Robinett v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance , 83 F. App'x 638 ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 11, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-30376
Summary Calendar
JERRY L. ROBINETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Veterans Administration of; E. ROSS BUCKLEY, JR.,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 02-CV-842-R
--------------------
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jerry L. Robinett, a non-prisoner, appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), the Veteran’s
Administration of the U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA),
and E. Ross Buckley Jr., an attorney representing State Farm, and
the dismissal of his claims for state law invasion of privacy
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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against State Farm and Buckley, and Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671, and Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 522a claims
against the VA.
The VA has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing
that Robinett’s notice of appeal was untimely because the
district court did not have the authority to grant an extension
of time for Robinett to file his motion for new trial. Based on
the application of the unique circumstances exception recognized
in Fairley v. Jones, 824 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1987), we choose
to exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. The VA’s motion to
dismiss the appeal is DENIED.
The district court granted the VA’s motion to dismiss
Robinett’s FTCA claim because he had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Robinett does not address the district
court’s dismissal of his FTCA claim in his appellate brief, and
so he has abandoned his FTCA claim. Brinkmann v. Dallas County
Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
Robinett argues that the VA violated federal regulations
when a paralegal working at the Regional Counsel’s Office
authorized the release of his medical files. He contends that
the regulations require the Regional Counsel to personally
investigate the lawfulness and appropriateness of such an order.
He bases his argument on 38 C.F.R. § 1.511(c)(3)(ii) which
provides that the Regional Counsel determine whether the records
should be released pursuant to a state court order. It is
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contemplated by the regulation that employees of the Regional
Counsel “having reasonable knowledge of the requirements of this
regulation” will be able to handle such requests. 38 C.F.R.
§ 1.511(c)(3)(ii).
Robinett argues that he provided evidence, sufficient to
defeat summary judgment, that the VA intentionally and willfully,
and with flagrant disregard for his privacy, released his medical
records. He contends that the district court erred in its
determination that State Farm had a right to discover his medical
records because they were relevant to the state court litigation.
The state court issuing the order determined that his records
were relevant, and the employees of the Regional Counsel, after
reviewing the order and supporting documentation as required by
the regulation, determined that the “disclosure of the records
[was] necessary to prevent the perpetration of fraud or other
injustice in the matter in question.” 38 C.F.R. § 1.511(c)(3)(ii).
The medical records were then released pursuant to the exception
for orders of a court of competent jurisdiction contained in
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11). Robinett has not alleged any facts to
preclude summary judgment which would show that the VA “acted in
a manner which was intentional or willful.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(g)(4).
Robinett argues that the district court erred in its
determination that the VA’s failure to notify him of the release
of his records did not adversely affect him. He contends that
the records custodian led him to believe that he would have
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time to take legal action to prevent the release, which would
have been successful because the release was unlawful.
Blue brief, 19-20.
The regulations require the VA to make a reasonable effort
to notify the subject that the records were disclosed under
compulsory legal process. 38 C.F.R. § 1.511(d). The regulations
do not require the VA to inform the subject before the release in
time for the subject to challenge the release. Robinett has not
shown a violation of the notice regulation which would give rise
to a cause of action under 5 U.S.C. § 552(g)(1)(D). Robinett has
not shown any error in the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the VA on his Privacy Act claim.
Robinett argues that the district court erred in dismissing
his claims against State Farm and Buckley by ruling that since it
had dismissed all of his claims against the VA, it no longer had
jurisdiction to hear the remaining state law claims. He contends
that this is so because the district court erred in dismissing
his claims against the VA under the Privacy Act. He also argues
that the claims are intertwined and that the district court had
supplemental jurisdiction. Robinett has not shown that the
district court abused its discretion in declining to exercise
its supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.
The district court had dismissed all of Robinett’s federal
claims. The district court did not err in granting summary
judgment for the VA on the Privacy Act claims. The district
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court noted that his remaining state law claims were related to
other state law claims currently pending in state court,
which court was familiar with the background of the case.
Robinett has not shown that the district court abused its
discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101, 110 (5th Cir. 1997).
Robinett argues that the district court erred in not
granting his motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59. He repeats all of the arguments he made to show
that the district court erred in dismissing his claims in the
first place. The district court denied Robinett’s motion because
he had failed to offer any evidence or arguments that would merit
reconsideration. His arguments in his motion merely reiterated
the arguments the district court considered and rejected in
its original rulings and were not addressed to the grounds for
seeking Rule 59(e) relief. R. 6-9, 26-34. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. Midland West
Corp. v. FDIC, 911 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED.