Rogers Vann v. City of Southaven , 884 F.3d 307 ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 16-60561   Document: 00514372480     Page: 1   Date Filed: 03/05/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT      United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 5, 2018
    No. 16-60561
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    ROGERS VANN, As Personal Representative and on Behalf of the Wrongful
    Death Beneficiaries of Jeremy W. Vann,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    CITY OF SOUTHAVEN, MISSISSIPPI; LIEUTENANT JORDAN JONES,
    Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police Officer; SERGEANT
    BRETT YOAKUM, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police
    Officer; POLICE CHIEF TOM LONG, Individually and in His Official
    Capacity as a Police Officer and Chief of Police; SERGEANT JEFF LOGAN,
    Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police Officer,
    Defendants – Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
    Before SMITH, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel
    rehearing, the petition for panel rehearing is GRANTED. The panel opinion,
    Vann v. City of Southaven, 
    876 F.3d 133
     (5th Cir. 2017), is WITHDRAWN, and
    the following is substituted:
    Case: 16-60561      Document: 00514372480        Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/05/2018
    No. 16-60561
    This lawsuit arises from the death of Jeremy W. Vann, who was shot and
    killed by police in a retail parking lot in Southaven, Mississippi during a small-
    scale drug sting operation. During the encounter, Vann was shot by two
    officers, Sergeant Jeff Logan and Lieutenant Jordan Jones. Plaintiff sued the
    officers involved and the City of Southaven under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , claiming
    that the officers violated Vann’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
    unreasonable seizure, excessive force, and deadly force, and that the City had
    failed properly to train its officers and had permitted an official practice or
    custom that violated the constitutional rights of the public at large. The
    officers and the City simultaneously moved for summary judgment. 1 The
    district court granted the officers’ and the City’s summary-judgment motion.
    “This court reviews de novo the district court’s resolution of legal issues
    on a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.” Hanks
    v. Rogers, 
    853 F.3d 738
    , 743 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Griggs v. Brewer, 
    841 F.3d 308
    , 311 (5th Cir. 2016)). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is
    no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Griggs, 841 F.3d at 311–12); see
    also McClendon v. City of Columbia, 
    305 F.3d 314
    , 322 (5th Cir. 2002) (en
    banc). “[W]e view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
    and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Hanks, 853 F.3d at 743
    (quoting Griggs, 841 F.3d at 312); see also Tolan v. Cotton, 
    134 S. Ct. 1861
    ,
    1866 (2014) (“Our qualified-immunity cases illustrate the importance of
    drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant . . . .”).
    “A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment
    burden of proof. Once an official pleads the defense, the burden then shifts to
    1  The City and the officers were and continue to be represented by the same counsel
    in single briefs and motions.
    2
    Case: 16-60561     Document: 00514372480      Page: 3   Date Filed: 03/05/2018
    No. 16-60561
    the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue
    as to whether the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly
    established law.” Hanks, 853 F.3d at 744 (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v.
    Callahan, 
    623 F.3d 249
    , 253 (5th Cir. 2010)).
    With respect to Jones, one of the two officers who shot Vann, it is
    undisputed that Jones shot Vann after his colleague, Logan, was knocked to
    the ground by Vann’s car and as Vann’s car approached Logan for a second
    time. Under these circumstances, Jones’s use of force did not violate clearly
    established law.
    With respect to Logan, the other officer who shot Vann, even assuming
    arguendo that Logan used excessive force, the question then becomes, was
    there law that put Logan on notice that shooting in the situation presented
    violated the constitution? It is the plaintiff’s burden to find a case in his favor
    that does not define the law at a “high level of generality.” Cass v. City of
    Abilene, 
    814 F.3d 721
    , 732–33 (5th Cir. 2016). In the district court, Plaintiff,
    Vann’s representative, cited nary a pre-existing or precedential case. That
    alone dooms his case here. See id. at 733 (granting qualified immunity even
    though the defendant did not cite any cases in his favor to the district court
    because plaintiffs bears the burden of showing specific law on point). Even on
    appeal, Plaintiff fails to cite a case on point from this court or the Supreme
    Court that helps his case, instead relying on an out-of-circuit case.
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    to Jones, Logan, Yoakum, and Long. In addition, finding no error in the district
    court’s analysis regarding the City, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment to the City of Southaven.
    3