In Re The Marriage Of: Gillian Ben-artzi v. Eric Ben-artzi ( 2015 )


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    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION ONE
    In the Matter of the Marriage of                 No. 72063-5-1
    GILLIAN BEN-ARTZI,
    Respondent,
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    and
    ERIC BEN-ARTZI,
    Appellant.               FILED: August 10, 2015
    Schindler, J. — Dr. Eric Ben-Artzi appeals entry of the decree of dissolution, the
    findings of fact and conclusions of law, the order of child support, and the parenting
    plan. He challenges (1) the imposition of international travel restrictions under RCW
    26.09.191 (3)(g), (2) imputing income to him for purposes of calculating child support,
    (3) the division of property, (4) the award of maintenance, and (5) the award of attorney
    fees. We affirm in all respects.
    FACTS
    Eric Ben-Artzi was born and raised in Israel. He served in the Israeli Navy from
    1993 until 1996. In 1996, Ben-Artzi came to the United States to attend graduate
    school at Northwestern University. From 1997 until 1998, he worked at J.P. Morgan in
    No. 72063-5-1/2
    New York. From 1998 until 2006, he was enrolled in the PhD program at the Courant
    Institute of Mathematical Sciences at New York University.
    Gillian Hopson grew up in Granville, Ohio. In 2004, she moved to New York to
    obtain a master's degree in education. Gillian started dating Ben-Artzi in May 2005.1
    After obtaining his PhD in 2006, Dr. Ben-Artzi worked as a trader at Citigroup
    earning a base salary between $125,000 and $150,000. Dr. Ben-Artzi and Gillian
    married on September 23, 2006. Dr. Ben-Artzi worked at Citigroup and Gillian taught
    English at a high school in the Bronx. Approximately a year later, Gillian gave birth to
    their first child.
    From 2007 until 2010, Dr. Ben-Artzi worked as a vice president and strategist at
    Goldman Sachs earning approximately $132,500 a year. From February 2009 until
    September 2010, the family lived in Granville, Ohio, and Dr. Ben-Artzi commuted to
    work at Goldman Sachs in New York.
    In June 2010, Dr. Ben-Artzi left Goldman Sachs to work as a vice president and
    "quantitative risk officer" at Deutsche Bank. From September 2010 until December
    2011, the family lived in New Jersey. In 2011, Dr. Ben-Artzi earned approximately
    $160,000.
    In March 2011, Dr. Ben-Artzi reported concerns about "possible securities law
    violations and financial fraud" to the Deutsche Bank compliance office and to the United
    States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). After telling his supervisor that he
    had reported his concerns to the SEC, Deutsche Bank began an "internal investigation."
    We refer to Gillian Ben-Artzi by her first name for clarity. No disrespect is intended.
    No. 72063-5-1/3
    In June, Gillian gave birth to their second child. Dr. Ben-Artzi took a paternity
    leave and returned to work at Deutsche Bank in October 2011.
    On November 4, Dr. Ben-Artzi filed a whistleblower complaint with the SEC
    alleging Deutsche Bank "failfed] to accurately report the value of its credit derivatives
    portfolio." On November 7, Deutsche Bank terminated Dr. Ben-Artzi.
    In January 2012, the family moved to Bellingham, Washington. On May 1, Dr.
    Ben-Artzi's attorneys filed a 34-page wrongful termination complaint against Deutsche
    Bank with the United States Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health
    Administration (OSHA). The complaint alleged retaliation in violation of the federal
    Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.2 Dr. Ben-Artzi sought economic and noneconomic
    damages, including lost wages and emotional distress damages. Dr. Ben-Artzi spent
    nearly all of his time working on the SEC and OSHA actions.
    On March 26, 2013, Gillian filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage in
    Whatcom County Superior Court. The court entered a temporary restraining order
    prohibiting "both parties" from "transferring, removing, encumbering, concealing,
    damaging or in any way disposing of any property except in the usual course of
    business or for the necessities of life or as agreed in writing by the parties." The order
    specifically states:
    Both husband and wife are now required to obey the following order
    unless the court changes it. Either of you may ask the court to change or
    clarify this order. The court has the power to punish violations of this
    order and to require the violator to pay attorneys' fees to the other party
    for having to bring the violation before the court.
    218 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1), (2).
    No. 72063-5-1/4
    On May 1, Gillian filed a motion to relocate to Granville, Ohio, where she had "a
    family support network to help with childcare." In her declaration in support, Gillian
    states Dr. Ben-Artzi "has been unemployed for 18 months and I would like to return to
    work in order to support my family, provide benefits, and create a stable life for me and
    our children." Dr. Ben-Artzi opposed relocation.3 Gillian also asked the court to enter
    an order restricting his "ability to remove the children from the country without court
    permission." Gillian asserted Dr. Ben-Artzi is an Israeli citizen and he had threatened to
    take the children to Israel. Her declaration states, in pertinent part:
    I believe there is also the strong possibility that [Dr. Ben-Artzi] could
    return to Israel, where he has family and he might have help finding
    employment. Eric is an Israeli citizen and has never completed the
    process of becoming an American citizen despite obtaining a green card
    five years ago. To keep his options open, he has postponed becoming [a]
    U.S. citizen because he wants to avoid U.S. taxes if he moves to another
    country. Recently, he threatened to move back to Israel if the court
    approves a child-support order he doesn't like. I am very concerned about
    Eric's threats regarding Israel. He seriously scared me when he described
    family law in Israel as a non-Jewish mother having no rights and that
    therefore he would have custody. I am asking for a provision in the
    parenting plan to address this issue by limiting Eric's ability to remove the
    children from the country without court permission.
    The court granted the motion to relocate. The court found Dr. Ben-Artzi's
    opposition "seems intended to block the Mother's efforts for his personal benefit instead
    of the children's best interests" and "may be intended to gain financial or tactical
    advantage in the dissolution." Pending entry of a temporary parenting plan, the court
    prohibited Dr. Ben-Artzi from removing the children from Washington State.
    3According to Gillian, in April 2013, Dr. Ben-Artzi said he would let her relocate to Ohio with the
    children ifshe did not ask for any money in the dissolution, including child support.
    No. 72063-5-1/5
    On June 1, Gillian and the children moved to Ohio. Dr. Ben-Artzi moved to Ohio
    and got a job at Ohio State University teaching a math course during the fall term. On
    July 26, the court entered a temporary parenting plan. The plan designates Gillian as
    the residential parent and imposes travel restrictions, "Both parents are restrained and
    prohibited from international travel with a child, until final orders are entered."
    On October 31, the court entered a temporary order of child support. The court
    found Dr. Ben-Artzi was "voluntarily underemployed" and imputed net monthly income
    based on a "reliable historical rate of pay." The court ordered him to pay Gillian $1,929
    a month in child support, health care, and day care expenses. The court also awarded
    Gillian $250 in attorney fees and ordered Dr. Ben-Artzi to pay Gillian within 45 days.
    The dissolution trial was scheduled to begin on January 14, 2014. On November
    7, 2013, Gillian filed a motion to compel discovery and to strike the settlement
    conference and the trial date. Gillian asserted Dr. Ben-Artzi had not provided "any
    responses to the discovery" including the response to interrogatories and requests for
    production "due on October 23." On November 14, the court granted the request to
    strike the settlement conference and the trial date and entered an order requiring Dr.
    Ben-Artzi to "provide full and complete responses" to the discovery requests by January
    30, 2014. The court rescheduled the trial to April 22, 2014.
    In December 2013, Dr. Ben-Artzi notified Ohio State University that he was
    "actively" looking for a higher paying job and "might not complete the term if there is an
    offer." Ohio State did not offer Dr. Ben-Artzi a teaching position for the spring semester.
    No. 72063-5-1/6
    On December 31, the court entered an order finding Dr. Ben-Artzi in contempt for
    "intentionally fail[ing] to comply" with the temporary order of child support and the order
    to pay attorney fees. The order states he could purge the contempt by paying Gillian
    $800 within 30 days. On January 24, 2014, the court ordered Dr. Ben-Artzi to make
    "payment in full of all child support ordered" within 10 days.
    On February 21, 2014, Gillian identified Kenneth Brewe as an expert to testify at
    trial regarding the SEC whistleblower and the OSHA wrongful termination actions.
    Mr. Brewe will testify about his opinion regarding the nature and
    scope of any proceeds regarding Respondent's damages, claims,
    complaints, wages, compensation, rewards, and entitlements etc., as a
    party, witness, whistleblower or any other such capacity in any litigation,
    case, cause, claim, wrongful discharge, administrative proceeding, or any
    other such action, [OSHA], [SEC], or any other such person, agency,
    entity, business, employer, or third party with respect to any action.
    On March 10, Gillian filed a "Motion and Declaration for Order to Show Cause Re
    Contempt for Violation of Restraining Order and Discovery Order." Gillian argued Dr.
    Ben-Artzi violated the temporary restraining order entered March 26, 2013 by
    withdrawing over $100,000 from their IRA.4 Gillian states that before the separation, the
    account balance was $142,201. Gillian also asserts Dr. Ben-Artzi violated the
    November 14, 2013 order to provide "full and complete responses" to discovery by
    January 2014, did not "produce any discovery by this deadline," and only recently
    produced "a fraction of what was required."5 Gillian states Dr. Ben-Artzi had not
    provided complete answers or responded to over 100 requests related to the pending
    SEC and OSHA actions including financial information regarding the SEC and OSHA
    4 Individual retirement account.
    5 Emphasis in original.
    6
    No. 72063-5-1/7
    actions, expenses, or the names and addresses of witnesses.6
    On March 21, the court entered an order of contempt against Dr. Ben-Artzi and a
    "Second Order to Compel Respondent to Produce Discovery and for Sanctions." The
    court found Dr. Ben-Artzi in contempt for withdrawing "not less than $100,733 from the
    community IRA" and failing to provide "full and complete responses" to discovery as
    previously ordered. The court found Dr. Ben-Artzi "again failed to produce . .. discovery
    response[s] by the deadline as ordered" and "refused to deliver (actually mail) his
    discovery responses to Petitioner's attorney as required." The court found his "actions
    have been in bad faith and constitute intransigence." The court ordered Dr. Ben-Artzi to
    provide "a full and complete accounting" of all withdrawals from the IRA within seven
    days, provide "full and complete discovery responses" signed under oath within five
    days, and pay $825 in attorney fees within ten days. The order states Dr. Ben-Artzi
    6 Gillian's declaration in support of the Motion for Order to Show Cause Re Contempt for Violation
    of Restraining Order and Discovery Order states, in pertinent part:
    [The discovery requests] sought disclosure regarding ... whether [Dr. Ben-Artzi] had
    "made any financial arrangements, liens, loans, contingencies, contracts, loans [sic],
    interest-sharing, or any other such monetary agreement, whether or not it has been
    realized, vested or unvested, and if so, state the following: (a) name, address and phone
    number of any person, agency or entity with whom you made such an agreement; (b) the
    purpose and details of such agreement; (c) the date and terms of such agreement; (d)
    whether you consulted with or obtained the agreement of your wife with respect to such
    agreement, and ifnot, why not; (e) if any funds, money, compensation or benefitwere
    received by you due to any such agreement, what was the amount of such funds, the
    disposition of such funds and the dates pertaining thereto; (f) ifany funds, money,
    compensation or benefit were loaned or distributed by you to any person, agency or
    entity with whom you made such an agreement!,] what was the amount of such funds,
    the source of funds, the character of the funds (separate or community), if community
    funds whether yourwife was consulted with or agreed to use of community funds and if
    not why not, and the dates pertaining to all transactions regarding such funds or other
    benefits." Respondent's answer was incomplete and vague. It confirmed the existence
    of such information and third parties, but provided no details such as contact information
    or details of the third party agreements. For example, in subsection (e) Dr. Ben-Artzi
    states "funds were transferred to me under one of the confidential agreements," but he
    does not disclose the amount of funds, the source of funds or the purpose. Regarding
    subsection (f), Dr. Ben-Artzi states that he has a profit-sharing arrangement with
    unnamed interested parties. One of these may be his "business partner," Adrian Fournier
    de Launay of the Fournier Law Firm, listed in response #177, but he does not disclose
    the nature of the legal contract or terms.
    No. 72063-5-1/8
    could purge the finding of contempt by providing "full and complete records" and paying
    $2,200 in attorney fees within seven days.
    On April 10, the court held a contempt review hearing. The court found Dr. Ben-
    Artzi did not comply with the conditions of the March 21 order of contempt or the second
    order to compel discovery, and he did not "make any efforts to comply with the
    underlying orders for which he is in contempt of court." The court found his "actions
    continue to be in bad faith and intransigence." The court found Gillian "incurred attorney
    fees solely due to Respondent's intransigence and failure to comply with discovery rules
    and court orders, for which she should be compensated." The court ruled Dr. Ben-Artzi
    remained in contempt of court, ordered him to "provide full and complete discovery
    responses as previously ordered," and assessed a $250.00 "daily monetary penalty"
    that shall continue until compliance and further order of the court. The court also
    ordered Dr. Ben-Artzi to pay $412.50 in attorney fees to Gillian within seven days.
    Before trial, Gillian filed a motion to impose discovery sanctions under CR 37.
    The court granted the motion. The court found Dr. Ben-Artzi did not comply with the
    orders compelling discovery, and the responses he provided on February 18, 2014
    "were a fraction of what was required, were not correctly identified, were not under oath
    or dated, and an extensive amount of documents were missing or unanswered." The
    court also found Dr. Ben-Artzi "failed to appear for his deposition despite repeated
    requests for coordination and proper notice." The court found Dr. Ben-Artzi's actions
    "have been willful, in bad faith and constitute intransigence." The court entered an order
    prohibiting Dr. Ben-Artzi "from introducing any evidence at trial that was the subject of
    8
    No. 72063-5-1/9
    Petitioner's discovery requests which [he] did not answer." The order states, in
    pertinent part:
    The discovery sought by [Gillian] is essential for her preparation of the
    case. Petitioner has been harmed by [Dr. Ben-Artzi]'s failure to comply
    with discovery rules and court orders. Petitioner would be unfairly
    prejudiced at trial and unable [to] proceed with trial due to Respondent's
    failure to comply, if this order were not entered. Petitioner's due process
    rights to a fair trial would be violated if Respondent's misconduct was not
    sanctioned and Petitioner protected by this order.
    The night before the trial was scheduled to begin on April 22, Dr. Ben-Artzi sent
    an e-mail to the court stating he had missed his flight to Washington and would "call
    tomorrow morning to see how quickly this can be rescheduled." Dr. Ben-Artzi did not
    call the next morning but sent another e-mail stating he might be able "to travel to Court"
    the following day. The court continued the trial and instructed Dr. Ben-Artzi "to attend
    by telephone tomorrow morning."
    Dr. Ben-Artzi called the next morning. However, he almost immediately asked to
    take a break. The court told Dr. Ben-Artzi to "call the Court back within the next 10
    minutes and we'll proceed." After waiting for almost an hour, the court proceeded with
    the trial. Dr. Ben-Artzi never called back.
    The issues at trial were the parenting plan, the order of child support, the division
    of property including the IRA and the characterization and disposition of any proceeds
    from the SEC and OSHA actions, and Gillian's request for maintenance and attorney
    fees.
    Gillian testified that Dr. Ben-Artzi threatened to abscond with the children to
    Israel. Gillian also testified Dr. Ben-Artzi threatened to "leave the country and never pay
    me anything." Gillian said Dr. Ben-Artzi is an Israeli citizen with "very high connections"
    No. 72063-5-1/10
    in the Israeli government and she was concerned "he will use that power to somehow
    hurt me in a variety of ways, including taking the children." Gillian said Dr. Ben-Artzi
    told her that "a mother who is not Jewish . .. would have no rights in Israel compared to
    a Jewish father with the connections that he has."
    The parties owned no real property. The property subject to division primarily
    was the Charles Schwab IRA and the SEC and OSHA actions. The court admitted into
    evidence a number of exhibits including bank records for the joint IRA, copies of the
    SEC whistleblower and OSHA wrongful termination complaints, and copies of Dr. Ben-
    Artzi's resume and earnings statements from his previous employers. The court also
    considered the memorandum submitted by Brewe.
    Gillian testified that during the marriage, Dr. Ben-Artzi expended community
    funds on the SEC and OSHA actions and made a number of trips to the East Coast to
    meet with attorneys and others. Gillian testified Dr. Ben-Artzi also retained an
    investment firm in Toronto, Canada, The Kilgour Williams Group, to work on the SEC
    action.
    [Dr. Ben-Artzi] devoted a lot, a great deal of time and money and energy
    into those cases. They were very important to him and he, this was truly
    his first priority and he had to pay I know, I believe — I haven't, I think we
    asked for the attorney's agreement with [the attorney] but we didn't see it,
    but I believe from my conversations with [Dr. Ben-Artzi] that [the attorney]
    asked for some of his expenses [to] be paid up front. He works primarily
    on contingency but there were some up front costs and fees and
    expenses and I know those were thousands of dollars and we paid those
    in 2012.
    Gillian's expert Brewe addressed whether the SEC and OSHA actions were
    community property. As to the SEC whistleblower action, Brewe stated that because
    Dr. Ben-Artzi "filed an actual claim for [an] award with the SEC," Dr. Ben-Artzi's interest
    10
    No. 72063-5-1/11
    "is vested." Brewe states that because Dr. Ben-Artzi "discovered the alleged violations
    by Deutsche Bank and reported them during the marriage[,] contingent upon the SEC
    acting against Deutsche Bank and sanctions being imposed, ... the claim [is] a
    community asset."
    As to the OSHA wrongful termination action, Brewe states the "pain and suffering
    portion of a personal injury award recovered by a spouse from a third person is the
    separate property of the injured person." However, he notes that "any amount intended
    to redress lost earnings or medical expenses paid from the community property funds
    will be deemed community property" and, therefore, "[a]ny recovery compensating Mr.
    Ben-Artzi for economic loss during the marriage should be considered community
    property."
    At the conclusion of trial, the court made a tentative oral ruling subject to written
    objections by Dr. Ben-Artzi.
    I'm going to announce the decisions that I'm provisionally making in this
    case. I'm also going to issue an order requiring that Dr. Ben-Artzi file with
    the Court any objections he has to the proposed findings that I'm about to
    announce and that those objections be filed in writing on or about May 1st,
    2014. If. . . Dr. Ben-Artzi wishes to testify or bring other factual
    information to the Court's attention regarding these points he may do so in
    writing on or before May 1st, 2014, however, any documentary evidence
    that he provides won't be considered by the Court unless that
    documentary evidence was also provided in discovery. And that's the
    implementation of the Court's order on motion in limine.
    The court found Dr. Ben-Artzi misappropriated over $100,000 of community
    funds from the Charles Schwab IRA. The court awarded Gillian the remaining funds in
    the IRA. The court ruled that if Dr. Ben-Artzi "does not pay all amounts remaining in
    that account to [Gillian] as I've just ordered then I will issue a judgment in her favor" for
    $33,376. Based on "all of the circumstances," the court awarded Gillian "a full 50-
    11
    No. 72063-5-1/12
    percent share of the net proceeds" of the SEC whistleblower and OSHA wrongful
    termination actions and all other litigation related to the termination from Deutsche
    Bank.
    The court ruled that absent a court order, Dr. Ben-Artzi was prohibited from
    traveling with the children outside the United States. The court ruled it was "reasonable
    to impute income to Dr. Ben-Artzi at the $100,000 level" based on "his historic earning
    levels." The court found Gillian incurred additional attorney fees based on Dr. Ben-
    Artzi's intransigence and ruled she was entitled to an attorney fee award of $68,493.
    The next day, the court sent the transcript of the oral ruling to Dr. Ben-Artzi
    setting a deadline of May 8 to submit written objections. The letter states, in pertinent
    part:
    As the ruling indicates, Dr. Ben-Artzi may submit written argument and
    any documents he disclosed in discovery and considers pertinent to the
    issues at trial. I will consider any submission he makes and will issue a
    final ruling after that.
    On May 7, Dr. Ben-Artzi filed "Respondent's Written Testimony and Objections."
    Dr. Ben-Artzi argued some funds in the IRA were separate property and objected to
    awarding Gillian the remaining funds because he "viewed the withdrawals from our IRA
    as required for the 'necessities of life.'" Dr. Ben-Artzi argued the court should award
    him "a greater share of the proceeds" from the SEC and OSHA actions based on his
    "post-separation efforts to increase the likelihood and value of a recovery." Dr. Ben-
    Artzi stated the "work and expenses involved in the SEC case have been even greater
    than in the OSHA case." Dr. Ben-Artzi also asserted he could receive an award "only if
    [SEC] decides to impose sanctions of at least $1 million on Deutsche Bank." However,
    if the court concluded the SEC and OSHA actions were community property, Dr. Ben-
    12
    No. 72063-5-1/13
    Artzi argued the court must determine "which aspects of the award are separate, as with
    the OSHA claim (i.e., what portions are for personal injury, front pay, etc.)." Dr. Ben-
    Artzi also argued the court should "determine a net value after expenses, and determine
    to what extent my efforts to press the matter with the SEC after separation merit an
    increased percentage of the separate property."
    Dr. Ben-Artzi objected to the award of spousal maintenance, imputing income to
    him for purposes of calculating child support, and the award of attorney fees. Dr. Ben-
    Artzi did not address the parenting plan or the imposition of foreign travel restrictions.
    On May 21, 2014, the court entered a decree of dissolution, findings of fact and
    conclusions of law, the final parenting plan, and a final order of child support.
    The court found that the value of the Charles Schwab IRA "before withdrawals
    made by Husband in 2013 and 2014" was $139,332. The findings further state, in
    pertinent part:
    The Husband has committed waste in this matter by his violation of the
    court's Temporary Restraining Order entered March 26, 2013. The
    Husband improperly absconded with almost all of the parties' only
    retirement asset when he liquidated more than $120,000 of a community
    IRA.
    The court awarded each party 50 percent of the net proceeds of the SEC and
    OSHA actions.
    The court imposed foreign travel restrictions in the parenting plan under RCW
    26.09.191 (3)(g). The court found Dr. Ben-Artzi was a flight risk with the children and
    "likely to violate any court order to permit travel." The court awarded Gillian
    maintenance. The court found Dr. Ben-Artzi was voluntarily underemployed and
    imputed income to him, resulting in a monthly child support obligation of $1,777.60. The
    13
    No. 72063-5-1/14
    court ordered Dr. Ben-Artzi to pay $45,000.00 in attorney fees. The court concluded,
    "The Husband should be ordered to pay $45,000[.00] of the Wife's attorney fees
    pursuant to RCW 26.09.140, CR 37 and Washington law on the doctrine of
    intransigence."
    The court found Dr. Ben-Artzi remained in contempt of court for failure to comply
    with a number of court orders, including the order to provide full and complete
    responses to discovery, the order to pay child support, and the orders to pay attorney
    fees.
    The Husband has a pattern of willful disregard for court orders. He has
    been found in contempt of court twice. He has knowingly and intentionally
    failed to comply with court rules and court orders for production of
    discovery and preservation of marital assets. He has had court sanctions
    and discovery sanctions imposed against him. He has repeatedly been
    ordered to pay the Wife's attorney fees.
    The Husband has committed intransigence in this matter. He has
    knowingly and willfully obstructed this proceeding. His actions have been
    in bad and [sic] faith and have caused excessive and unnecessary
    litigation, thereby wasting court time and unreasonably causing the Wife to
    incur attorney fees. The Husband should be ordered to pay $45,000 of
    the Wife's attorney fees as a result of his misconduct throughout this
    matter.
    The court awarded Gillian "a marital lien in the amount of $200,583.12 which
    represents the total judgments awarded to her in this matter as property division,
    spousal maintenance (alimony), child support, discovery sanctions and attorney fees."
    The court ruled, "Discharge of the judgments shall reduce this sum accordingly."
    On June 10, 2014, Dr. Ben-Artzi filed a notice of appeal of the decree of
    dissolution, the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the final parenting plan, and the
    final child support order.
    14
    No. 72063-5-1/15
    On July 24, the superior court entered an order finding Dr. Ben-Artzi in contempt
    of court for intentionally failing to comply with the order of child support and the
    conditions of the decree including the failure to return the money he withdrew from the
    joint IRA. The court also found Dr. Ben-Artzi remained in contempt for failure to comply
    with other court orders including the order to produce bank statements.
    At the contempt review hearing on August 21, the court found that Dr. Ben-Artzi
    "failed to comply with any of the purge conditions" and that he "may have fled the United
    States due to his contempt of court." The court ordered Dr. Ben-Artzi to pay $825 in
    attorney fees within seven days and entered a $7,000 judgment in favor of Gillian for the
    daily penalty imposed for discovery violations. The court also ordered Dr. Ben-Artzi to
    "disclose his physical, residential address" within seven days.
    At the contempt review hearing on September 30, the court ordered Dr. Ben-Artzi
    to pay $500.00 in attorney fees within seven days and entered a $10,000.00 judgment
    for the "contempt violations from August 21 to date." The court also entered a judgment
    of $9,401.78 for past due child support, maintenance, and interest.
    In November 2014, Dr. Ben-Artzi filed a declaration, stating, "I have now found
    an excellent job in Israel, close to my family and friends. I will separately file my Israeli
    address under seal with the Court once the move is complete." Dr. Ben-Artzi asserted
    he had "not abandoned my children" and planned "to file for a new parenting plan in the
    very near future."
    15
    No. 72063-5-1/16
    ANALYSIS
    Motion To Dismiss
    Gillian seeks dismissal of the appeal on the grounds that Dr. Ben-Artzi refuses to
    comply with court orders and has fled the jurisdiction. We deny the motion to dismiss.
    As a general rule, a party is not precluded from filing an appeal even ifthe party
    is in contempt of court. See Jones v. Jones, 
    75 Wash. 50
    , 59, 
    134 P. 528
    (1913).
    Gillian's reliance on Pike v. Pike. 
    24 Wash. 2d 735
    , 
    167 P.2d 401
    (1946), is misplaced.
    In Pike, the mother absconded with the children after filing an appeal of an
    interlocutory custody order and "refused to disclose the present abode of herself and
    children." Pike, 24 Wash, at 736-37. The court entered "an order dismissing the
    appeal, to take effect on a certain day, . . . unless before that time appellant returns the
    children to their father in accordance with the interlocutory order." Pike, 24 Wash, at
    742-43.
    Standard of Review
    Dr. Ben-Artzi challenges (1) imposing international travel restrictions under RCW
    26.09.191 (3)(g), (2) imputing income for purposes of calculating child support, (3) the
    characterization and division of property, (4) the award of maintenance, and (5) the
    award of attorney fees.7
    We review the parenting plan, the order of child support, the characterization of
    property awarding Gillian half ofthe net proceeds in the SEC whistleblower action,
    7After oral argument, Dr. Ben-Artzi filed a supplemental designation ofclerk's papers and
    "Respondent's Declaration Compliance with Court Orders." Gillian objected to the supplemental
    designation on the grounds that it does not comply with the requirements of either RAP 9.6 orRAP 9.11.
    Because the supplemental designation does not comply with RAP 9.6 or RAP 9.11, we do not consider it.
    Dr. Ben-Artzi also filed a motion to consider additional evidence and to withdraw his challenge to the child
    support order and the parenting plan. Gillian filed an answer. We deny the request to consider additional
    evidence and the motion to withdraw the appeal of the child support order and the parenting plan.
    16
    No. 72063-5-1/17
    maintenance, and attorney fees for abuse of discretion. Katare v. Katare, 
    175 Wash. 2d 23
    , 35, 
    283 P.3d 546
    (2012); In re Marriage of Shui & Rose. 
    132 Wash. App. 568
    , 588,
    
    125 P.3d 180
    (2005); In re Marriage of Mattson. 
    95 Wash. App. 592
    , 604, 
    976 P.2d 157
    (1999); In re Marriage of Bulicek, 
    59 Wash. App. 630
    , 633, 
    800 P.2d 394
    (1990). The
    court abuses its discretion if the decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on
    untenable grounds or untenable reasons. 
    Katare, 175 Wash. 2d at 35
    .
    We review the court's decision to determine whether substantial evidence
    supports the findings and whether those findings, in turn, support the conclusions of
    law. 
    Katare, 175 Wash. 2d at 35
    ; In re Marriage of Mueller, 
    140 Wash. App. 498
    , 503-04,
    
    167 P.3d 568
    (2007). Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence sufficient to
    persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true. 
    Katare, 175 Wash. 2d at 35
    .
    We review the record "in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the findings
    were entered." In re Marriage of Gillespie. 
    89 Wash. App. 390
    , 404, 
    948 P.2d 1338
    (1997). We defer to the court's determination on issues of credibility and
    persuasiveness of the evidence. In re Marriage of Meredith. 
    148 Wash. App. 887
    , 891
    n.1,201 P.3d 1056 (2009).
    Parenting Plan
    Dr. Ben-Artzi contends the court abused its discretion by imposing foreign travel
    restrictions under RCW 26.09.191 (3)(g).8 Dr. Ben-Artzi contends the findings do not
    8 RCW 26.09.191(3) states, in pertinent part:
    A parent's involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect on the child's best
    interests, and the court may preclude or limit any provisions of the parenting plan, ifany
    of the following factors exist:
    (g) Such other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best
    interests of the child.
    17
    No. 72063-5-1/18
    support the conclusion that he "is a flight risk with the children."
    A trial court has the discretion to impose foreign travel restrictions in a parenting
    plan based on "factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best
    interests of the child." RCW 26.09.191 (3)(g); 
    Katare, 175 Wash. 2d at 35
    -36. The
    restrictions imposed "must be reasonably calculated to address the identified harm." In
    re Marriage of Katare. 
    125 Wash. App. 813
    , 826, 
    105 P.3d 44
    (2004). Imposition of
    restrictions on foreign travel is appropriate if the court finds there is "a danger of serious
    damage" such as abduction, even if the parent "had not yet attempted abduction."
    
    Katare. 175 Wash. 2d at 36
    .
    Here, the parenting plan states, in pertinent part:
    The Father is restricted and restrained from removing a child from the
    United States unless permitted by subsequent modification of this
    Parenting Plan. The Father shall not possess or seek to obtain a child's
    passport, passport card, birth certificate, or enhanced state [identification]
    card or license unless permitted by subsequent modification of this
    Parenting Plan. Modification of this Parenting Plan, if any, shall not occur
    except as provided by law pursuant to RCW 26.09.260.^
    The findings of fact and conclusions of law state, in pertinent part:
    The Husband is a flight risk with the children. These Findings of Fact and
    Conclusions provide a basis to determine that the Husband may
    improperly remove the children [from] the United States. He grew up in
    another country where he remains a citizen, served in the military, and has
    extensive contacts and influential family members in his country of origin.
    He is not a United Sates citizen. He has exhibited an extreme disregard
    for court orders, discovery rules, and his legal and financial duties to the
    community. The Husband is likely to violate any court order to permit
    travel. If he did so it would be harmful to the children and cause the Wife
    to incur substantial attorneys fees and delay to obtain the children's return
    to the United States. For these reasons, and because it is in the children's
    best interest, the Husband should be prohibited from international travel
    with the children as provided in the Parenting Plan.
    9The parenting plan also requires that"[a]ll passports, passport cards, birth certificates, or
    enhanced state [identification] cards or licenses for a child shall remain in the care and custody ofthe
    Mother."
    18
    No. 72063-5-1/19
    Dr. Ben-Artzi contends that because he violated orders related only to discovery
    and financial obligations, the finding that he "exhibited an extreme disregard for court
    orders" does not support the determination that he is likely to violate a court order
    permitting travel to Israel. We disagree. The undisputed record establishes Dr. Ben-
    Artzi willfully disregarded court orders and "exhibited an extreme disregard for court
    orders." Substantial evidence supports the finding that he "is likely to violate any court
    order to permit travel."
    Next, Dr. Ben-Artzi argues that unlike Katare, because Israel is a signatory to the
    Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the court erred
    by imposing travel restrictions.10
    In Katare, the court affirmed imposition of foreign travel restrictions based on the
    finding that the father demonstrated a "pattern of abusive behavior" and made "credible
    threats to abscond with the children" to India. 
    Katare, 175 Wash. 2d at 42
    , 29. The court
    held that because substantial evidence supported finding "a danger of serious damage
    (abduction)," the foreign travel restrictions were justified. 
    Katare, 175 Wash. 2d at 36
    , 38.
    Although the court notes the nonsignatory status of India, that factor was not dispositive.
    The court relied on evidence of threats made by the father and his pattern of abusive
    behavior. 
    Katare, 175 Wash. 2d at 37-38
    .11
    Here, as in Katare, substantial evidence supports the finding that Dr. Ben-Artzi is
    a flight risk and may improperly remove the children from the United States, and that "[i]f
    he did so, it would be harmful to the children."
    10 See 
    Katare. 175 Wash. 2d at 28
    n.1.
    11 And contrary to Dr. Ben-Artzi's assertion, Katare does not require expert testimony to
    determine whether the parent's conduct justifies imposition of travel restrictions in a parenting plan.
    19
    No. 72063-5-1/20
    Gillian testified Dr. Ben-Artzi had become "very vindictive" and she was
    concerned he would use his "power to somehow hurt me in a variety of ways, including
    taking the children." Gillian testified Dr. Ben-Artzi told her she would have no rights in
    Israel as "a non-Jewish mother," and "therefore he would have custody" of the children.
    We conclude substantial evidence supports the imposition of foreign travel restrictions.
    Child Support
    Dr. Ben-Artzi contends the court abused its discretion by imputing income to him
    based on his historical rate of pay for purposes of calculating child support. We review
    a trial court's "award of child support, including imputation of income for a voluntarily
    unemployed or underemployed parent," for abuse of discretion. 
    Shui, 132 Wash. App. at 588
    .
    In determining whether a parent is voluntarily underemployed, the court
    considers the parent's "work history, education, health, and age, or any other relevant
    factors." RCW 26.19.071 (6).12 The purpose of the statutory order of priority is to
    ensure that the amount imputed reflects "the level at which the parent is capable and
    qualified." In re Marriage of Sacco. 114Wn.2d 1,4, 784 P.2d 1266(1990).
    12 Under RCW 26.19.071(6):
    The court shall impute income to a parent when the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
    voluntarily underemployed.... In the absence of records of a parent's actual earnings,
    the court shall impute a parent's income in the following order of priority:
    (a) Full-time earnings at the current rate of pay;
    (b) Full-time earnings at the historical rate of pay based on reliable information,
    such as employment security department data;
    (c) Full-time earnings at a past rate of pay where information is incomplete or
    sporadic;
    (d) Full-time earnings at minimum wage in the jurisdiction where the parent
    resides if the parent has a recent history of minimum wage earnings, is recently coming
    off public assistance, aged, blind, or disabled assistance benefits, pregnant women
    assistance benefits, essential needs and housing support, supplemental security income,
    or disability, has recently been released from incarceration, or is a high school student;
    (e) Median net monthly income of year-round full-time workers as derived from
    the United States bureau of census, current population reports, or such replacement
    report as published by the bureau of census.
    20
    No. 72063-5-1/21
    The court did not abuse its discretion by imputing income to Dr. Ben-Artzi based
    on his "historical rate of pay" under RCW 26.19.071 (6)(b). Dr. Ben-Artzi has a PhD in
    mathematics from the "number one applied mathematics school in the country." After
    receiving his PhD, Dr. Ben-Artzi worked at Citigroup earning a base salary between
    $125,000 and $150,000. In January 2008, Dr. Ben-Artzi earned $132,551 at Goldman
    Sachs, and in 2011, he earned $160,000 at Deutsche Bank. But other than the
    semester he worked at Ohio State University, Dr. Ben-Artzi was unwilling to pursue
    employment after he was terminated from Deutsche Bank.
    Division of Property
    Dr. Ben-Artzi asserts the division of property is not just and equitable. He
    contends the court abused its discretion by awarding Gillian all of the funds in the IRA
    and half of the net proceeds in the SEC whistleblower action. Dr. Ben-Artzi does not
    challenge the award of 50 percent of the net proceeds from the OSHA action.
    In a dissolution action, the trial court must order a "just and equitable" distribution
    of the parties' assets and liabilities, whether community or separate. RCW 26.09.080.
    All property, both separate and community, is before the court for distribution. Farmer
    v. Farmer. 
    172 Wash. 2d 616
    , 625, 
    259 P.3d 256
    (2011). The characterization of the
    property as community or separate "is a relevant factor which must be considered, but it
    is not controlling." In re Marriage of Konzen. 
    103 Wash. 2d 470
    , 478, 
    693 P.2d 97
    (1985).
    Although under RCW 26.09.080 the trial court in a dissolution
    proceeding must consider the character and status of property before
    distribution, the actual characterization of property as community or
    separate is not essential to the exercise of discretion by the trial court in
    distributing assets and liabilities.
    In re Marriage of Brewer, 
    137 Wash. 2d 756
    , 770, 
    976 P.2d 102
    (1999).
    21
    No. 72063-5-1/22
    The court's characterization of property as separate or community presents a
    mixed question of law and fact. We review factual findings supporting the
    characterization for substantial evidence. 
    Mueller, 140 Wash. App. at 503-04
    . The
    ultimate characterization of property as community or separate is a question of law we
    review de novo. 
    Mueller. 140 Wash. App. at 503-04
    .
    In reaching a just and equitable property division, the trial court must consider (1)
    the nature and extent of the community property, (2) the nature and extent of the
    separate property, (3) the duration of the marriage, and (4) the economic circumstances
    of each spouse at the time the property division is to become effective. RCW
    26.09.080; In re Marriage of Rockwell, 
    141 Wash. App. 235
    , 242, 
    170 P.3d 572
    (2007).
    But these factors are not exclusive. RCW 26.09.080; In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn.
    App. 545, 556, 
    918 P.2d 954
    (1996).
    Because the trial court is in "the best position to assess the assets and liabilities
    of the parties," it has "broad discretion" to determine what is just and equitable under the
    circumstances. 
    Brewer, 137 Wash. 2d at 769
    . A just and equitable division "does not
    require mathematical precision, but rather fairness, based upon a consideration of all
    the circumstances of the marriage, both past and present, and an evaluation of the
    future needs of parties." 
    Crosetto. 82 Wash. App. at 556
    . The court has the discretion to
    award the separate property of one party to the other in appropriate circumstances, in
    re Marriage of DewBerrv, 
    115 Wash. App. 351
    , 366, 
    62 P.3d 525
    (2003); In re Marriage of
    White, 
    105 Wash. App. 545
    , 549, 
    20 P.3d 481
    (2001).
    We will seldom modify a trial court's division of property and assets on appeal. In
    re Marriage of Muhammad, 
    153 Wash. 2d 795
    , 808, 
    108 P.3d 779
    (2005). The party who
    22
    No. 72063-5-1/23
    challenges such a decision bears a heavy burden to show a manifest abuse of
    discretion on the part of the trial court. 
    Muhammad, 153 Wash. 2d at 808
    . A court abuses
    its discretion if its decision is outside the range of acceptable choices or based on
    untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 
    133 Wash. 2d 39
    ,
    47, 940P.2d 1362(1997).
    IRA
    Dr. Ben-Artzi contends the court abused its discretion by awarding Gillian "100
    percent" of the funds remaining in the IRA. We disagree. Substantial evidence
    supports the finding that Dr. Ben-Artzi "committed waste" when he "improperly
    absconded with almost all of the parties' only retirement asset." Between May 2013 and
    March 2014, Dr. Ben-Artzi withdrew approximately $120,000 from the joint IRA resulting
    in a loss of $10,000 in federal tax penalties. The value of the account before
    withdrawals by Dr. Ben-Artzi was approximately $139,332. The court did not abuse its
    discretion by ordering Dr. Ben-Artzi to pay Gillian the amount withdrawn and awarding
    the remaining funds in the IRA to Gillian.
    SEC Whistleblower Action
    Dr. Ben-Artzi argues the SEC action is a mere expectancy that is not subject to
    division in the dissolution proceeding. In the alternative, Dr. Ben-Artzi claims the court
    erred in mischaracterizing the potential award for emotional distress, punitive damages,
    and future lost wages and awarding each party 50 percent of the net proceeds in the
    SEC whistleblower action.
    The court found that based on "all the circumstances of this case" including Dr.
    Ben-Artzi's refusal to comply with court orders to provide responses to discovery or "pay
    23
    No. 72063-5-1/24
    [Gillian] as required by prior Orders of [the] Court, ... a fair allocation of net litigation
    proceeds is 50% / 50%." The decree states, in pertinent part:
    Property to be Awarded the Husband
    Except as specifically awarded to the Wife, the Husband is awarded as his
    separate property all of the following:
    50% of the net proceeds, damages or any monetary losses,
    earnings, claims, compensation, fees, rewards, entitlements,
    unpaid or lost wages, contingent future interests, costs,
    disbursements, awards, wrongful termination, punitive damages, or
    any other such monetary dispensation (distribution, payment, etc[.])
    in any action, litigation, wrongful discharge, administrative
    proceeding, case, cause, or any other such legal case, court matter
    or administrative proceeding including, without limitation, the
    whistleblower matter before [OSHA] and its derivative or related
    proceedings, the whistleblower matter before [SEC] and its
    derivative or related proceedings, except as specifically provided
    below and otherwise awarded to the Wife. "Net proceeds" is
    defined in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this
    matter. Based on all the circumstances of this case, including
    Husband's failure to pay Wife as required by prior Orders of this
    Court, the Court finds that a fair allocation of net litigation proceeds
    is 50% / 50%.
    The court defined "net proceeds" as "the gross proceeds received" in a judgment,
    settlement, or award, minus "attorney fees and testifying expert fees."
    The findings of fact and conclusions of law further state, in pertinent part:
    The parties have the following community property:
    Net proceeds of litigation and/or potential litigation arising from
    events which occurred during or in relation to Husband's
    employment with Deutsche Bank. This includes proceeds,
    damages, monetary losses, earnings, claims, compensation, fees,
    rewards, entitlements, unpaid or lost wages, contingent future
    interests, costs, disbursements, awards, wrongful termination,
    punitive damages, or any other such monetary dispensation
    (distribution, payment, etc[.]) in any action, litigation, wrongful
    discharge, administrative proceeding, case, cause, or any other
    24
    No. 72063-5-1/25
    such legal case, court matter or administrative proceeding
    including, without limitation, the whistleblower matter before
    [OSHA] and its derivative or related proceedings, and the
    whistleblower matter before [SEC] and its derivative or related
    proceedings.
    The court specifically awarded future lost wages to Dr. Ben-Artzi as his separate
    property. The findings of fact state, in pertinent part:
    Each party has separate property consisting of his or her accumulated
    income, belongings, retirement, etc., obtained after March 26, 2013.
    The Husband has no other separate property, except for the Center for
    Model Risk Research, potential future lost wages after March 26, 2013,
    and the non-community portion, if any, of possible emotional damages
    after March 26, 2013 with respect to the foregoing whistleblower action(s).
    The court ordered Dr. Ben-Artzi to pay all attorney fees, costs, and expenses
    incurred with attorneys and others for the SEC and OSHA actions.
    The Husband should be ordered to pay all attorney fees, costs and
    expense he has incurred or will incur with Kristen Reid, Ronald Hardesty,
    David Starks, Thad Guyer, Jordon Thomas, Adrian Fournier, McKinley
    Irvin, Belcher Swanson, Labaton & Sucharow, Kilgour Williams Group, or
    any other attorney with respect to any and all matters including, without
    limitation, this matter, [SEC], [OSHA] or any other such agency, entity,
    business, employer, or third party with respect to any proceeding, matter
    or cause of action.
    First, Dr. Ben-Artzi argues the court erred in awarding Gillian 50 percent of the
    net proceeds because the SEC action is a mere expectancy that is not subject to
    division. We disagree. "Enforceable contract rights and contingent future interests,
    such as lawsuit proceeds and fee arrangements, are all property interests subject to
    characterization as separate or community property for distribution purposes." In re
    Estate of Duxbury. 
    175 Wash. App. 151
    , 161, 
    304 P.3d 480
    (2013). " The law has long
    recognized that a contingent future interest is property no matter how improbable the
    25
    No. 72063-5-1/26
    contingency.'" In re Marriage of Leiand. 
    69 Wash. App. 57
    , 71, 
    847 P.2d 518
    (1993)
    (quoting In re Marriage of Brown, 
    15 Cal. 3d 838
    , 
    126 Cal. Rptr. 633
    , 638 n.8 (1976)).
    " The fact that a contractual right is contingent upon future events does not degrade
    that right to an expectancy.'" 
    Leiand. 69 Wash. App. at 71
    (quoting 
    Brown. 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638
    n.8). An expectancy " 'is not to be deemed an interest of any kind.'" 
    Leiand. 69 Wash. App. at 71
    13 (quoting 
    Brown, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638
    n.8).
    The undisputed record supports finding the SEC action is a contingent future
    interest subject to division. Consistent with well-established case law, Gillian's expert
    described the difference between a contingent future interest and an expectancy.
    Brewe states, in pertinent part:
    An expectancy is a mere hope, based upon no direct provision,
    promise, or trust. An expectancy is the possibility of receiving a thing,
    rather than having a vested interest in it. . . . Because expectancies are
    such tenuous interests, they are not property rights subject to division, in
    re Estate of Baird, 
    131 Wash. 2d 514
    , 521-22, 
    933 P.2d 1031
    (1997).l14l
    On the other hand, Brewe states:
    A contingent future interest is a vested interest... but the interest
    can only be exercised upon the happening of a future event, and the
    future event is not certain to occur. . . . Contingent future interests are
    property rights subject to division. [Leiand, 69 Wn. App. 71]J15'
    The evidence at trial supports the court's determination that the SEC action is a
    contingent future interest and not a mere expectancy. The undisputed evidence
    established the SEC action is a vested contingent action subject to division. Brewe
    testified that because Dr. Ben-Artzi "filed an actual claim for the award with the SEC, . .
    his interest is vested, but the interest is contingent upon the SEC acting against
    13 Internal quotation marks omitted.
    14 Emphasis in original.
    15 Emphasis in original.
    26
    No. 72063-5-1/27
    Deutsche Bank" and imposing sanctions of over $1 million. The SEC must award
    between 10 percent and 30 percent of the money collected in an SEC enforcement
    action that results in sanctions of over $1 million. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21 F-3(a), .21F-
    5(b).
    The case Dr. Ben-Artzi relies on, Freeburn v. Freeburn, 
    107 Wash. 646
    , 
    182 P. 620
    (1919), is distinguishable. In Freeburn, the husband received a monthly salary and
    dividends under a mining contract that was set to expire. Freeburn, 107 Wash, at 650.
    The court declined to treat the proceeds of a hypothetical renewal of the contract as
    property subject to division, stating, "It is mere speculation to suggest that this contract
    may be renewed upon the same or any terms whatever." Freeburn, 107 Wash, at 650.
    In the alternative, Dr. Ben-Artzi claims that if the SEC action is subject to division
    in the dissolution, the court erred in failing to take into consideration his right to
    reimbursement for his postseparation work on the SEC action. The record does not
    support his argument.
    Gillian testified Dr. Ben-Artzi "pursued these legal cases since 2010" and the
    "investigations became his full-time job in June 2011." Dr. Ben-Artzi refused to provide
    in discovery the information concerning his efforts. Under CR 37, the court excluded
    any evidence Dr. Ben-Artzi did not produce during discovery. Dr. Ben-Artzi did not
    respond to discovery requesting information about his work on the SEC action and the
    fees paid to attorneys and experts in connection with the SEC and OSHA actions.
    Dr. Ben-Artzi also argues the court abused its discretion in requiring him to pay
    the attorney and expert fees incurred in pursuing the SEC action. Based on the
    undisputed record, the court did not err in requiring Dr. Ben-Artzi to pay attorney fees
    27
    No. 72063-5-1/28
    and expert costs. The evidence at trial established Dr. Ben-Artzi retained attorneys to
    file the SEC and OSHA claims during the marriage and paid experts using community
    funds.
    Next, Dr. Ben-Artzi claims the court erred in failing to characterize emotional
    damages and future earnings as separate property. It is well established that any
    award of emotional damages is separate property and future lost wages may be
    separate property. In re Marriage of Brown, 
    100 Wash. 2d 729
    , 738, 
    675 P.2d 1207
    (1984); In re Marriage of Kraft. 
    119 Wash. 2d 438
    , 451, 
    832 P.2d 871
    (1992). The court
    awarded Dr. Ben-Artzi future lost wages. The court also found that if Dr. Ben-Artzi
    receives "damages for emotional distress," that portion would be separate property.
    Nonetheless, to the extent the court did not accurately characterize future lost
    wages and emotional damages, remand is not necessary. Mischaracterization of
    property requires remand only if we conclude "(1) the trial court's reasoning indicates
    that its division was significantly influenced by its characterization of the property, and
    (2) it is not clear that had the court properly characterized the property, it would have
    divided it in the same way." In re Marriage of Shannon, 
    55 Wash. App. 137
    , 142, 
    777 P.2d 8
    (1989).
    Here, the record establishes the court's decision to award each party 50 percent
    of the net proceeds from the SEC and OSHA actions was not significantly influenced by
    the characterization of future lost wages and emotional damages. The court explicitly
    found that "[b]ased on all the circumstances of this case, including Husband's failure to
    pay Wife as required by prior Orders ofthis Court, ... a fair allocation of net litigation
    28
    No. 72063-5-1/29
    proceeds is 50% / 50%." The court did not err in concluding an equal division of the net
    proceeds of the SEC action was just and equitable.
    Life Insurance Policy
    Dr. Ben-Artzi contends the provision in the decree that requires him to obtain a
    life insurance policy for the benefit of Gillian is ambiguous as to whether he must pay
    the premiums. In the alternative, Dr. Ben-Artzi argues that if he must pay the premiums,
    it is an abuse of discretion.
    The decree states Gillian "shall be permitted to maintain a life insurance policy
    insuring the Husband's life for so long as he owes any obligations to her or regarding a
    child under any court order." The findings specifically state:
    Because of the Husband's intransigence and pattern of misconduct, he
    should be ordered to pay the Wife for her to maintain a life insurance
    policy insuring his own life for so long as he has obligations owed to her or
    [their] children under the Decree or an Order of Child Support.
    The plain and unambiguous language requires Dr. Ben-Artzi to pay Gillian the
    amount necessary for her to maintain the life insurance policy. Substantial evidence
    also supports the finding that because of Dr. Ben-Artzi's intransigence and pattern of
    misconduct, he should pay Gillian the amount necessary for her to maintain the life
    insurance policy. The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Dr. Ben-Artzi to pay
    Gillian the amount necessary for her to pay the premiums for the life insurance policy.
    Maintenance
    Dr. Ben-Artzi contends the court abused its discretion in awarding maintenance.
    An award of maintenance is within the broad discretion of the trial court. 
    Bulicek, 59 Wash. App. at 633
    . The only limitation on the amount and duration of maintenance under
    29
    No. 72063-5-1/30
    RCW 26.09.090 is that the award must be just. In re Marriage of Luckev, 73 Wn. App.
    201,209, 868 P.2d 189(1994).
    The court found Gillian "is more likely to be in greater need of funds during this
    next year as her employment situation is not fully stabilized." The court ordered Dr.
    Ben-Artzi to pay "maintenance at $3,000 per month for the first year and at $2,500 a
    month for the next two years." Substantial evidence supports the award of
    maintenance.
    After Gillian gave birth to their first child in 2007, the couple agreed she should
    stop working and be a "stay-at-home mother." At the time of trial, Gillian was employed
    as a "long-term substitute" teacher but hoped "to find a permanent position at the school
    where I work" and eventually earn the salary of "a full-time regularly appointed teacher."
    Attorney Fees
    Dr. Ben-Artzi contends the court abused its discretion by awarding Gillian
    attorney fees. The party challenging an award of attorney fees has the burden of
    proving the court abused its discretion by making a decision that is clearly untenable or
    manifestly unreasonable. 
    Mattson. 95 Wash. App. at 604
    .
    After deducting $7,000 that "would have been incurred by her in the absence of
    the intransigence on Dr. Ben-Artzi's part," the court awarded Gillian $68,493 in attorney
    fees. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding of intransigence and the award
    of fees. Dr. Ben-Artzi's refusal to comply with the discovery rules and multiple court
    orders resulted in significant delay and additional expense. The court did not abuse its
    discretion by awarding Gillian attorney fees.
    30
    No. 72063-5-1/31
    We affirm in all respects. Upon compliance with RAP 18.1, we award Gillian fees
    on appeal. See RCW 26.09.140; 
    Mattson, 95 Wash. App. at 605-06
    .
    JU-W/^£iUv
    7
    WE CONCUR:
    31