Albert Lynch v. J. Valez , 705 F. App'x 295 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 16-20721      Document: 00514256903         Page: 1    Date Filed: 12/01/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 16-20721                                   FILED
    Summary Calendar                          December 1, 2017
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    ALBERT LYNCH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    OFFICER J. VALEZ; OFFICER E. MORGAN; OFFICER M. OCHO; OFFICER
    L. BROOKS; SERGEANT L. WISE,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:14-CV-1253
    Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Albert Lynch, Texas prisoner # 1997324, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil
    rights action against Harris County Sheriff’s Officers J. Valez [sic], M. Ocho
    [sic], E. Morgan, L. Brooks, and Sergeant L. Wise, alleging that the defendants
    violated his constitutional rights by failing to protect him from an attack by
    fellow inmate Lucky Ward. He also alleged that they failed to follow Harris
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 16-20721    Document: 00514256903      Page: 2    Date Filed: 12/01/2017
    No. 16-20721
    County Jail procedures regarding the use of restraints while escorting
    prisoners from their cells on the lockdown cellblock. Defendants Morgan and
    Brooks were served, and the district court granted their motions for summary
    judgment, finding that Lynch failed to show Morgan and Brooks (or any of the
    other officers) were deliberately indifferent to a specific imminent threat or
    risk of harm that Ward posed to Lynch.
    Lynch appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by
    not ordering the defendants to submit full discovery. The district court granted
    relevant discovery, including interrogatories requesting what the officers
    wrote about the incident, whether the officers were disciplined for the incident,
    the Harris County jail rules and regulations regarding maximum-security
    cellblocks, and the officers’ actions or inactions in preventing the incident.
    Lynch asserts that the denied discovery requests were not provided by
    defendants and would show contested factual evidence that he needs to prove
    deliberate indifference by the defendants.      Lynch may not rely on “vague
    assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified
    facts.” Raby v. Livingston, 
    600 F.3d 552
    , 561 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). Lynch offers no argument showing how any of
    the additional requested discovery he seeks would create a genuine issue of
    material fact. Lynch has not shown that the district court abused its discretion
    in declining to compel responses to all of Lynch’s requested discovery.
    McCreary v. Richardson, 
    738 F.3d 651
    , 654-55 (5th Cir. 2013).
    Arguing that his case does present exceptional circumstances, Lynch
    challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel.
    He also seeks the appointment of counsel on appeal.        As the district court
    correctly determined, exceptional circumstances were not present in the
    instant case. Lynch filed thorough pleadings and responses to the defendants’
    2
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    No. 16-20721
    motions that adequately addressed the issues of the case. Accordingly, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. See Cupit v.
    Jones, 
    835 F.2d 82
    , 86 (5th Cir. 1987). Likewise, Lynch has not shown that the
    appointment of counsel is warranted on appeal. His request for appointment
    of counsel on appeal is DENIED.
    Lynch argues that the district court abused its discretion by not ordering
    service of process upon the defendants. The district court ordered the United
    States Marshal’s Service to serve all five defendants named in Lynch’s
    complaint, service was made on Morgan and Brooks, but service on the other
    three officers was returned unexecuted because the information supplied by
    Lynch was insufficient to identify or locate them. The district court ordered
    Lynch to amend his complaint with the proper names or updated addresses for
    these three defendants so that they might be served with process. Lynch filed
    a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, but the district court denied
    Lynch’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint as moot because he did
    not attach a proposed amended complaint for the court’s review. Lynch did not
    remedy this noted defect by filing another motion for leave with a proposed
    amended complaint. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not
    taking any additional steps to order service of process due to Lynch’s failure to
    remedy the noted defect. See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 
    101 F.3d 444
    , 445
    (5th Cir. 1996); Rochon v. Dawson, 
    828 F.2d 1107
    , 1110 (5th Cir. 1987).
    Although Lynch cites the legal standards for summary judgment and for
    a claim of failure to protect in the context of his argument concerning discovery,
    he offers no challenge to the district court’s conclusion that he failed to meet
    his burden with respect to his failure to protect claim, or the district court’s
    alternative conclusion that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
    Thus, he has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s grant of summary
    3
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    No. 16-20721
    judgment on the merits of his claim. See Cinel v. Connick, 
    15 F.3d 1338
    , 1345
    (5th Cir. 1994).
    AFFIRMED; MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DENIED.
    4