United States v. Lorenzo Rodriguez , 559 F. App'x 332 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-30742      Document: 00512559970         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/13/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 13-30742
    FILED
    March 13, 2014
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    LORENZO V. RODRIGUEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:13-CR-33-1
    Before WIENER, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Lorenzo V. Rodriguez appeals the 18-month within-guidelines sentence
    imposed after he pleaded guilty to being an alien in possession of a firearm and
    ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A).                 All of Rodriguez’s
    appellate arguments to go the district court’s application of the four-level
    increase called for by U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). For the reasons set forth
    below, we affirm.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-30742     Document: 00512559970     Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/13/2014
    No. 13-30742
    Rodriguez’s advisory guidelines sentencing range was determined under
    § 2K2.1. Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) calls for a four-level increase in a defendant’s
    offense level if he possessed a firearm with “an altered or obliterated serial
    number.” The increase is to be applied “regardless of whether the defendant
    knew or had reason to believe that the firearm . . . had an altered or obliterated
    serial number.”    § 2K1.2, comment. (n.8(B)).     “This court has continually
    enforced the clear and unambiguous language of § 2K2.1(b)(4) and its strict
    liability standard.” United States v. Perez, 
    585 F.3d 880
    , 883 (5th Cir. 2009).
    Rodriguez challenges the validity of the Guideline’s strict liability standard,
    but Perez governs the issue. See United States v. Lipscomb, 
    299 F.3d 303
    , 313
    n.34 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that one panel of this court may not overrule the
    decision of another absent an intervening en banc or Supreme Court decision
    that changes the applicable law).
    The penalty for a violation of § 922(g) is found at 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
    Section 924(a)(2) does not mandate any minimum sentence for a violation of
    § 922(g), and it caps a defendant’s possible prison sentence at 10 years. No
    other penalty range is triggered by the fact of the obliteration of a firearm’s
    serial number. Because the fact of the obliterated serial number is not a fact
    that increases the mandatory minimum or maximum statutory sentencing
    range, Rodriguez’s argument that it was required to be proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt fails. See Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    , 2155
    (2013); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 490 (2000); United States v.
    Tuma, 
    738 F.3d 681
    , 693 (5th Cir. 2013)(“Tuma’s sentence did not expose him
    to a mandatory minimum sentence and was well within the sentencing
    discretion of the district court; therefore, Alleyne is inapplicable.”).    “It is
    settled in this circuit that a sentencing judge is entitled to find by a
    preponderance of the evidence all the facts relevant to the determination of a
    2
    Case: 13-30742    Document: 00512559970     Page: 3      Date Filed: 03/13/2014
    No. 13-30742
    Guidelines sentencing range.” United States v. Setser, 
    568 F.3d 482
    , 498 (5th
    Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We   also   reject   Rodriguez’s   argument     that    the   district   court
    impermissibly considered the obliteration of the serial number in sentencing
    him because that same obliteration was the subject of a separate count in the
    indictment, charging him with violating § 922(k), that was later dismissed.
    Conduct that is charged in dismissed counts of an indictment may be
    considered as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes as long as the conduct
    has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Valdez,
    
    453 F.3d 252
    , 264 (5th Cir. 2006); see U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a).
    Finally, we consider the applicability of § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) here. According
    to the presentence report (PSR), the serial number of the firearm Rodriguez
    possessed had, in fact, been obliterated or removed. The PSR was prepared
    using investigative reports provided by the Government. Accordingly, the facts
    contained therein had sufficient indicia of reliability that the district court
    could rely upon them in making its factual determinations absent the
    presentation of rebuttal evidence by Rodriguez. See United States v. Zuniga,
    
    720 F.3d 587
    , 591 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ollison, 
    555 F.3d 152
    , 164
    (5th Cir. 2009). Rodriguez has never asserted that the serial number of the
    firearm he possessed was not obliterated.       Instead, his arguments have
    pertained only to his knowledge of that obliteration, which knowledge is
    irrelevant for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). See 
    Perez, 585 F.3d at 883
    . Thus,
    the district court’s finding that Rodriguez possessed a firearm with an
    obliterated serial number was plausible in light of the record as a whole and
    the district court’s application of the four-level enhancement under
    § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) was not clearly erroneous. See 
    id. AFFIRMED. 3