Alden Leeds, Inc. v. NLRB , 812 F.3d 159 ( 2016 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued September 18, 2015          Decided February 5, 2016
    No. 11-1267
    ALDEN LEEDS, INC.,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    RESPONDENT
    UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 1245,
    INTERVENOR
    Consolidated with 11-1296
    On Petition for Review and Cross-Application
    for Enforcement of an Order of
    the National Labor Relations Board
    Joseph B. Fiorenzo argued the cause and filed the briefs
    for petitioner.
    Jeffrey W. Burritt, Attorney, National Labor Relations
    Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the
    brief were John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel,
    Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and
    Robert J. Englehart, Supervisory Attorney.
    2
    Patricia McConnell and Jessica D. Ochs were on the
    brief for intervenor United Food and Commercial Workers
    Local 1245 in support of respondent.
    Before: TATEL, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and
    GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    EDWARDS.
    EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Petitioner Alden Leeds,
    Inc. (“Alden Leeds” or “the Company”), seeks review of a
    Decision and Order issued by the National Labor Relations
    Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) on July 19, 2011. The Board
    has filed a cross-application for enforcement. The United
    Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1245 (“the
    Union”), the charging party before the Board, has intervened
    in support of the Board.
    The Board found that Alden Leeds had violated Sections
    8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”
    or “the Act”), 
    29 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(1), (3), by locking out its
    employees on November 3, 2009, without providing the
    employees with a timely, clear, and complete offer setting
    forth the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. Alden
    Leeds, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (July 19, 2011). Alden
    Leeds claims that substantial evidence in the record does not
    support the Board’s finding that the Company committed the
    cited unfair labor practices. Alden Leeds also argues that,
    even if the lockout was unlawful, the Board erred in declining
    to allow the Company to attempt to establish in a separate
    compliance proceeding that its backpay liability ended on
    November 9, 2009.
    3
    We hold that, on the record before us, there is substantial
    evidence to support the Board’s finding that Alden Leeds
    violated the Act by locking out its employees on November 3,
    2009. Therefore, we deny the Company’s petition for review
    on this issue and grant the Board’s cross-application for
    enforcement.
    We have no jurisdiction to consider the Company’s claim
    that the Board erred in precluding it from litigating its
    backpay liability in a compliance proceeding. Alden Leeds
    failed to raise this issue before the Board in the first instance,
    as required by Section 10(e) of the Act. See 
    29 U.S.C. § 160
    (e) (“No objection that has not been urged before the
    Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by
    the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection
    shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”).
    There are no “extraordinary circumstances” here which give
    the court jurisdiction to address this matter.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    Petitioner Alden Leeds manufactures and packages
    swimming pool cleaning supplies and chemicals at two
    locations in New Jersey. The Company employs
    approximately fifty production and delivery employees, who
    have been represented by the Union since 2001. In September
    2009, Alden Leeds and the Union commenced negotiations on
    a new contract to succeed their 2005 collective bargaining
    agreement, which was set to expire on October 3, 2009. The
    Union sought increases in wages, sick days, and vacation
    days; changes in seniority; and a three-year agreement. The
    main sticking point between the parties was health care.
    Premiums were set to increase under the existing health care
    plan, and the Company and Union disagreed over how to
    apportion the increases.
    4
    The parties’ first bargaining session was on September
    30, 2009. At that meeting, Tom Cunningham, the Union’s
    business agent, went through the Union’s proposals and
    explained that the Union was seeking to keep its existing
    health care plan, which would necessitate increased
    contributions from the Company. Mark Epstein, the
    Company’s president and chief executive officer, informed
    Cunningham that the Company was not going to agree to the
    health care contribution increases the Union was seeking.
    Nonetheless, Epstein told Cunningham that he was going to
    explore alternative health care plans with the Company’s
    insurance broker.
    The next meeting between the parties took place on
    October 5. Epstein provided Cunningham with descriptions of
    several alternative health care plans that had been prepared by
    the Company’s broker. Cunningham stated that the plans
    would not work for the Union employees, as the deductibles
    and out-of-pocket costs were very high. Epstein responded
    that the Company’s broker would look into other health care
    plans that might be more affordable for the employees.
    Cunningham then attempted to discuss the Union’s other
    contract proposals, but Epstein interjected that he “couldn’t
    do anything” with the other proposals, and that all the
    Company wanted was “a freeze for one year.” Alden Leeds,
    Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 20, at 3. Cunningham responded that
    the Union would not agree to such a deal because the
    Company’s current health care contributions would not
    sustain medical coverage for the year. Epstein repeated that he
    would furnish Union officials with additional health care
    plans for their consideration.
    On October 8, the Company and the Union met again. At
    this meeting, Epstein stated that he was still trying to obtain
    5
    some additional health care plan proposals to provide the
    Union. Epstein also repeated that the Company wanted to
    extend the current contract for one year with a one-year
    “freeze.” 
    Id. at 4
    . However, Epstein informed the Union that
    he expected to have information on some additional health
    care plans by the next week. The parties signed an agreement
    at their October 8 meeting extending the 2005 collective
    bargaining agreement until November 2.
    On October 21, Epstein emailed Cunningham an
    additional health care plan for the Union to review. Epstein
    also indicated that he “hoped to have something even better”
    and that he would advise the Union if anything came through.
    
    Id. at 5
    . The next day, on October 22, Epstein emailed
    Cunningham an analysis of the health care plan that the
    Company had provided to the Union the day before. Epstein
    explained that the cost of the plan would be more expensive
    than the existing plan, but less expensive than the Union’s
    proposed renewal. Alternatively, Epstein suggested that if the
    Company provided employee-only coverage and eliminated
    family coverage, the cost would drop below the existing plan
    and the company could pay $400 towards each employee’s
    deductible. Epstein ended his email by reiterating that he
    hoped to have something better later that day and, if so, he
    would forward it to the Union.
    Later on October 22, Epstein emailed Cunningham yet
    another health care plan. He explained that, although the cost
    was similar to the plan that he had provided the day before
    and the deductible was higher, employees would not be
    required to provide their medical histories in order to secure
    coverage. Cunningham showed these plans to the Union’s
    secretary treasurer, John Troccoli. Cunningham told Troccoli
    that he was not really sure what the Company was proposing
    6
    on health care and that the Company had made no proposal
    dealing with the Union’s other issues.
    On October 30, Troccoli telephoned Epstein and
    informed him that the Union did not think any of the
    Company’s proposed health care plans would work because
    the deductibles were too high, medical reviews were required,
    and the cost to employees would be too high. As a
    concession, the Union offered the Company a continuation of
    the existing health care plan for one year at the same
    contribution levels. Troccoli requested that the parties go
    forward and discuss the other outstanding issues. Epstein
    replied, “You don’t understand. I just want to keep everything
    the same. I don’t want to pay anything more. . . . I want to
    keep everything the same for one year.” 
    Id. at 6
     (ellipsis in
    original). Troccoli responded that the Union was willing to do
    that with health care, but wanted to discuss the other
    outstanding issues. Epstein repeated that he wanted to keep
    everything the same for one year, and that the Union
    employees were supposed to vote on the Company’s offer.
    Troccoli responded, “Vote on what? I have no idea what
    we’re voting on.” 
    Id.
     Epstein stated that if the employees did
    not vote and agree to the Company’s offer, the employees
    would be locked out. Troccoli repeated that he did not know
    what the Union employees were supposed to be voting on.
    Epstein replied that the Union would have something by the
    end of the day.
    Later that day, Epstein sent an email to the Union, which
    stated:
    During the 30 days since the Agreement between the
    parties expired we at the Company have tried our best to
    come up with an alternative medical plan that would cost
    the same or less than the proposed increase for the Union
    7
    plan. Our best efforts resulted in a plan that 1) requires
    medical interview for coverage 2) does not include dental
    3) does not include optical 4) did not cost less than the
    expiring plan. However if we were to eliminate the
    family coverage and go to single coverage for all Union
    members then this plan would cost less than the expiring
    Union plan. There would be enough of a savings that the
    Company would provide $400 to each member to go
    toward their deductibles. . . . If we have no Agreement
    between the parties by the close of business on Monday
    then the Company will lock out the Union members on
    Tuesday morning Nov 3, 2009.
    
    Id.
     Union officials made no effort to contact Epstein regarding
    his email. At 4 p.m. on November 2, Epstein informed the
    Union that, effective immediately, the employees were locked
    out. On November 3, the Union employees attempted to
    punch in at work but were prevented from doing so by the
    Company.
    The parties met on November 3, 4, and 9. At the meeting
    on November 9, the Company presented the Union with a
    document entitled “Final Offer.” 
    Id. at 8
    . In its “Final Offer,”
    the Company specified the health care plan that would be
    provided to employees and the contribution rates for both
    employees and the Company. The “Final Offer” further stated
    that all other terms of the 2005 collective bargaining
    agreement would remain in full force and effect. On
    November 12, the Union rejected the Company’s “Final
    Offer.”
    8
    II. THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE BOARD
    The Union filed unfair labor practice charges against the
    Company. Thereafter, the Board’s Regional Director issued a
    complaint and notice of hearing, alleging, inter alia, that
    Alden Leeds violated Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act
    by unlawfully locking out its employees. On August 30, 2010,
    following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
    concluded that Alden Leeds had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and
    (3) of the Act by locking out its employees on November 3,
    2009, without providing its employees with a timely, clear,
    and complete offer setting forth the conditions necessary to
    avoid the lockout. Alden Leeds, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 20, at
    10-13. The ALJ noted that the Company’s October 30 email
    purporting to detail the terms of its offer was confusing,
    incomplete, and internally inconsistent, and that both
    Cunningham and Troccoli were confused about which health
    care plan, if any, the Company was proposing. 
    Id. at 11
    . The
    ALJ found that the Company first submitted a complete
    proposal to the Union on November 9, 2009. 
    Id. at 12
    . The
    ALJ found, however, that this proposal did not cure the
    Company’s failure to provide a complete proposal prior to the
    lockout, and that the lockout, unlawful at its inception,
    retained its initial taint of illegality until it was terminated and
    the affected employees were made whole. 
    Id.
     The ALJ
    recommended that the Company should cease and desist from
    illegally locking out its employees, reinstate the unlawfully
    locked out employees, and provide the unlawfully locked out
    employees full backpay. 
    Id. at 13
    .
    On July 19, 2011, the Board substantially adopted the
    ALJ’s findings and his recommended order. 
    Id. at 1
    . The
    Board added the following explanation to its judgment:
    9
    We agree with the [ALJ], for the reasons he states,
    that the lockout’s initial illegality was not cured when the
    Respondent provided the Union with a complete contract
    proposal on November 9, 2009, almost 1 week after the
    lockout began. The [ALJ] specifically so found and the
    [Company] has not argued in its exceptions or brief in
    support that the judge erred in so finding. Moreover, it is
    well established that “a lockout unlawful at its inception
    retains its initial taint of illegality until it is terminated
    and the affected employees are made whole.” Movers and
    Warehousemen’s Assn. of Washington DC, 
    224 NLRB 356
    , 357 (1976), enfd. 
    550 F.2d 962
     (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
    denied 
    434 U.S. 826
     (1977). The Board further held in its
    decision on the merits in Movers, “the burden must be on
    Respondent to show that its failure to restore the status
    quo ante had no adverse impact on the subsequent
    collective bargaining,” and that “no such showing has
    been made.” 
    Id. at 358
    . Here, the [ALJ] did not find that
    the [Company] has carried its burden in this regard and
    the [Company] did not except to the absence of such a
    finding. In these circumstances, further litigation of this
    matter at compliance is unwarranted.
    
    Id.
     at 1 n.3. One member of the Board indicated that he would
    have allowed the Company to litigate its backpay liability at a
    compliance proceeding even though Alden Leeds had failed
    to raise a specific exception to the ALJ’s decision on this
    point. 
    Id.
    Alden Leeds now petitions for review of the Board’s
    Decision and Order. Specifically, Alden Leeds raises two
    challenges. First, Alden Leeds argues that the Board erred in
    adopting the ALJ’s finding that the Company violated the Act
    by failing to provide the Union with a timely, clear, and
    complete offer setting forth the conditions necessary to avoid
    10
    the lockout. Second, Alden Leeds contends that the Board
    erred in concluding that further litigation of the Company’s
    backpay liability in a compliance proceeding was
    unwarranted.
    III. DEFERENCE DUE TO THE BOARD’S FINDINGS
    It is well established that this court “accords a very high
    degree of deference to administrative adjudications by the
    NLRB.” Bally’s Park Place, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    646 F.3d 929
    , 935
    (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). We review the Board’s
    findings of fact for substantial evidence, which “gives the
    agency the benefit of the doubt, since it requires not the
    degree of evidence which satisfies the court that the requisite
    fact exists, but merely the degree which could satisfy a
    reasonable factfinder.” Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v.
    NLRB, 
    522 U.S. 359
    , 377 (1998). Credibility determinations
    made by the ALJ, as adopted by the Board, are accepted
    unless they are patently insupportable. NLRB v. Creative
    Food Design Ltd., 
    852 F.2d 1295
    , 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
    Furthermore, “[w]hen the Board concludes that a violation of
    the NLRA has occurred, we must uphold that finding unless it
    has no rational basis or is unsupported by substantial
    evidence.” Bally’s, 
    646 F.3d at 935
     (citation omitted).
    “Indeed, the Board is to be reversed only when the record is
    so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find
    to the contrary.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor
    practice for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire
    or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
    employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
    labor organization.” 
    29 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(3). Such conduct also
    violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 
    id.
     § 158(a)(1), which
    makes it an unfair labor practice “to interfere with, restrain, or
    11
    coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed” in the
    Act. Laro Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 
    56 F.3d 224
    , 227 n.3 (D.C.
    Cir. 1995). An employer may, however, lawfully lock out its
    employees for “the sole purpose of bringing economic
    pressure to bear in support of [its] legitimate bargaining
    position.” Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 
    380 U.S. 300
    , 318
    (1965). In order for such a lockout to be lawful, the employer
    must inform the union in a clear and timely manner of its
    demands so that the union has a fair opportunity to evaluate
    whether to accept the employer’s proposal and avoid a
    lockout. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 
    339 N.L.R.B. 650
    , 656
    (2003), enforced in relevant part 
    402 F.3d 651
     (6th Cir.
    2005); see also Dietrich Indus., Inc., 
    353 N.L.R.B. 57
    , 60
    (2008).
    Alden Leeds argues that its October 30, 2009, email was
    clear, and that the record is replete with evidence that the
    Company’s negotiating position remained unchanged
    throughout the entire period leading up to, and including, the
    lockout. According to Alden Leeds, the record demonstrates
    that the Union knew and understood that the Company was
    offering a one-year freeze on all terms of the existing
    agreement, including the cost of employee health care. On
    this view of the record, the Company argues that the Board
    had no grounds to support its determination that Alden Leeds
    violated the Act. We disagree.
    Reviewing the record as a whole, it is clear that the
    Board’s judgment in this case is supported by substantial
    evidence. In considering the Company’s October 30, 2009,
    email to the Union – the last communication sent from the
    Company to the Union before the lockout – a reasonable
    factfinder could conclude that the Company’s proposal to the
    Union regarding health care was unclear. See Allentown Mack
    Sales, 
    522 U.S. at 377
    . The email fails to illuminate whether
    12
    the Company was proposing any or all of its various
    alternative health care plans, which differed from the existing
    health care plan under the 2005 collective bargaining
    agreement. Furthermore, the ALJ credited the testimony of
    both Cunningham and Troccoli that the Union was confused
    about which health care plan, if any, the Company was
    proposing in its October 30 email. We must accept these
    credibility determinations, as nothing in the record suggests
    that they are “patently insupportable.” See Creative Food
    Design, 
    852 F.2d at 1297
    .
    Although Alden Leeds argues that the record contains
    evidence that is contrary to the Board’s findings and supports
    its position, “[t]he question before us is not whether
    substantial evidence supports the [Company’s] view, but
    whether it supports the Board’s.” Wayneview Care Ctr. v.
    NLRB, 
    664 F.3d 341
    , 352 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Board’s
    judgment in this case easily commands the deference of this
    court under the controlling standards of review.
    IV. THE SECTION 10(E) ISSUE
    “[A] lockout unlawful at its inception retains its initial
    taint of illegality until it is terminated and the affected
    employees are made whole.” Movers & Warehousemen’s
    Ass’n of Metro. Wash., D.C., Inc., 
    224 N.L.R.B. 356
    , 357
    (1976), enforced 
    550 F.2d 962
     (4th Cir. 1977). In other
    words, to cure a lockout, the employer must restore the status
    quo ante as well as end the lockout. See Greensburg Coca-
    Cola Bottling Co., 
    311 N.L.R.B. 1022
    , 1029 (1993),
    enforcement denied on other grounds, 
    40 F.3d 669
     (3d Cir.
    1994). Nevertheless, “an employer can avoid further liability
    if it is able to show affirmatively that a failure to restore the
    status quo ante did not adversely affect subsequent
    bargaining.” 
    Id.
    13
    Alden Leeds contends that the Board erred in refusing to
    permit the Company to litigate the scope of its backpay
    liability in a compliance proceeding. In particular, the
    Company argues that it should be afforded an opportunity to
    establish in a compliance proceeding that its backpay liability
    ended on November 9. We lack jurisdiction to consider this
    challenge, however, because Alden Leeds failed to raise this
    claim with the Board, as required by the Act.
    Section 10(e) of the NLRA provides that “[n]o objection
    that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent,
    or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure
    or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of
    extraordinary circumstances.” 
    29 U.S.C. § 160
    (e). The
    Board’s regulation interpreting this provision requires parties
    to “set forth specifically the questions of procedure, fact, law,
    or policy to which exception is taken” and “concisely state the
    grounds for the exception.” 
    29 C.F.R. § 102.46
    (b)(1); see also
    
    id.
     § 102.46(b)(2) (“Any exception to a ruling, finding,
    conclusion, or recommendation which is not specifically
    urged shall be deemed to have been waived.”). “And it is long
    established that where a petitioner objects to a finding on an
    issue first raised in the Board’s decision, a petitioner must file
    for reconsideration to afford the Board an opportunity to
    correct the error, if any.” Nova Se. Univ. v. NLRB, 
    807 F.3d 308
    , 313 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Woelke & Romero Framing,
    Inc. v. NLRB, 
    456 U.S. 645
    , 666 (1982)).
    It is undisputed that Alden Leeds failed to raise its claim
    with the Board as required by Section 10(e) of the Act. Once
    the ALJ found that the Company’s November 9, 2009, offer
    did not cure the lockout, and instead found that the lockout
    retained its initial taint of illegality until the Company
    terminated the lockout and made its employees whole, Alden
    14
    Leeds was obligated to challenge that finding in its exceptions
    to the Board in order to preserve the issue for judicial review.
    See Nova Se. Univ., 807 F.3d at 313 (dismissing challenge
    under Section 10(e) where petitioner failed to file proper
    exception); Spectrum Health-Kent Cmty. Campus v. NLRB,
    
    647 F.3d 341
    , 348-50 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same). But as the
    Board found and the Company concedes, Alden Leeds failed
    to raise and preserve its objection. See Alden Leeds, Inc., 357
    N.L.R.B. No. 20, at 1 n.3; Br. of Petitioner at 50 (“The
    question of the scope of the Company’s backpay liability . . .
    was not the subject of a specific exception made to the NLRB
    below.”). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction under Section
    10(e) to consider the Company’s challenge.
    In an attempt to escape this conclusion, Alden Leeds
    presses several arguments, none of which is persuasive. First,
    the Company contends that under Greensburg Coca-Cola
    Bottling Co., 
    311 N.L.R.B. 1022
     (1993), cited by the
    dissenting Board member, the scope of the Company’s
    backpay liability should be reserved for the compliance stage
    of the Board’s proceedings, despite the fact that Alden Leeds
    did not raise this issue before the Board during the unfair
    labor practice proceedings. See Br. of Petitioner at 47-52. But
    as the majority of the Board correctly pointed out,
    Greensburg Coca-Cola does not support the Company’s
    position. In Greensburg Coca-Cola, the ALJ explicitly
    deferred the backpay issue of whether the lockout was cured
    or retained its initial taint of illegality to a future compliance
    proceeding, 311 N.L.R.B. at 1028-29, and neither party filed
    an exception to that portion of the ALJ’s decision. Thus, the
    jurisdictional bar of Section 10(e) was not at issue. In the
    present case, in contrast, the ALJ explicitly ruled that the
    lockout was not cured and retained its initial taint of illegality
    until the Union’s employees were made whole, but Alden
    Leeds never objected to this finding. Greensburg Coca-Cola
    15
    thus presents no justification to disturb the application of
    Section 10(e)’s jurisdictional bar in the present case.
    Second, relying on Trump Plaza Associates v. NLRB, 
    679 F.3d 822
     (D.C. Cir. 2012), Alden Leeds argues that the
    jurisdictional bar of Section 10(e) does not apply in this case
    because the Board was “sufficiently appraised” of the issue
    that Alden Leeds now seeks to raise. Therefore, according to
    the Company, it would have been an “empty formality” to
    raise the matter with the Board in the first instance. Reply Br.
    of Petitioner at 22-24. We reject this argument.
    In Trump Plaza, the court found that the substance of the
    petitioner’s challenge was encompassed in its other
    exceptions filed with the Board. Therefore, the court
    determined that Section 10(e) was not a bar to the petitioner’s
    challenge, despite the petitioner’s failure to specifically object
    before the Board. Trump Plaza, 
    679 F.3d at 830
    . Unlike in
    Trump Plaza, Alden Leeds never put before the Board, in any
    manner, the argument that it now advances – that Alden
    Leeds should be able to contest the scope of its backpay
    liability at a compliance proceeding. Not only did Alden
    Leeds fail to make this argument in a specific exception filed
    before the Board, but none of the other exceptions filed by
    Alden Leeds encompassed the substance of this challenge.
    Indeed, Alden Leeds has never even argued that its other
    exceptions encompassed its backpay challenge. Trump Plaza
    therefore provides the Company with no relief. See id.; see
    also Parsippany Hotel Mgmt. Co. v. NLRB, 
    99 F.3d 413
    , 417-
    18 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding vague exception insufficient to
    provide Board with required notice of ground for petitioner’s
    challenge).
    Finally, Alden Leeds argues that Section 10(e) should not
    apply in this case because the Board discussed the backpay
    16
    issue on its own initiative, the issue has been briefed by the
    parties, and the issue involves an undecided question of law.
    See Br. of Petitioner at 51-52. These points cannot carry the
    day. The Company attempts to frame these circumstances as
    “extraordinary,” sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court
    to address the issue. See Reply Br. at 24-28. The Company’s
    position, however, finds no support in the law. “[S]ection
    10(e) bars review of any issue not presented to the Board,
    even where the Board has discussed and decided the issue.”
    HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC v. NLRB, 
    798 F.3d 1059
    , 1069
    (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Alwin Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 
    192 F.3d 133
    , 143 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, Section 10(e)
    applies “regardless of whether the questions raised be
    considered questions of law, questions of fact, or mixed
    questions of fact and law.” P.R. Drydock & Marine
    Terminals, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    284 F.2d 212
    , 215-16 (D.C. Cir.
    1960).
    V.    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, we hereby deny the
    petition for review and grant the cross-petition for
    enforcement.
    So ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1267

Citation Numbers: 421 U.S. App. D.C. 99, 812 F.3d 159

Filed Date: 2/5/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (15)

National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner/cross-Respondent ... , 40 F.3d 669 ( 1994 )

movers-and-warehousemens-association-of-metropolitan-washington-dc , 550 F.2d 962 ( 1977 )

Laro Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor Relations ... , 56 F.3d 224 ( 1995 )

puerto-rico-drydock-marine-terminals-inc-v-national-labor-relations , 284 F.2d 212 ( 1960 )

Spectrum Health—Kent Community Campus v. National Labor ... , 647 F.3d 341 ( 2011 )

dayton-newspapers-inc-dba-cox-publishing-of-ohio , 402 F.3d 651 ( 2005 )

Parsippany Hotel Management Co. v. National Labor Relations ... , 99 F.3d 413 ( 1996 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Creative Food Design Ltd.,... , 852 F.2d 1295 ( 1988 )

Wayneview Care Center v. National Labor Relations Board , 664 F.3d 341 ( 2011 )

Trump Plaza Associates v. National Labor Relations Board , 679 F.3d 822 ( 2012 )

Alwin Manufacturing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board , 192 F.3d 133 ( 1999 )

Bally's Park Place, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , 646 F.3d 929 ( 2011 )

Allentown MacK Sales & Service, Inc. v. National Labor ... , 118 S. Ct. 818 ( 1998 )

American Ship Building Co. v. National Labor Relations Board , 85 S. Ct. 955 ( 1965 )

Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations ... , 102 S. Ct. 2071 ( 1982 )

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