Watson v. Sch Bd of Franklin Parish ( 2023 )

Case: 22-30038 Document: 00516648312 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/16/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 22-30038 February 16, 2023
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Esther Watson,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
School Board of Franklin Parish; Eddie Ray Bryan;
Ronnie Hatton; Danny Davis; Richard Kelly; Louise
Johnson; Tim Eubanks; Dorothy Brown; Lanny Johnson,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:20-CV-527
Before Stewart, Dennis, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge: *
For approximately half a century, Esther Watson worked in
education, including as a teacher for over twenty years, an assistant principal
for almost a decade, a principal for around seven years, and a child welfare
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.
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No. 22-30038
and attendance supervisor for another seven years or so. Starting in 2009,
Watson served as the assistant principal of Winnsboro Elementary School
(WES) in Franklin Parish, Louisiana. During the 2017-18 school year, the
principal of WES resigned. Watson, an African American woman, applied for
the open position. She was not selected, and the position went to Scott
McHand, a white man who had eight years of teaching experience. Watson
then sued the Franklin Parish School Board, alleging that she was not selected
for the position because of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. The district court dismissed the claims against the School Board
members and Johnson in their individual capacities and then, after discovery,
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining Title
VII claims. Watson now appeals this grant of summary judgment. Because
we find that Watson provided evidence that she was clearly better qualified
than the white man who was selected, we reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I.
In 1973, Esther Watson, an African American woman, was hired by
the Catahoula Parish School Board as a teacher. Over the next thirty-five
years, Watson worked as an educator within the Catahoula Parish school
district board. She spent the first twenty years or so as a teacher before, in
1994, becoming principal of a junior high school. Watson spent
approximately seven years as a school principal. Then, in 2001, she became
the child welfare and attendance supervisor in Catahoula Parish. During her
time in Catahoula Parish, Watson achieved ten certifications, including
certifications to serve as a superintendent (2001), a principal (1979), a
supervisor of student teaching (1984), a parish/city school supervisor of
instruction (1979), and an adult education administrator and/or supervisor
2
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(1995). 1 In 1976, she also obtained a Master of Education plus 30 hours in
graduate courses. Watson retired from the Catahoula Parish School district
in 2008.
After approximately one month of retirement, Watson applied for the
position of assistant principal at a junior high school in Franklin Parish.
Watson was hired for the position by Dr. Lanny Johnson, the superintendent
for Franklin Parish. Watson spent one year at the junior high before moving
to serve as Winnsboro Elementary School’s (WES) assistant principal.
Ronald Lofton, WES’s principal, had served as superintendent for Catahoula
Parish while Watson was employed there and specifically requested that
Watson serve as his assistant principal. Lofton resigned from this position in
the 2017-18 school year.
Watson applied for the now-open position of principal of WES. As
part of the selection process, the personnel director for Franklin Parish
assembled an interview committee to conduct the initial review of
candidates. 2 The interview committee then provided the rankings of the
candidates to the superintendent, Johnson, who made the ultimate decision
as to whom to hire. Watson scored higher on the interview score. 3
1
Watson also received certifications in other areas, including certifications to serve
as an adult education instructor (1995) and for adapted physical education (1983).
2
Typically, the interview committee was comprised of administrators from the
central office as well as, possibly, principals from the other schools in the district and a
teacher from the school for which the position was being filled.
3
It is an undisputed fact, asserted by both parties, that Watson scored higher on
the interview. Although the record does not appear to contain comparative scores, the
parties agree that her score was slightly higher.
3
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Watson, however, was not selected to serve as principal of WES for
the 2018-19 school year. Instead, Scott McHand, a white man, got the
position. McHand had been employed as a teacher by the Franklin Parish
School Board since 2011, including one year experience serving as a Mentor
Teacher. He did not have any prior experience as a school administrator,
although he had both a Master of Teaching, Elementary Education (2012)
and a Master of Educational Leadership (2018).
In April 2020, Watson filed suit against the Franklin Parish School
Board, its individual members, and Johnson (collectively referred to as the
“School Board”) in their individual and official capacities, claiming that she
was not selected as principal of WES due to racial discrimination. While the
suit was pending, the district court dismissed the claims against the school
board members and Johnson in their individual capacities on grounds of
qualified and statutory immunity. The School Board then moved for
summary judgment on the remaining claims against the remaining
defendants in their official capacities; the district court granted the motion
and dismissed Watson’s suit with prejudice. Watson appeals.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020). “Summary
judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.’” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A genuine issue of material fact
exists when there is evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find for
the non-moving party.” Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 323
(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). When reviewing an appeal from summary
judgment, we must view the facts and evidence in the light most favorable to
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the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Hanks v.
Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 743-44 (5th Cir. 2017).
A Title VII claim for employment discrimination based on
circumstantial evidence is evaluated under the burden-shifting framework
first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Roberson-King v. La. Workforce Comm’n, Office of Workforce Dev., 904 F.3d
377, 380-81 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04).
Under this this three-part framework, “a plaintiff must first establish
a prima facie case of discrimination, which requires a showing that the
plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the
position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment
action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside [her]
protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated
employees outside the protected group.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492
F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007).
Once the plaintiff has made this showing, the burden shifts to the
employer to “articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
employment action.” Morris v. Town of Independence, 827 F.3d 396, 400 (5th
Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). This burden “is one of production, not
persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment.” Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to “rebut the employer’s purported explanation” and “to show that
the reason given is merely pretextual.” Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d
917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). When conducting the pretext inquiry, we do “not
‘engage in second-guessing of an employer’s business decisions.’” Roberson-
King, 904 F.3d at 381 (quoting LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480
F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2007)).
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It is undisputed that Watson has established a prima facie case of
employment discrimination. Watson, an African American female, is a
member of a protected class and was qualified for the principal position.
Nonetheless, she was rejected from that position in favor of McHand, a white
man.
The School Board, however, contends that it provided legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons as to why McHand, not Watson, was selected for
the position. According to the School Board, Johnson considered a variety of
factors, including the educational credentials, certifications, interview
scores, work history, and, most importantly, “anticipated length of service”
when making his decision. Specifically, Johnson believed that Watson was
unlikely to remain in the principalship position, or even with the Franklin
Parish School Board, for the long term. This conclusion was based on two
primary factors: first, that Watson was a retiree returned to work and second,
that Watson, unlike McHand, did not live in Franklin Parish.
Assuming that these proffered reasons are legitimate and non-
discriminatory, the burden shifts back to Watson to show that the School
Board’s asserted justification is pretextual. 4 Watson may “establish pretext
‘by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is false or unworthy
of credence.’” Roberson-King, 904 F.3d at 381 (quoting Laxton v. Gap Inc.,
333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003)). Alternatively, she may show that a fact
finder could infer pretext by presenting evidence that she was “‘clearly better
4
Watson contends that any consideration of her status as a retiree returned to work
would constitute impermissible age discrimination under the Age Discrimination
Employment Act. Because we find that Watson provides evidence sufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact as to whether the reasons given by the School Board were pretextual,
we need not resolve the issue as to whether one of the bases for Watson’s non-selection
was itself discriminatory.
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qualified’ (as opposed to merely better or as qualified)” than the employee
who was selected. EEOC v. La. Office of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1444 (5th
Cir. 1995); see also McMichael v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.,
934 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a plaintiff “must show that
his replacement, if any, is clearly less qualified” to show pretext); see also
Stennett v. Tupelo Pub. Sch. Dist., 619 F. App’x 310, 319 (5th Cir. 2015)
(noting that, where the plaintiff was alleging age discrimination, “a
reasonable jury could consider the strength of [the plaintiff’s] qualifications
vis-à-vis the successful younger applicants as undermining the credibility of
[the defendant’s] proffered hiring rationale”).
“To meet her burden to show that she was clearly better qualified, the
plaintiff ‘must present evidence from which a jury could conclude that no
reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen
the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question.’” Roberson-
King, 904 F.3d at 381 (quoting Moss, 610 F.3d at 923). “Showing that two
candidates are similarly qualified does not establish pretext under this
standard,” Price v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 723 (5th Cir. 2002), and
employers are “generally free to weigh the qualifications of prospective
employees,” Martinez v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n-Civil Rights Div., 775 F.3d
685, 688 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that “an employee’s ‘better education, work
experience, and longer tenure with the company [did] not establish that [s]he
[was] clearly better qualified,’” where other considerations weighed in favor
of the selected candidate (quoting Price, 283 F.3d at 723)).
Here, Watson produced evidence from which a jury could find that
she was clearly better qualified for the principal position and that therefore
the School Board’s proffered reasons for selecting McHand over her were
pretextual. Watson presented evidence showing that she had significantly
more educational certifications than McHand. More importantly, she also
presented evidence as to her substantial amount of relevant work experience,
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above all almost a decade as assistant principal at WES and several years as a
principal in Catahoula Parish. 5 In comparison, McHand, although he had
recently received a degree in educational leadership, had less than a decade
of teaching experience and no prior experience in any administrative
position. Additionally, Watson scored higher in her interview with the
interview committee. Given Watson’s long history of experience in
administrative positions, especially as both an assistant principal and
principal, her larger number of educational certifications of all types,
including a certification to serve as a superintendent, and stronger
performance before the interview committee, a jury could—not necessarily
will—find that no reasonable person could have selected McHand over her
in the absence of racial discrimination. Accordingly, summary judgment was
inappropriate.
III.
For the reasons given above, we REVERSE the district court and
REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
5
We reiterate that years of experience alone generally is not determinative of
whether a candidate is “clearly better qualified.” However, we note that in Moss, upon
which the district court relied for the proposition that an “attempt to equate years served
with superior qualifications is unpersuasive,” Moss, 610 F.3d at 923 (cleaned up), we
affirmed the grant of summary judgment only after confirming that the selected applicant,
although she had less years of overall experience, had considerably more specialized
experience than the plaintiff. Id. at 924. Here, Watson relies heavily on her years of
experience as a school administrator, including nearly a decade as assistant principal at WES
as well as her prior principalship in Catahoula Parish. McHand has no such specialized
experience.
8