Griffin v. City of Dallas ( 1994 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 93-1390.
Leroy GRIFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF DALLAS, Defendant-Appellee.
July 26, 1994.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas.
Before JOHNSON, GARWOOD, and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.
SAM D. JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Leroy Griffin, a Dallas, Texas, police officer filed
a Title VII charge against the City of Dallas on May 14, 1990,
claiming that the Dallas Police Department had wrongfully
discharged him. Mr. Griffin, an African American, filed this
discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") 275 days after his discharge.
The EEOC later issued Mr. Griffin a right-to-sue letter. Mr.
Griffin thereafter brought this cause of action against the city in
the federal district court for the Northern District of Texas. The
City of Dallas moved for summary judgment. It argued that Mr.
Griffin's claim was untimely, having been filed outside the 180-day
time frame outlined in section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act. The
district court agreed and granted summary judgment in the city's
favor. Mr. Griffin appeals. We now reverse and remand for trial
on the merits.
I. Background
1
The Dallas Police Department hired Leroy Griffin as a police
officer on August 31, 1973. Almost sixteen years later, on July
28, 1989, the city terminated Mr. Griffin's employment. Mr.
Griffin attributed his dismissal to his race, as opposed to any
misconduct. He therefore filed a charge of race discrimination
with the EEOC on May 14, 1990—275 days after his discharge.
Although Mr. Griffin did not physically file a charge with the
Texas Commission on Human Rights ("TCHR"), he addressed his charge
to both the EEOC and the TCHR and marked a box which stated, "I
also want this charge filed with the EEOC." The EEOC notified Mr.
Griffin of his right to sue the city on February 11, 1992. On May
6, 1992, Mr. Griffin commenced this race discrimination action in
federal district court.
The City of Dallas filed a motion for summary judgment,
contending that section 706(e) of Title VII required Mr. Griffin to
file his claim with the EEOC no later than 180 days after the
alleged unlawful dismissal. Because Mr. Griffin filed his claim
with the EEOC 275 days after his dismissal—ninety-five days beyond
that 180-day limitations period—the city argued that Mr. Griffin's
claim was time-barred.
Counsel for Mr. Griffin directed the district court to that
part of section 706(e) which extends the limitations period to 300
days if a claim is also filed with a state or local fair employment
practice ["FEP"] agency. Mr. Griffin's counsel proffered a
Worksharing Agreement in which the TCHR had designated the EEOC as
its agent for receiving Title VII claims. In that same agreement,
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the TCHR waived jurisdiction over any Title VII charges filed with
the EEOC after 180 days but before 300 days after the date of the
alleged Title VII violation. Mr. Griffin contended that under the
Worksharing Agreement, the filing of his claim with the EEOC
constituted a filing of the claim with the TCHR and triggered the
section 706(e), 300-day limitations period. The district court
disagreed. It therefore granted the city's motion for summary
judgment. Mr. Griffin appeals.
II. Discussion
A. Compliance with Section 706(e)—Institution of State Proceedings
This is the fourth in a series of cases in which this Court
has been called upon to delineate the relationship between the TCHR
and the EEOC and, in light thereof, to define the limitations
requirements of section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act. Section
706(e) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
A charge under this section shall be filed [with the EEOC]
within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred ..., except that in a case of an
unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person
aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or
local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such
practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect
thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be
filed [with the EEOC] by or on behalf of the person aggrieved
within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Under the clear terms of this statute,
a charge of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 180
days after the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory practice
unless the complainant has instituted proceedings with a state or
local FEP agency. If the complainant has instituted state or local
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proceedings, the limitations period for filing such a charge with
the EEOC extends to 300 days.
In Mennor v. Fort Hood National Bank, this Court ruled that
the 300-day filing period set forth in section 706(e) applies
regardless whether state proceedings are timely filed under state
or local law. 829 F.2d 553, 554 (5th Cir.1987). In our second
section 706(e) case, Urrutia v. Valero Energy Corp., we held that
a nominal filing with the proper state or local agency is all that
is required to institute proceedings under the terms of section
706(e). 841 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
829, 109 S. Ct. 82, 102 L. Ed. 2d 59. We decided in Urrutia that this
nominal-filing requirement was satisfied when the EEOC transmitted
a copy of the charge to the TCHR. We concluded that the complaint
there, filed with the EEOC within the 300-day period set forth in
section 706(e), was timely. Id. We reaffirmed our Urrutia holding
one year later in Washington v. Patlis, 868 F.2d 172 (5th
Cir.1989).
In this, the fourth section 706(e) case, we must determine
whether the EEOC's acceptance of Mr. Griffin's discrimination
charge satisfied Urrutia's nominal-filing requirement and
instituted proceedings with the TCHR. Because the EEOC received
Mr. Griffin's charge as TCHR's agent, we hold that the EEOC's
acceptance of that charge satisfied both requirements.
In August 1989, the TCHR and the EEOC entered a Worksharing
Agreement which was designed "to minimize duplication of effort in
the processing of charges and to achieve maximum consistency of
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purpose and results."1 Worksharing Agreement § 1(a). The TCHR
designated the EEOC as its limited agent for receiving charges in
section 2(a) of the Worksharing Agreement: "The [TCHR] by this
agreement designates and establishes the EEOC as a limited agent of
the [TCHR] for the purpose of receiving charges on behalf of the
[TCHR] and EEOC agrees to receive such charges." Worksharing
Agreement § 2(a).
Under the plain terms of this agreement, when Mr. Griffin
filed his discrimination complaint with the EEOC—a complaint which
was also addressed to the TCHR—the EEOC accepted that complaint,
not only for its own purposes, but also for the purposes of the
TCHR. Hence, upon the EEOC's receipt of the complaint, the TCHR,
for all legal and practical purposes, received the complaint. As
in Urrutia, we hold here that once the TCHR received Mr. Griffin's
complaint, even if only nominally, proceedings were instituted
within the meaning of section 706(e). The institution of state
proceedings extended the statute of limitations to 300 days.
B. Compliance with Section 706(c)—Termination of State Proceedings
1
Congress empowered the EEOC to enter into such agreements
in the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(1) states that
the EEOC "shall have power to cooperate with and, with their
consent, utilize regional, State, local, and other agencies, both
public and private, and individuals." Section 2000e-8(b) expands
upon the authority granted in § 2000e-4(g)(1). That section
provides that the EEOC "may enter into written agreements with
such State or local agencies and such agreements may include
provisions under which the Commission shall refrain from
processing a charge in any cases or class of cases specified in
such agreements or under which the Commission shall relieve any
person or class of persons in such State or locality from
requirements imposed under this section." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
8(b).
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Although we hold that proceedings were, in fact, instituted
by the TCHR pursuant to section 706(e), that finding does not end
our inquiry. We must next determine whether Mr. Griffin instituted
proceedings with the EEOC pursuant to section 706(c). While it is
true that Mr. Griffin physically presented a written claim of
discrimination to the EEOC in its Dallas, Texas, office, section
706(c) provides that no charge may be filed with the EEOC unless
one of two events occurs: 1) the expiration of sixty days after
state or local proceedings were instituted or 2) the termination of
those state or local proceedings. When the EEOC receives a charge
prior to the expiration of the sixty days and prior to the
termination of the state or local proceedings, the EEOC merely
holds that charge in " "suspended animation' " until one of the two
triggering events transforms the receipt of the charge into the
filing of the charge. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 111, 108 S. Ct. 1666,
1669, 100 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1988) (quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S.
522, 525-26, 92 S. Ct. 616, 618-19, 30 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1972)).
In this case, as in Washington v. Patlis, sixty days beyond
the initiation of the state proceedings extends past the 300-day
limitations period. Mr. Griffin's complaint, therefore, if at all
timely, can so be only if the state proceedings were terminated
before the 300-day limitations period expired. Upon review of the
TCHR-EEOC Worksharing Agreement and applicable case law, we find
that the state proceedings were instantaneously terminated upon Mr.
Griffin's filing of his charge with the EEOC.
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The TCHR waived its exclusive jurisdiction over Mr. Griffin's
charge, indeed over "[a]ll charges covered under Title VII which
[were] received by EEOC beyond 180 days but before 300 days after
the date of the alleged violation." Worksharing Agreement §§
4(c)(7), 4(d). The TCHR additionally conferred upon the EEOC
exclusive responsibility for such charges. Id. at § 4(c)(7). In
Urrutia, this Court recognized that the waiver provision there
became effective when the parties entered the Worksharing
Agreement. See Urrutia, 841 F.2d at 125 ("Under terms of the
Worksharing Agreement, the TCHR had already agreed that the EEOC
was to have exclusive responsibility for processing all claims
filed between 180 days and 300 days after alleged violations of
Title VII." (emphasis added)). The State therefore needed to do
nothing more to execute its waiver.
Determining the effect of such waiver provisions, the Supreme
Court, in Commercial Office Products, ruled that a state FEP
agency's waiver of its exclusive jurisdiction over discrimination
charges accomplishes three things: A waiver effectively terminates
state proceedings within the meaning of section 706(c). It allows
the EEOC to deem the charge filed, and it permits the EEOC to
process the charge immediately. 486 U.S. at 112, 108 S.Ct. at
1669-70. In light of our ruling in Urrutia and the Supreme Court's
decision in Commercial Office Products, we now hold that the TCHR's
waiver of jurisdiction over Mr. Griffin's charge, and indeed over
all charges filed after 180 days but before 300 days following the
alleged discriminatory event, was self-executing. The waiver
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instantaneously transformed the EEOC's receipt of Mr. Griffin's
charge into a filing of that charge and authorized the EEOC to
initiate proceedings on that charge immediately.
Our holding is consistent with the EEOC's construction of
waiver provisions in such Worksharing Agreements. In the
regulations which interpret its Title VII authority, the Commission
has determined that when a discrimination charge "on its face
constitutes a charge within a category of charges over which the
FEP agency has waived its rights to the period of exclusive
processing ..., the charge is deemed to be filed with the
Commission upon receipt of the document." 29 C.F.R. §
1601.13(a)(4)(ii)(A). According to the EEOC, "[s]uch filing is
timely if the charge is received within 300 days from the date of
the alleged violation." Id.
This construction is in consonance with the purposes of Title
VII. As the Commercial Office Products Court recognized, Congress
created the sixty-day, exclusive-jurisdiction period to afford
states the first opportunity to handle discrimination complaints
which arise within their provinces. 486 U.S. at 118, 108 S.Ct. at
1672-73. States' jurisdiction, though exclusive, is entirely
voluntary. If states do not want exclusive—or any—jurisdiction,
they are free to relinquish it. The only consequence is that the
EEOC may then intervene sans delay. Id.
Today's holding brings this Circuit in line with the Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, each of which has
ruled that such waivers are self-executing, permitting the EEOC to
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commence proceedings when the charge is filed. See Worthington v.
Union Pacific Railroad, 948 F.2d 477 (8th Cir.1991); Sofferin v.
American Airlines, Inc., D.J., 923 F.2d 552 (7th Cir.1991); Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Techalloy Maryland, Inc., 894
F.2d 676 (4th Cir.1990); Griffin v. Air Products and Chemicals,
Inc., 883 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.1989); Green v. Los Angeles County
Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir.1989).
III. Conclusion
Because the EEOC accepted Mr. Griffin's complaint as TCHR's
agent, Mr. Griffin instituted state proceedings within the meaning
of section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act. The institution of
those proceedings extended the limitations period to 300 days. The
TCHR's waiver of its exclusive jurisdiction over Mr. Griffin's
claim terminated the state proceedings when Mr. Griffin filed his
claim with the EEOC. Because Mr. Griffin filed his claim within
the 300-day period, the State's waiver conferred upon the EEOC the
authority to process the claim immediately. The district court
erred in holding otherwise.
We REVERSE and REMAND for trial on the merits.
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