apply to convictions of
    attempted murder
    In support of his argument that section 1170.95 applies to
    attempted murder convictions, appellant cites to People v.
    Medrano (2019) 
    42 Cal.App.5th 1001
    , review granted March 11,
    2020, S259948 (Medrano), People v. Larios (2019) 
    42 Cal.App.5th 956
    , review granted February 26, 2020, S259983 (Larios), and
    People v. Sanchez (2020) 
    46 Cal.App.5th 637
    , review granted
    June 10, 2020, S261768 (Sanchez). While these cases all
    conclude that Senate Bill No. 1437 applies to attempted murder
    on direct appeal, Medrano and Larios also held that defendants
    convicted of attempted murder are not eligible for resentencing
    under section 1170.95. (Medrano, at pp. 1015–1016; Larios, at
    pp. 968–970.) The court in Sanchez did not address the issue. By
    contrast, no appellate court has held that section 1170.95 applies
    to defendants convicted of attempted murder.
    According to the plain language of section 1170.95, the
    statute applies to “[a] person convicted of felony murder or
    murder under a natural and probable consequences theory”
    (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)), and not to petitioners seeking relief from a
    final conviction of attempted murder. (See People v. Harris
    (2021) 
    60 Cal.App.5th 557
    , 566, review granted Apr. 21, 2021,
    S267529 (Harris).) That limitation does not contravene
    constitutional equal protection guarantees. (See People v. Love
    (2020) 
    55 Cal.App.5th 273
    , 287, review granted Dec. 16, 2020,
    S265445; People v. Munoz (2019) 
    39 Cal.App.5th 738
    , 760, review
    granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258234; People v. Lopez (2019)
    3
    
    38 Cal.App.5th 1087
    , 1107–1112, review granted Nov. 13, 2019,
    S258175.)
    2.     Section 1170.95 does not apply to convictions of
    voluntary manslaughter
    The trial court’s conclusion that section 1170.95 does not
    apply to convictions of manslaughter has been endorsed by
    several recent Court of Appeal decisions. (Harris, supra,
    60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 565–569; People v. Paige (2020)
    
    51 Cal.App.5th 194
    , 200–204 (Paige); People v. Sanchez (2020)
    
    48 Cal.App.5th 914
    , 917–920 (Sanchez); People v. Turner (2020)
    
    45 Cal.App.5th 428
    , 434–438 (Turner); People v. Flores (2020)
    
    44 Cal.App.5th 985
    , 992–997 (Flores); People v. Cervantes (2020)
    
    44 Cal.App.5th 884
    , 887 (Cervantes).) We agree with our sister
    courts that “the language of the statute unequivocally applies to
    murder convictions. There is no reference in the statute to the
    crime of voluntary manslaughter. To be eligible to file a petition
    under section 1170.95, a defendant must have a first or second
    degree murder conviction. The plain language of the statute is
    explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions. [Citation.] [¶]
    . . . The plain reading of the statute is consistent with the
    legislative goal of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).
    That bill was enacted to correct the unfairness of the felony
    murder rule so that murder convictions could be vacated by filing
    section 1170.95 petitions. [Citations.] The felony murder rule,
    however, is not applicable to the crime of voluntary
    manslaughter.” (Cervantes, supra, at p. 887.)
    Appellant counters that he was initially charged with
    murder but pled guilty to manslaughter. He argues eligibility for
    resentencing under subdivision (a)(2) of the statute because he
    accepted “a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which he could be
    4
    convicted for first degree or second degree murder.”2 We agree
    with the Flores, Turner, Paige, Sanchez and Harris courts, all of
    which correctly rejected this argument. A manslaughter plea,
    even one entered when a defendant was originally charged with
    murder, does not fall within section 1170.95.
    3.    The exclusion of manslaughter from section 1170.95
    eligibility does not violate equal protection or due
    process
    Appellant argues that denying section 1170.95 relief to
    those convicted of voluntary manslaughter violates his federal
    and state constitutional rights to equal protection and due
    process. We disagree.
    The Legislature’s decision not to provide relief for
    defendants convicted of manslaughter does not offend equal
    protection principles. “[V]oluntary manslaughter, [is] a different
    crime from murder, [and] carries a different punishment.
    Normally ‘offenders who commit different crimes are not
    similarly situated’ for equal protection purposes. [Citation.]
    ‘[O]nly those persons who are similarly situated are protected
    from invidiously disparate treatment.’ [Citation.]” (Cervantes,
    supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 888; see also Harris, supra,
    60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 569–571; Paige, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 205–206; Sanchez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 920–921.)
    2      Section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2) provides: “The
    petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder
    following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which
    the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree
    murder.”
    5
    Nor does such an exclusion violate the right to due process.
    “ ‘[S]ubstantive due process requires a rational relationship
    between the objectives of a legislative enactment and the
    methods chosen to achieve those objectives.’ [Citation.] Here
    there was such a relationship. The legislative goal was to
    eliminate the sentencing disparity caused by the felony murder
    rule. That goal was properly achieved by the section 1170.95
    petition procedure to vacate those murder convictions.”
    (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 889.)
    4.     The trial court did not err in summarily denying the
    petition
    Here, the trial court properly denied relief because, having
    pled no contest to manslaughter and attempted murder,
    appellant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. Where
    a determination of eligibility does not require an inquiry into the
    underlying facts of the offenses, a trial court does not err by
    denying the petition without issuing an order to show cause. (Cf.
    People v. Lewis (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
    , 971.)
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying appellant’s section 1170.95 petition for
    resentencing is affirmed.
    RUBIN, P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    BAKER J.                       KIM, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B308311

Filed Date: 9/13/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/13/2021