LuAnne Huntington v. Office of Personnel Management ( 2015 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    LUANNE HUNTINGTON,                              DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                          DE-844E-14-0314-I-1
    v.
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL                             DATE: July 31, 2015
    MANAGEMENT,
    Agency.
    THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    LuAnne Huntington, Layton, Utah, pro se.
    Linnette Scott, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    REMAND ORDER
    ¶1         The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has filed a petition for review
    of the initial decision, which reversed OPM’s reconsideration decision denying
    the appellant’s application for disability retirement. For the reasons discussed
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
    2
    below, we GRANT the agency’s petition for review and REMAND the case to the
    field office for further adjudication in accordance with this Order.
    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
    ¶2         The appellant is a Tax Examiner for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
    Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 66-68, 96; see Petition for Review (PFR) File,
    Tab 2 at 25, Tab 3 at 3. After more than 27 years of Federal service, she applied
    for disability retirement, citing hypothyroidism, gastritis, headaches, recurring
    cold sores, chronic fatigue, depression, and anxiety. IAF, Tab 5 at 30-31, 96-100.
    OPM denied the application in October 2013.          
    Id. at 22-27.
        The appellant
    requested reconsideration, but OPM denied the request in March 2014.             
    Id. at 7-12.
    ¶3         The appellant filed a Board appeal, challenging OPM’s reconsideration
    decision. IAF, Tab 1. After holding the requested hearing, the administrative
    judge reversed OPM’s decision, finding that the appellant met the criteria for a
    disability retirement annuity under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System
    (FERS). IAF, Tab 33, Initial Decision (ID) at 13.
    ¶4         OPM has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1.
    The appellant has filed a response. PFR File, Tabs 2-4.
    ¶5         In an appeal from an OPM decision on a voluntary disability retirement
    application, the appellant bears the burden of proof by preponderant evidence.
    Christopherson v. Office of Personnel Management, 119 M.S.P.R. 635, ¶ 6
    (2013); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(ii). To qualify for disability retirement under
    FERS, an employee must establish that: (1) she has completed at least 18 months
    of creditable civilian service; (2) while employed in a position subject to FERS,
    she became disabled because of a medical condition, resulting in a deficiency in
    performance, conduct, or attendance, or, if there is no such deficiency, the
    disabling medical condition is incompatible with either useful and efficient
    service or retention in the position; (3) the disabling medical condition is
    3
    expected to continue for at least 1 year from the date the disability retirement
    application was filed; (4) accommodation of the disabling medical condition in
    the position held must be unreasonable; and (5) she did not decline a reasonable
    offer of reassignment to a vacant position. Christopherson, 119 M.S.P.R. 635,
    ¶ 6; see 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a); 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a).
    ¶6         In its petition for review, OPM presented no substantive argument regarding
    the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant met requirements (1), (4),
    and (5). See PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-7; ID at 4. Therefore, the only issues in this
    appeal relate to requirements (2) and (3). We find that remand is necessary for
    credibility findings and further adjudication on these requirements.
    On remand, the administrative judge must make credibility determinations to
    resolve the disputed issues.
    ¶7         OPM argues that the administrative judge erred in failing to make
    credibility determinations to resolve the issues in dispute. 2       PFR File, Tab 1
    at 5-7. We agree.
    ¶8         The Board has clarified that there are two ways to meet the statutory
    requirement that an employee “be unable, because of disease or injury, to render
    useful and efficient service in the employee’s position.” Henderson v. Office of
    Personnel Management, 117 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶¶ 12-19 (2012). These are: (1) by
    showing that the medical condition caused a deficiency in performance,
    attendance, or conduct; or (2) by showing that the medical condition is
    incompatible with either useful and efficient service or retention in the position.
    
    Id., ¶ 16;
    see 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a)(1)(B); 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a)(2). The Board will
    consider all pertinent evidence in determining an appellant’s entitlement to
    disability retirement: objective clinical findings, diagnoses and medical opinions,
    subjective evidence of pain and disability, and evidence relating to the effect of
    2
    OPM also argues that the appellant’s impairments are situational to the IRS,
    precluding an award of disability retirement. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. Because we are
    remanding the appeal for the administrative judge to make credibility findings and those
    findings may be relevant to this argument, we will not address it at this time.
    4
    the applicant’s condition on her ability to perform the duties of her position.
    Henderson, 117 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 19.
    ¶9          The administrative judge summarized some of the relevant evidence and
    testimony before concluding that the appellant met her burden of proof.                     ID
    at 2-3, 5-13. However, the initial decision does not contain credibility findings in
    support   of   that     conclusion.         See    Spithaler     v.    Office   of   Personnel
    Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (an initial decision must identify all
    material issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of
    credibility, and include the administrative judge’s conclusions of law and his
    legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that reasoning rests).
    Therefore, remand is appropriate.
    ¶10         On remand, the administrative judge should make credibility determinations
    to   address   the     disputed   issues.         See   Hillen    v.    Department     of   the
    Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987) (providing guidance regarding how to resolve
    credibility issues).    For example, the administrative judge should address any
    relevant inconsistencies between the appellant’s allegations concerning her
    condition and the evidence she provided in support of those allegations with
    respect to severity, duration, and impact on her employment. 3 The administrative
    judge also should address any relevant inconsistencies between the treating
    3
    The appellant reported suffering from depression and anxiety dating as far back as
    2010. See, e.g., IAF, Tab 19 at 2-17, Tab 20 at 2, Tab 36, Hearing Compact Disc
    (HCD) 1 (the appellant’s testimony). However, the available medical records contain
    no mention of those conditions until January 2013, when she asked a physician to
    complete her retirement paperwork. IAF, Tab 5 at 34. In addition, while the
    appellant’s allegations are now focused almost entirely on her mental health, HCD1 (the
    appellant’s testimony), her initial disability application materials listed only physical
    limitations, IAF, Tab 5 at 30. Further, the current record reflects little evidence of the
    appellant seeking treatment for her mental health condition prior to when she applied
    for disability retirement, except for a brief description of her condition by her primary
    physician on January 2, 2013. The record also contains little or no evidence of her
    seeking treatment from January 2013, to April 2014. HCD1 (M.A. testimony); IAF,
    Tab 5 at 7.
    5
    clinicians’ records, their testimony, their knowledge of the appellant’s job duties,
    and the appellant’s actual performance. 4
    On remand, the administrative judge should also hold a hearing to determine
    whether the appellant unreasonably refused treatment.
    ¶11         OPM next argues that the appellant is precluded from receiving the
    disability retirement annuity she seeks because she unreasonably refused
    treatment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. We find that the administrative judge should
    hold a new hearing to further adjudicate this matter.
    ¶12         An applicant for disability retirement benefits must establish the extent to
    which her disability can or cannot be controlled. Smedley v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 108 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 23 (2008).           When an employee is unable to
    render useful and efficient service because she fails or refuses to follow or to
    accept normal treatment, her disability flows, not from the disease or injury itself,
    but from her voluntary failure or refusal to take the available corrective or
    ameliorative action.    
    Id. Accordingly, the
    voluntary refusal to accept facially
    reasonable treatment, standing alone, will bar entitlement to disability retirement
    benefits. 
    Id. ¶13 Despite
    the appellant’s allegations that she has suffered from depression
    and anxiety for many years and that those impairments are disabling, the record
    documents only a brief period where she received mental health treatment. The
    appellant received counseling with one social worker between May and
    July 2014, and another between August and September 2014.                 HCD1 (C.C.
    testimony); IAF, Tab 30 at 4.       She also received a prescription for Zoloft in
    April 2014, Paxil in May 2014, and Cymbalta in July 2014, each new one
    4
    The appellant’s treating clinicians testified to varying degrees that her mental health
    could effect her ability to perform job duties. HCD1 (C.C. and M.A. testimony); HCD2
    (S.J. testimony). However, the record suggests these treating clinicians had limited
    knowledge of what those job duties were, with one mistakenly identifying her position
    as custodial. HCD1 (C.C. and M.A. testimony); HCD2 (S.J. testimony). In addition,
    the appellant’s employment records seem to suggest that her performance met or
    exceeded expectations when she was working. IAF, Tab 5 at 69, 72-73, Tab 24 at 37.
    6
    following complaints about the other. HCD1 (M.A. testimony). The appellant
    reportedly failed to tolerate Paxil, because it caused her to feel tired, and Zoloft,
    because it made her feel funny, with one physician noting, “she has never really
    [given medications] much of a chance.” IAF, Tab 26 at 2. The appellant received
    a prescription for Escitalopram, another selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor, in
    October 2014. 
    Id. at 2-3.
    The record is unclear regarding compliance with and
    efficacy of that prescriptive treatment or the prior prescription for Cymbalta.
    ¶14         The initial decision summarizes much of the aforementioned treatment. ID
    at 7-11. However, it does not contain any findings as to whether the appellant’s
    alleged disability is the result of her voluntary refusal to accept facially
    reasonable treatment, such as counseling, prescribed medications, or referrals to
    mental health specialists.     See generally Faragon v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 51 M.S.P.R. 63, 69-70 (1991) (finding an appellant’s refusal to see
    a psychiatrist or to take stress-reducing medications because he believed such
    medication would cloud his judgment was insufficient to justify his failure to
    undergo treatment). Nor does the hearing transcript contain adequate testimony
    from the appellant or others to clarify the issue. On remand, the administrative
    judge should hold a hearing to further develop the record on this matter and issue
    findings accordingly, including additional credibility determinations.            See
    generally Zucker v. Office of Personnel Management, 114 M.S.P.R. 288, ¶ 9
    (2010) (credibility determinations are best made first by the administrative
    judge).
    7
    ORDER
    For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to the field office
    for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
    FOR THE BOARD:                          ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 7/31/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021