Chehl v. So Univ Agri Mech ( 2002 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    
    
    
                               No. 01-30698
                             Summary Calendar
    
    
    
    SAHIB SINGH CHEHL,
    
                                             Plaintiff-Appellant,
    
    versus
    
    SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE;
    EDWARD R. JACKSON; HUEY LAWSON; MARVIN YATES; WILLIAM E. MOORE;
    ERNEST L. WALKER,
    
                                             Defendants-Appellees.
    
                          --------------------
              Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the Middle District of Louisiana
                          USDC No. 98-CV-640-D
                          --------------------
                              April 1, 2002
    
    Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    
    PER CURIAM:*
    
         Sahib Singh Chehl appeals from the summary-judgment
    
    dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the
    
    Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the Age
    
    Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) against his employer,
    
    Southern University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
    
    (“Southern”), Edward R. Jackson, Huey Lawson, Marvin Yates,
    
    
    
    
         *
            Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
                                 No. 01-30698
                                      -2-
    
    William E. Moore, and Ernest L. Walker.     Chehl also brought a
    
    claim against Southern under Louisiana law for unjust enrichment.
    
         Chehl does not argue that the district court erred in
    
    dismissing his ADEA claim or his claim for unjust enrichment.
    
    Thus he has waived any argument he might have asserted with
    
    respect to the district court’s dismissal of these claims.     See
    
    Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
    
         Turning to Chehl’s claims against the individual defendants,
    
    we hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Chehl’s
    
    Title VII claims, as Title VII does not impose personal liability
    
    on individuals.     See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 
    164 F.3d 258
    , 262 (5th Cir. 1999).    We are unable to discern any argument
    
    in Chehl’s brief that the district court erred in dismissing the
    
    claims against the individual defendants brought pursuant to 42
    
    U.S.C. § 1981.    If an appellant fails to make arguments in his
    
    brief, they are deemed abandoned.     See Yohey, 985 F.2d at 224-25.
    
         Chehl has also stated claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
    
    under Title VII against Southern.    With respect to the former,
    
    this court must sua sponte raise the issue of its subject-matter
    
    jurisdiction.     See McDonald v. Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs, 
    832 F.2d 901
    , 906 (5th Cir. 1987).    We have held that Congress did
    
    not express an intent to waive the states’ Eleventh Amendment
    
    immunity from suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.     See Sessions v. Rusk
    
    State Hosp., 
    648 F.2d 1066
    , 1069 (5th Cir. 1981).     We have also
    
    held that Southern is a state entity entitled to assert Eleventh
    
    Amendment immunity.    See Richardson v. Southern Univ., 
    118 F.3d 450
    , 456 (5th Cir. 1997).    As Southern is entitled to immunity
                               No. 01-30698
                                    -3-
    
    from Chehl’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, this court is without
    
    subject-matter jurisdiction.   See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany,
    
    
    187 F.3d 452
    , 465-66 (5th Cir. 1999).
    
         Chehl’s complaint alleged that Southern has discriminatory
    
    compensation practices and that he was unlawfully removed as
    
    Director of the Aerospace Research and Education Project (“AREP”)
    
    and as Chairman of the Mechanical Engineering Department due to
    
    his race and religion.   After a careful review of Chehl’s
    
    arguments and the record, we find no error on the part of the
    
    district court.
    
         Chehl’s complaint also alleged a Title VII retaliation claim
    
    against Southern.   Chehl alleges that in retaliation for his
    
    complaints regarding Southern’s allegedly discriminatory
    
    compensation practices he was removed from his positions as
    
    Director of AREP and department chairman.   We express no opinion
    
    as to whether Chehl has made out a prima facie case on his Title
    
    VII retaliation claim.   However, after a careful review of
    
    Chehl’s arguments and the record, we hold that Chehl has failed
    
    to show that any of the legitimate, nonretaliatory justifications
    
    offered by Southern for Chehl’s removal from these positions was
    
    pretextual, or that he would not have been removed from these
    
    positions “but for” his participation in protected activity.    See
    
    Evans v. City of Houston, 
    246 F.3d 344
    , 354-55 (5th Cir. 2001).
    
         The judgment of the district court is in all respects
    
    AFFIRMED.