Snoddy v. City of Nacogdoches , 98 F. App'x 338 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 25, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-41238
Summary Calendar
THOMAS F SNODDY
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
CITY OF NACOGDOCHES
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
No. 9:00-CV-12
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and BARKSDALE, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Thomas F. Snoddy, a former police
officer for Defendant-Appellee the City of Nacogdoches, brought a
Title VII lawsuit against the City alleging that he was denied a
promotion, demoted, harassed, and constructively discharged both
on account of his race and in retaliation for his past complaints
of discrimination. Snoddy appeals from the district court’s
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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grant of the City’s motion for summary judgment on each of these
claims. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Snoddy, an African-American, was employed by the City as a
police officer from 1993 until he resigned in April 1999. In
early 1994, according to Snoddy, he began reporting to his
superiors various incidents of racial discrimination within the
police department. Snoddy alleges that his complaints did
nothing to end the discrimination and instead caused a backlash
as his supervisors within the department subjected him to
“trumped-up” disciplinary actions and unfair performance
evaluations, denied him a promotion, and removed him from the
department’s Field Officer Training (“FTO”) program. Snoddy
further claims that he felt compelled to resign as a result of
this series of discriminatory incidents.
In January 2000, Snoddy brought suit against the City
alleging employment discrimination and retaliation, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., based on his non-promotion, demotion,
harassment, and constructive discharge claims.1 In May 2003,
Snoddy noticed a deposition under Rule 30(b)(6), requiring the
City to provide a witness with information about the police
1
According to the district court, Snoddy also brought
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City had
retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment
rights. But because Snoddy does not reassert these claims on
appeal, we will not address them.
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department’s promotion practices during Snoddy’s tenure as a
police officer. The City filed a motion to quash this deposition
and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The
district court granted both motions and entered a final order
dismissing Snoddy’s claims with prejudice. Snoddy now appeals
the district court’s resolution of both motions.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Quashing the Deposition
Snoddy first asserts that the district court erred in
granting the City’s motion to quash his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.
The district court found that the deposition was “unreasonably
cumulative and duplicative” since it believed that Snoddy had
already obtained the information he was seeking by deposing both
Elizabeth Sanchez and Police Chief William Lujan.2 In addition,
the district court found that Snoddy had more than ample time, in
the years that the case was pending, to develop the facts of his
case. It therefore quashed the deposition under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(2).
“We review a district court’s decision denying discovery,
including quashing deposition subpoenas, for abuse of
discretion.” Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491
2
The district court also observed that these witnesses
were provided by the City under Rule 30(b)(6). In fact, both
before the district court and this court the City claims that,
had it been required to cooperate with this third deposition, it
would have considered Chief Lujan the appropriate witness to
testify regarding the police department’s promotion policies.
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(5th Cir. 1999). Snoddy argues that the deposition should not
have been quashed because he did not obtain the information he
was seeking––the identity of the official responsible for the
promotion decision and the educational and experiential
qualifications of the white candidate who was selected––in either
of the previous depositions. Snoddy also claims that the
district court should have granted his request for a continuance,
under Rule 56(f), which would have allowed him to conduct the
deposition before the court ruled on the City’s pending summary-
judgment motion. We disagree. The Federal Rules expressly state
that a district court may limit a party’s discovery if that party
“has had ample opportunity . . . to obtain the information
sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(ii). Furthermore, a party who
“has not diligently pursued discovery” is not entitled to a
continuance under Rule 56(f). See, e.g., Beattie v. Madison
County Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 606 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the
deposition and ruling on the City’s motion for summary judgment
without granting a continuance. Cf. Walls v. General Motors,
Inc., 906 F.2d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[The plaintiff] had
ample time and sufficient opportunities to conduct the discovery
procedures which he complains were denied him. He cannot now lay
his failure to conduct discovery at the feet of the district
court.”).
B. Summary Judgment
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Snoddy also attacks the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the City on his discrimination and retaliation
claims. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.
Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 190 (5th Cir.
2001). Summary judgment is proper when the record, viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates no
genuine issue of material fact and where the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c); see also Blow v. City of San Antonio, 236 F.3d 293, 296
(5th Cir. 2001). Moreover, “[t]he moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law [if] the nonmoving party has failed
to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
1. Non-Promotion
Before the district court, Snoddy alleged that the City did
not promote him to a detective position in the fall of
1997––choosing instead to promote Greg Johnson, a white
male––both on account of Snoddy’s race and in retaliation for his
previous complaints of racial prejudice within the police
department. To prove intentional discrimination under the now-
familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Snoddy was
first required to establish a prima facie case by a preponderance
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of the evidence. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). It is undisputed that Snoddy met this burden:
(1) he is African-American, (2) he was qualified for the
position, (3) he was not selected, and (4) the position was
filled by a white applicant. Cf. Blow, 236 F.3d at 296
(discussing the elements of a prima facie case). Snoddy’s prima
facie case created a presumption of discrimination, shifting to
the City the burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for not promoting Snoddy. Id. at 296-97. The district
court found that the City fulfilled its burden by showing that it
selected Greg Johnson because he outscored Snoddy on all three of
the relevant criteria––the performance review, the interview, and
the number of years of service in the department.
Thus, to overcome the City’s motion for summary judgment,
Snoddy bore the burden of providing sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that the City’s reason was
pretextual. Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720, 723
(5th Cir. 2002). Snoddy could have satisfied this burden by
demonstrating that he was “clearly better qualified” for the
detective position than the employee selected by the City. See
id. at 722. Nevertheless, we have cautioned that, “unless
disparities in curricula vitae are so apparent as virtually to
jump off the page and slap us in the face,” we will not second-
guess an employer’s promotion decisions. Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d
839, 847 (5th Cir. 1993). Snoddy believes that his two college
No. 03-41238
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degrees in criminal justice, compared to Johnson’s high school
education, demonstrate his superior qualifications. There is no
evidence that a college degree was required for the detective
position, however. Thus, in light of Johnson’s higher scores in
each of the selection criteria, Snoddy has not demonstrated that
he was clearly more qualified for the detective position. See
Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 882 (5th Cir. 2003).
Snoddy also attempts to prove pretext by pointing out that most
of the City’s selection criterial were inherently subjective.
But this fact alone does not create an inference that the City’s
proffered reasons for choosing Johnson were pretextual. See id.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on Snoddy’s discriminatory non-promotion claim.
Snoddy also alleged that the City chose not to promote him
in retaliation for voicing his complaints of racial
discrimination within the department. To establish a prima facie
case of retaliation under Title VII, Snoddy was required to
demonstrate: “(1) that [he] engaged in activity protected by
Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and
(3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action.” Fierros, 274 F.3d at 191
(internal quotation marks omitted). The district court held that
Snoddy did not satisfy the third prong of this test because he
proffered no evidence––other than his own subjective
beliefs––that retaliation played a role in the City’s promotion
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decision. Critically, the court noted that Snoddy did not allege
or prove that the officials responsible for choosing among the
candidates for the detective position were aware of his previous
complaints of race discrimination. Notwithstanding Snoddy’s
other arguments to the contrary, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on this basis. Cf. Manning, 332 F.3d
at 883-84 (affirming the grant of summary judgment to an employer
on a retaliation claim because the employee did not prove that
the individuals who denied his transfer request knew he had
engaged in a protected activity).
2. Demotion
In his complaint, Snoddy also alleged that the City removed
his duties as an FTO in the spring of 1998 both because of his
race and in retaliation for his past complaints of race
discrimination. The district court held that Snoddy had not
satisfied a prima facie case of discrimination or of retaliation
under Title VII because withdrawing Snoddy from the FTO program
was neither a demotion nor any other type of adverse employment
action. Specifically, the district court noted that while Snoddy
was no longer required to perform additional training duties as a
result of the department’s decision, his primary job title, pay,
hours, and benefits remained the same.
Snoddy does not attack the legal basis of these conclusions
on appeal. Instead, he contends that the district court erred by
not noticing the City’s concession, in its motion for summary
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judgment, that removing Snoddy from the FTO program was the
equivalent of demoting him. Our review of the City’s motion,
however, did not reveal any such concession.3 We therefore
uphold the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Snoddy’s
demotion claims.
3. Harassment
Snoddy presents two arguments against the district court’s
grant of the City’s motion for summary judgment on his claim of
racial harassment. First, Snoddy points out “that a district
court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte on grounds not
requested by the moving party.” John Deere Co. v. Am. Nat’l
Bank, Stafford, 809 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 1987). While this
is a correct statement of law, the City explicitly challenged the
validity of Snoddy’s harassment claim in its motion for summary
judgment.4 Thus, John Deere does not apply to the case at bar.
Second, Snoddy asserts that the district court erred in
3
Snoddy relies on the following sentence in the City’s
motion: “The City asserts that the removal of [Snoddy] from his
FTO duties was not a promotion/demotion decision, but is
confined, for summary judgment purposes, to [Snoddy’s] pleadings
in which he asserts that this was a demotion.” In our view, the
latter half of this statement merely explains that the City chose
to address Snoddy’s removal from the FTO program as a demotion
claim––not as a second non-promotion claim. This interpretation
comports with the first half of the sentence, which more clearly
states that the City does not agree that Snoddy was demoted.
4
In fact, the City’s motion discusses the legal
standards for proving harassment, defends the department’s
treatment of Snoddy, and then concludes: “Since any alleged
harassment conjured up from the evidence . . . cannot meet the
stringent requirements of a hostile working environment claim,
this claim should fail as a matter of law and summary judgment is
appropriate” (emphasis added).
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holding that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to conclude that he was racially harassed by his supervisors
in the police department. To prevail on his claim of racial
harassment, Snoddy was required to prove that: “(1) [he] belongs
to a protected group; (2) [he] was subjected to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race;
[and] (4) the harassment complained of affected a term[,]
condition or privilege of employment.” Celestine v. Petroleos de
Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 353 (5th Cir. 2001). A court will
not find that the harassment “affected a term[,] condition or
privilege of employment” unless it was “‘sufficiently severe or
pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment.’” Id. (quoting Watts v. Kroger
Co., 170 F.3d 505, 509 (5th Cir.1999)). According to the
district court, Snoddy did not meet either the third or the
fourth prong of the Celestine test.
In challenging this conclusion, Snoddy asserts that the
district court overlooked the record evidence that supported his
claim. For example, he points to his sworn statement that:
“Negative comments were included in my performance evaluations as
a result of my race and my reporting racial prejudice within the
Police Department.” The district court was not required to
credit this conclusory allegation of discrimination, however.
See Auguster v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 403 &
n.3 (5th Cir. 2001).
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Snoddy also highlights the fact that the City was unable to
identify a single white employee who received a reprimand, as
Snoddy did, for arriving two minutes late to roll call. This
argument rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the burden of
proof. While Snoddy could have created an inference that the
reprimand was racially motivated by showing that similarly
situated white employees were treated differently, see, e.g.,
Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.
1995), the City was not required to demonstrate that a white
employee committed an identical violation, and received an
identical reprimand, in its motion for summary judgment.
Furthermore, Snoddy’s contention that the district court
ignored evidence, which tended to demonstrate that he was
unjustly disciplined by the City for conducting off-duty work in
a criminal trial without department approval, is similarly
unavailing. In its motion for summary judgment, the City
proffered evidence that Snoddy had requested, and had been
denied, permission to conduct this type of off-duty work. In
addition, the City proffered evidence of its investigation into
this incident, which demonstrated that the department based its
disciplinary action on testimony from witnesses who attended the
trial and overheard Snoddy bragging about his work on the trial
and the amount of money he was being paid. In response, Snoddy
simply argues that, had the City conducted a more thorough
investigation, it would have discovered that he attended the
No. 03-41238
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trial as an observer, not as an employee of the defense team.
Yet, Snoddy has proffered neither circumstantial nor direct
evidence that the City’s disciplinary decision was influenced by
his race. Thus, the district court correctly held that Snoddy’s
disciplinary sanction was not an act of racial harassment. Cf.
id. at 1090-92 (holding that an employee could not demonstrate
race discrimination merely by showing that his employer’s reason
for suspending him was “wrong,” because the employer’s decision
was made in good faith and the employee did not also show that
similarly situated white employees were treated differently).
Snoddy’s final complaint about the district court’s
resolution of his harassment claim centers on the City’s decision
to remove his training duties. Snoddy argues that the City’s
reliance on multiple, inconsistent reasons for withdrawing his
participation in the FTO program is itself probative of pretext.
Yet, even if we assume that the evidence in the record supports
an inference that the officials who removed Snoddy’s duties were
motivated by his race, Snoddy has not demonstrated that this one
action was so “sufficiently severe or pervasive” that he was
subject to an “abusive working environment.” Thus, the district
court correctly concluded that the City was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on Snoddy’s racial harassment claim.
4. Constructive Discharge
Finally, Snoddy contends that he presented sufficient
evidence to survive the City’s motion for summary judgment on his
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constructive-discharge claim. We agree with the district court,
however, that because no reasonable jury could find that Snoddy
was subjected to a hostile work environment based on the evidence
in the summary-judgment record, a reasonable jury also could not
find that he was constructively discharged. See Brown v. Kinney
Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Constructive
discharge requires a greater degree of harassment than that
required by a hostile environment claim.”).
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.