U.S. Bank National Association v. Bates ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 21-11251        Document: 00516611530            Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/16/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 16, 2023
    No. 21-11251                             Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, successor
    in interest to Bank of America, National Association,
    as Trustee, successor by merger to LaSalle Bank
    National Association, as Trustee, for Residential
    Asset Mortgage Products, INC., Mortgage Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-R,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Kevin G. Bates; Regina Bates,
    Defendants—Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:20-cv-965
    Before Jones, Southwick, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    This appeal arises out of a mortgage foreclosure suit, in which the
    Plaintiff creditor successfully sought summary judgement against a
    *
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 21-11251         Document: 00516611530        Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/16/2023
    No. 21-11251
    Defendant debtor. Because the appeal has been rendered moot by Plaintiff’s
    sale of the property in question, we dismiss the appeal.
    I.
    On or around October 25, 2000, Defendant Kevin Bates obtained a
    mortgage loan by executing a Texas Home Equity Adjustable Rate Note. The
    Note was secured by a Texas Home Equity Security Instrument, signed by
    both Defendants, which encumbered the property located at 1012 South
    Hollow Drive, Southlake, Texas 76092 (“the Property”).
    On July 24, 2020, Plaintiff’s mortgage servicer notified Defendants
    that they were in default. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants seeking
    judicial foreclosure. Plaintiff sought and the district court granted summary
    judgment, which Defendants now appeal.
    After noticing this appeal, Defendants filed a motion in the district
    court asking the court to set a bond to stay the upcoming scheduled sale of
    the Property by the Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b). The district court
    issued an order requiring Defendants to post a $387,000 bond—worth about
    one-third of the outstanding debt—to obtain a stay of the court’s judgment.
    Defendants did not post the bond. Subsequently, Defendants sought an
    emergency stay in this court, which we denied. See Fed. R. App. Proc. 8.
    Following these proceedings, Plaintiff scheduled a foreclosure sale of
    the Property for June 7, 2022. That morning, Defendants filed a Notice of
    Lis Pendens. Plaintiff subsequently conducted the sale and sold the property
    to a third party.
    Plaintiff has now filed a motion in this court to dismiss the appeal as
    moot because of the sale, which Defendants oppose. In its reply, Plaintiff also
    moved to cancel or expunge the lis pendens. Defendants moved for leave to
    file a sur-reply to Plaintiff’s motion, which Plaintiff opposes.
    2
    Case: 21-11251      Document: 00516611530            Page: 3   Date Filed: 01/16/2023
    No. 21-11251
    II.
    “Ordinarily, an appeal will be moot when the property underlying the
    dispute has been sold at a foreclosure sale because this court cannot fashion
    adequate relief, i.e., cannot reverse the transaction.” Christopher Vill., Ltd.
    P’ship v. Retsinas, 
    190 F.3d 310
    , 314 (5th Cir. 1999). “If the debtor fails to
    obtain a stay, and if the property is sold in the interim, the . . . court will
    ordinarily be unable to grant any relief” and “the appeal will be moot.”
    Matter of Sullivan Cent. Plaza, I, Ltd., 
    914 F.2d 731
    , 733 (5th Cir. 1990), on
    reh’g sub nom. Matter of Sullivan Cent. Plaza I, Ltd., 
    935 F.2d 723
     (5th Cir.
    1991). Both sides acknowledge this baseline rule.
    Nevertheless, Defendants contend that their lis pendens filing means
    that relief may be granted with regards to the subsequent purchaser’s title to
    the Property—and that the appeal is not moot. But by its plain terms, the lis
    pendens statute makes clear that the procedure is available only to “a party
    to the action who is seeking affirmative relief.” Tex. Prop. Code §
    12.007(a). See also In re Jamail, 
    156 S.W.3d 104
    , 107 (Tex. App. 2004);
    Brown v. Martin, 
    2011 WL 3366359
    , at *2 (Tex. App. Aug. 4, 2011). Here,
    neither the Defendants’ original Answer nor their operative First Amended
    Answer offer any basis on which they seek affirmative relief in this suit.
    Consequently, the lis pendens filed by Defendants is “void.” Helmsley-Spear
    of Texas, Inc. v. Blanton, 
    699 S.W.2d 643
    , 645 (Tex. App. 1985). And
    “[w]hen a lis pendens is not authorized under Texas law, the court need not
    follow the procedures prescribed by [the statute] to cancel it.” Matter of
    Texas Extrusion Corp., 
    844 F.2d 1142
    , 1153 (5th Cir. 1988).
    III.
    We grant Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. We also
    grant Plaintiff’s motion to cancel the lis pendens. We deny Defendant’s
    motion for leave to file a sur-reply.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-11251

Filed Date: 1/16/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/16/2023