Leslie Holmes v. Carolyn Colvin, Acting Cmsnr , 555 F. App'x 420 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-40486      Document: 00512539514         Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/20/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 13-40486                       February 20, 2014
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    LESLIE T. HOLMES,
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
    SECURITY,
    Defendant – Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:05-CV-677
    Before JOLLY, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Leslie T. Holmes filed suit in federal district court under § 205(g) of the
    Social Security Act, 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g).             He appeals the district court’s
    affirmance of the Commissioner of Social Security’s partially-favorable
    decision, which found that he was disabled and entitled to certain benefits from
    May 31, 2002 through March 3, 2009, but not thereafter. Holmes claims that
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-40486    Document: 00512539514     Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/20/2014
    No. 13-40486
    he was entitled to continuing disability benefits after March 3, 2009, and that
    the administrative law judge’s decision finding otherwise lacked substantial
    evidence, failed to develop the administrative record, and incorrectly weighed
    the evidence. We hold that neither the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) nor
    the Appeals Council erred, and affirm the district court’s decision.
    “Our standard of review of social security disability claims is exceedingly
    deferential and limited to two inquiries: whether substantial evidence supports
    the ALJ’s decision, and whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards
    when evaluating the evidence.” Taylor v. Astrue, 
    706 F.3d 600
    , 602 (5th Cir.
    2012). Evidence is “substantial” when it is enough for a reasonable mind to
    support the conclusion. 
    Id.
     This court has held that “[t]he evidence ‘must be
    more than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Leggett
    v. Chater, 
    67 F.3d 558
    , 564 (5th Cir. 1995)). Findings of fact supported by
    substantial evidence are conclusive, and we “may not reweigh the evidence in
    the record, nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute [our] judgment” for that
    of the Commissioner. Bowling v. Shalala, 
    36 F.3d 431
    , 434 (5th Cir. 1994).
    The ALJ’s decision stated that from May 31, 2002 through March 2,
    2009, Holmes was unable to perform past relevant work, and that there were
    no jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that he
    could have performed. But it also found that Holmes experienced medical
    improvement related to his ability to work as of March 3, 2009. Specifically, it
    stated that since March 3, 2009 the “claimant has had the residual functional
    capacity [RFC] to perform and maintain a limited range of sedentary work,”
    and that he regained the RFC to perform an eight-hour workday without
    missing more than twelve days from his employment in a calendar year.
    We hold that the ALJ reached his conclusions based on substantial
    evidence. The record shows that he ordered a consultative examination by Dr.
    2
    Case: 13-40486    Document: 00512539514     Page: 3   Date Filed: 02/20/2014
    No. 13-40486
    George Isaac, who considered Holmes’s medical history. The ALJ considered
    the medical evidence, including Dr. Isaac’s findings, in reaching his RFC
    conclusions. Because “we have consistently held that the [Commissioner], not
    the courts, has the duty to weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts in the
    evidence, and decide the case,” we will not overturn the ALJ’s RFC
    determination that Holmes was able to return to the workforce, albeit in a
    limited capacity. Johnson v. Bowen, 
    864 F.2d 340
    , 347 (5th Cir. 1988).
    We also hold that both the ALJ and the Appeals Council properly
    considered and handled Holmes’s post-hearing and post-decision evidence, and
    that the ALJ acted within his discretion in interpreting the evidence before
    him. Holmes entered into evidence examination reports by Dr. Kim Garges to
    support his claim of continued disability. But the ALJ discussed the competing
    evidence at length in his decision, comparing the observations and findings of
    Dr. Isaac and Dr. Garges. He concluded: “In short, with respect to the period
    since March 3, 2009, the undersigned gives greater weight to Dr. Isaac’s
    findings and opinions than to those of Dr. Garges.” Because “the ALJ ‘is
    entitled to determine the credibility of medical experts as well as lay witnesses
    and weigh their opinions accordingly,’” we hold that he did not commit
    reversible error in his weighing of the evidence. Greenspan v. Shalala, 
    38 F.3d 232
    , 237 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Scott v. Heckler, 
    770 F.2d 482
    , 485 (5th Cir.
    1985)).
    For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    3