Godwin v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-11376
Summary Calender
_____________________
SHAWN GODWIN
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
PIER 1 IMPORTS (US), INC
Defendant-Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
No. 4:98-CV-60-Y
_________________________________________________________________
July 12, 2000
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JONES and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Shawn Godwin (“Godwin”) appeals the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-
Appellee Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc. (“Pier 1"). We AFFIRM.
I.
Godwin, an African-American male, is a former employee of
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Pier 1. Godwin was first employed by Pier 1 in 1989 as a
receiving clerk. By 1995, after a series of promotions and
raises, Godwin was the Lead Copy Center Technician at Pier 1's
home office in Fort Worth, Texas. In September 1995, Godwin
suffered an on-the-job injury that strained his back and broke
his right hand.
Godwin’s injuries prevented him from immediately returning
to work and, pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”), Pier 1 placed Godwin on job-protected medical leave.
Godwin’s twelve weeks of job-protected leave under the FMLA
expired on December 14, 1995. Under Pier 1's medical leave
policy, however, an employee could take up to an additional six
months of medical leave after the expiration of his FMLA job-
protected leave. During this additional leave, however, the
employee’s job is not protected. If Pier 1 fills the employee’s
job during this time, the employee may attempt to find another
position within Pier 1 for which he is qualified. If an employee
does not return to work within the six months he is
administratively terminated.
Despite the fact that Godwin’s job-protected leave expired
in December 1995, Pier 1 kept Godwin’s position open for several
weeks. In early February 1996, Pier 1 learned that Godwin still
had not been released by his physician to return to work and that
it was uncertain when Godwin would be able to return. Therefore,
Pier 1 took steps to fill the Lead Copy Center Technician
2
position. On February 12, 1996, a Copy Center Technician, Kyle
DeGroat (“DeGroat”), was promoted to Lead Copy Center Technician.
The position vacated by DeGroat was filled the same day by the
Lead Mail Room Attendant, Gary Whalen (“Whalen”). On February
27, 1996, Whalen’s vacated position was filled by Eddie Solis, a
Pier 1 employee in the payroll department.
In March 1996, Godwin was issued a limited release by his
physician. This release allowed Godwin to return to work, but it
substantially limited what type of work Godwin could perform.
Godwin then interviewed for a position with Pier 1 as a Sample
Room Clerk, but withdrew himself from consideration because he
felt he could not perform the required tasks under his current
physical restrictions. On April 22, 1996, Godwin was released by
his physician to return to work with no restrictions. Godwin,
however, never contacted Pier 1 requesting to return to work or
inquiring as to available positions. Having exhausted his six
months of additional leave without returning to work, Godwin was
administratively terminated on June 21, 1996.1
Godwin believes that Pier 1 illegally discriminated against
him due to his race. After exhausting his administrative
remedies, Godwin filed suit in the United States District Court
1
Godwin belatedly submitted an application for employment
to Pier 1 on September 10, 1996. Although Pier 1 offered Godwin
a job as a Mailroom Attendant, at the same rate of pay and
benefits he enjoyed before his injury, Godwin rejected the offer.
3
for the Northern District of Texas alleging that Pier 1 had
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. Specifically, Godwin’s complaint
alleged that Pier 1 had discriminated against him by filling his
position with another employee and denying him any other position
in the company, thus preventing him from returning to work.
Godwin also alleged that one of his supervisors, Mel Hasty
(“Hasty”), had made disparaging remarks about minorities and that
these remarks indicated that Pier 1 had engaged in intentional
discrimination.
Pier 1 moved for summary judgment. After examining the
record and the parties’ briefs, the district court determined
that Godwin had failed to establish a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination because, at the time of the employment
actions Godwin complained of, he was physically unable to return
to work. As a result, Godwin could not show that he was
qualified for the positions. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14
F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court entered
judgment in favor of Pier 1 and dismissed Godwin’s complaint
without prejudice. Godwin timely appeals.
II.
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standards as the court below. See Matagorda
4
County v. Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986). A dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine” if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find in favor
of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Godwin initially argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment because he had presented direct
evidence, in the form of statements allegedly made by Hasty, of
unlawful employment discrimination by Pier 1. According to
Goodwin, Hasty told another employee that he did not want Godwin
back and that he did not want to hire any more “blacks” because
“those people file workers’ compensation claims.” Hasty
allegedly went on to say that Godwin was “a prime example of
that.” Godwin concludes that these comments, coupled with Pier
1's failure to hold open his position, raise genuine issues of
material fact regarding unlawful discrimination.2 We are
2
Pier 1 halfheartedly attempts to argue that Godwin waived
any argument regarding this issue because he failed to make such
an argument in opposition to Pier 1's motion for summary
judgment. Godwin’s response to Pier 1's motion for summary
judgment, however, specifically mentions Hasty’s derogatory
comments. Additionally, in his brief accompanying that response,
Godwin argues that Hasty’s comments, combined with other
evidence, shows that he was discriminated against. As a result,
Godwin did not waive appellate consideration of whether Hasty’s
5
unpersuaded that these comments, if made, are sufficient to
support a claim of unlawful employment discrimination.
“Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence which, if
believed, would prove the existence of a fact (i.e., unlawful
discrimination) without any inferences or presumptions.”
Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citations omitted). In Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d
326, 330 (5th Cir. 1998), we stated that a Title VII plaintiff
must show a causal connection between the allegedly
discriminatory remarks and the adverse employment action. Godwin
has failed to show any connection between Hasty’s statements and
Pier 1's failure to hold his job open until he returned to work.
To the contrary, the evidence shows that Hasty and Pier 1 made
every effort to keep Godwin’s position open for him, including
keeping the position available for nearly two months after
Godwin’s FMLA job-protected leave expired.
In addition, pursuant to his doctors orders, Godwin could
not return to light duty work until March 1996, and he was not
fully released to work until late April 1996. The employment
actions that Godwin complains of all took place before he was
given a doctor’s release to do light duty work. Setting aside
the fact that Godwin failed to demonstrate a causal connection
between Hasty’s remarks and the alleged employment
remarks constitute direct evidence of unlawful discrimination.
6
discrimination, we fail to see how any of Hasty’s personal biases
could have prevented Godwin from returning to work when his
medical orders prevented him from doing so.
Finding that Godwin has failed to present any direct
evidence of discrimination, we look to see whether he has
presented evidence creating an inference of intentional
discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). To create an inference of intentional
discrimination, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case by showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class;
(2) he sought and was qualified for an available employment
position; (3) he was rejected for that position; and (4) the
employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff’s
qualifications to fill the position. See McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the employer to show that the challenged
employment action was taken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons. See id. If the employer proffers such reasons, the
burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the proffered
reasons are mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. See id. at
804.
We agree with the district court that Godwin has failed to
establish a prima facie case. Specifically, Godwin has failed to
show that he sought and was qualified for an available position.
We note that the challenged employment action -- the filling of
7
the Lead Copy Center Technician, Lead Mailroom Attendant, and
Mailroom Attendant positions -- took place when Godwin was on
medical leave and had not been released to return to work. As
the district court noted, if a Title VII plaintiff is physically
unable to perform the job applied for, he is not qualified for
the position. See Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082,
1087 (5th Cir. 1994). As a result, Godwin cannot show that he
was qualified for the positions in question and thus cannot
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Furthermore, throughout Godwin’s brief he complains that,
once he was released to return to work, Pier 1 never contacted
him about returning. Inexplicably, Godwin contends that this
supports his proposition that Pier 1 discriminated against him
and helps establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must demonstrate not
only that he was qualified for a job, but that he “sought” the
position. See Grimes v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1996). Pier 1 had no
duty to contact Godwin about returning to work. Rather, the
burden was upon Godwin to inform Pier 1 of his medical release
and to seek a position with the company -- steps he failed to
take prior to his administrative discharge.3
3
In certain cases we may excuse a plaintiff’s failure to
apply for a job if he demonstrates that he was deterred from
applying due to a “known and consistently enforced policy of
discrimination.” Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d
8III.
Godwin has wholly failed to create a genuine issue of fact
regarding his claims of discrimination. He has neither
introduced any direct evidence of discrimination on the part of
Pier 1, nor created an inference of unlawful discrimination.
Therefore, we AFFIRM.
398, 406 (5th Cir. 1999). Godwin has failed to point to any
evidence that Pier 1 had such a policy.
9