Navarro Pecan Co Inc v. Penn America Ins Co ( 2002 )


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  •                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-31183
    Summary Calendar
    NAVARRO PECAN CO., INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    MANSFIELD WAREHOUSING INVESTMENT CO., LLC;
    MANSFIELD COLD STORAGE, INC.,
    Defendants,
    and
    MANSFIELD WAREHOUSING SERVICES, INC.,
    Defendant-Cross Claimant,
    versus
    PENN AMERICA INSURANCE CO.,
    Intervenor Defendant-Cross Defendant-Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    (99-CV-371)
    _________________________________________________________________
    March 29, 2002
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges:
    PER CURIAM:*
    For this interlocutory appeal permitted by our court, Navarro
    Pecan Co., Inc., contests the summary judgment awarded Penn America
    Insurance Co. The district court held that Penn’s insurance policy
    issued to Mansfield Warehousing Services, Inc. (MWSI), did not
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    cover the loss of Navarro’s property because, pursuant to a policy
    exclusion, it was in MWSI’s care, custody, or control.                            Navarro
    advances two contentions:         the terms of the policy are ambiguous;
    and the district court failed to properly apply Louisiana law.
    Navarro was a depositor of approximately 1.4 million pounds of
    pecans in a cold-storage warehouse owned by Mansfield Cold Storage,
    Inc., and operated by MWSI.           Navarro received warehouse receipts
    for loads of pecans delivered to MWSI, providing that the pecans
    would be returned upon payment of storage fees and presentation of
    the applicable warehouse receipt(s) to MWSI.                         The rupture of a
    frozen fire sprinkler pipe allegedly damaged the pecans.                          Navarro
    sued   MWSI,     and   subsequently       Penn       (MWSI’s    insurer),        for   $1.5
    million.
    Summary judgment was awarded Penn.               We review de novo.             E.g.,
    Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 
    76 F.3d 651
    , 654 (5th Cir. 1996).                                As
    noted, the policy excludes from coverage “[p]ersonal property in
    the care, custody or control of the insured [MWSI]”.
    Navarro    first    contends       the    “care,        custody      or   control”
    exclusion is ambiguous, precluding summary judgment for Penn.
    However,     because      MWSI   is   a    depositary          (or    bailee)      and    a
    warehouseman, it is deemed to have “care, custody or control” over
    the personal property it accepts for deposit.                        See Hendrix Elec.
    Co., Inc. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 
    297 So.2d 470
    , 474 (La.
    App. 2d Cir. 1974); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2926 (deposit
    requires person to receive property and preserve it); LA. REV. STAT.
    ANN.   §§   10:7-204    (warehouseman          has    duty     of   care)    &   10:7-209
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    (warehouseman    given     lien   over    goods   covered       by    receipt).
    Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the provision is
    not ambiguous.   See Home Ins. Co. v. A.J. Warehouse, Inc., 
    210 So. 2d 544
     (La. App. 4th Cir.), application denied, 
    214 So. 2d 162
    ,
    163, 165 (La. 1968).
    Navarro further contends Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd.,
    
    634 So. 2d 1180
     (La. 1994), provides the only circumstances where
    the “care, custody, or control” exclusion applies in Louisiana.
    The Louisiana Supreme Court stated, however, that “the first, and
    most common, circumstance usually occurs” in the contractor or
    subcontractor context and noted “the insured’s actual physical
    possession of or control over the property determined whether the
    exclusion applied”.        
    Id. at 1184
     (emphasis added).             The second
    circumstance occurs when “the insured has a proprietary interest in
    or derives monetary benefit from the property”.           
    Id.
    First, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not state these were
    the only circumstances where it applies, and other Louisiana
    decisions confirm the exclusion applies in other circumstances as
    well.   See, e.g., Keller v. Case, 
    757 So. 2d 920
    , 923 (La. App. 1st
    Cir. 2000) (horse boarded at stable under insured’s care, custody,
    and control); Duchmann v. Orleans Maritime Brokerage, Inc. & The
    Hartford, 
    603 So. 2d 818
    , 820 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (barge in
    insured’s care, custody, and control during transport); Berquist v.
    Fernandez, 
    535 So. 2d 827
     (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988) (Damage to horses
    being   transported   by    insured   excluded    by   “care,    custody,    or
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    control” exclusion.); A.J. Warehouse, 210 So. 2d at 550 (Damage to
    tiles stored in warehouse covered by the exclusion.).
    Further, Reynolds involved a claim based on theft from a self-
    storage unit.      
    634 So. 2d at 1182
    .   The court noted that Reynolds
    “merely leased storage space” and the storage contract was governed
    by the Louisiana Self-Service Storage Facility Act, LA. REV. STAT.
    ANN. 9:4756, which is not a deposit or covered by Louisiana’s
    provisions dealing with warehousemen. Because the lease of a self-
    storage space is fundamentally different from a deposit, the ruling
    in Reynolds (exclusion inapplicable) does not apply here.
    Finally, St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 
    123 F.3d 336
     (5th Cir. 1997), does not require reversal of the summary
    judgment.    There, we acknowledged the parties did not contend the
    property at issue was under the control of the insured           in a
    contractor    or    subcontractor   relationship   (Reynolds’   “first
    circumstance”) and determined that the insured did not derive a
    monetary benefit from the property under the “second circumstance”.
    Fair Grounds, 
    123 F.3d at 340
    .
    AFFIRMED
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