Turner v. White Con Indust Inc ( 1995 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 95-60075
No. 95-60182
Summary Calendar
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JAMES H. TURNER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WHITE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES, INC.; EMERSON ELECTRIC CO.;
BEAIRD-POULAN, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi
(1:93-CV-90-RR)
______________________________________________
(October 10, 1995)
Before KING, SMITH and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:*
In this products liability action, the manufacturer of a chain
saw appeals a jury verdict asserting error in the jury
instructions, admission of evidence, and size of the verdict. We
affirm.
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This controversy arises from an accident involving a Poulan
Model 5200 chain saw manufactured in the late 1970's. This
particular saw was equipped with a bow guide instead of the common
straight guide bar. A bow guide saw is designed for cutting fallen
trees into lengths while the tree is lying on the ground. As the
name implies, a bow guide is bowed outward with a large cutting
area. At the bottom of the bow are bumper spikes that are placed
firmly against the wood during cutting.
Plaintiff-appellee James Turner was the third owner of the saw
having purchased it from his brother-in-law in 1988 or 1989. On
March 9, 1990, Turner was using the saw when a bolt securing a
bumper spike broke causing the saw to kick back severely cutting
Turner's arm. Following his injury, Turner sued the manufacturer,
defendant-appellant Beaird-Poulan, Inc. and its various successor
corporations (collectively "Poulan"). Turner's lawsuit alleged
both negligence and strict products liability causes of action
stemming from the design, manufacture, and lack of warnings and
instructions. After a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict
in favor of Turner for $275,000. Poulan appeals.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Poulan raises two challenges to the jury instructions. We
review a challenge to a district court's jury instructions with
deference. Treadaway v. Societe Anonyme Louis-Dreyfus, 894 F.2d
161, 167 (5th Cir. 1990). If timely objection is made, we will
reverse only if the charge as a whole leaves us with substantial
and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in
2
its deliberations. Id. at 168; Middleton v. Harris Press & Shear,
Inc., 796 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1986).
Poulan first contends that the district court improperly
instructed the jury on strict liability. Specifically, Poulan
argues that the court misstated Mississippi law when it instructed
that Turner had to prove that "the chain saw was expected to and
did reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition of the alleged defect in which it was sold." Poulan
believes that this diluted Turner's burden because, under
Mississippi law, a plaintiff must prove that the product as a whole
reached the user without substantial change, not merely the absence
of change in the alleged defect.
Viewing the district court's instruction as a whole,1 we do
1
The complete instruction on strict liability is as follows:
Under applicable Mississippi law, one who designs,
manufactures, or sells any product in a defective
condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer, or its property, is liable for harm to such
person or its property if the manufacturer and/or
seller is engaged in the business of selling such
products and the product is expected to and does reach
the user without substantial change in the condition in
which it was sold.
Accordingly, if you find from a preponderance of the
evidence in this case:
1. The chain saw in question was, at the time of
its sale by defendant, in a defective condition,
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer of the
product, or to his property, and;
2. That the chain saw was expected to and did
reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition of the alleged defect in which it was
sold, and;
3. Plaintiff was injured while the chain saw was
3
not believe the jury was improperly guided. Mississippi has
adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the
foundation for strict products liability. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
v. Reeves, 486 So.2d 374, 377-78 (Miss. 1986). One of the
requisites for liability under section 402A is that the product "is
expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold." Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A(1)(b) (1965). The Mississippi Supreme Court has
explained that this specific section means that "from the evidence
it must appear that the defect which was a proximate cause of the
harm existed when the product left the possession of the
manufacturer." BFGoodrich, Inc. v. Taylor, 509 So.2d 895, 903
(Miss. 1987) (emphasis added); see Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage,
617 So.2d 248, 262 (Miss. 1993); see also Hardy v. Chemetron Corp.,
870 F.2d 1007, 1008 (5th Cir. 1989). The district court's
instruction on strict liability included both the language of
section 402A(1)(b) and the Mississippi Supreme Court's
interpretation of this section as outlined in BFGoodrich.
Consequently, the court did not improperly instruct the jury on
strict products liability under Mississippi law.
Poulan's second challenge to the jury instructions centers on
the district court's denial of a proposed spoliation instruction.
being used in a manner and for a purpose for which the
product was intended and which was reasonably
foreseeable by the defendants, and;
4. The defective condition of the product was the
sole cause or proximate contributing cause of the
resulting injury or damage, then your verdict shall be
for the plaintiff.
4
As a threshold matter, to prevail on this issue Poulan must show
that the proposed instruction correctly states the law. Treadaway,
894 F.2d at 167. The record, however, does not contain a copy of
the proffered instruction. Poulan mistakenly believes that a copy
was included with the trial exhibits sent to this Court. However,
the exhibits contain only the actual instructions given to the
jury, not Poulan's proposed instructions. Consequently, it is
impossible for this Court to determine if the proposed instruction
correctly stated the law.
Moreover, even if we assume the proposed instruction correctly
reflected the law on spoliation of evidence,2 such an instruction
was unnecessary in this case. The gist of Poulan's spoliation
claim is that Turner cleaned the chain saw of grease and grime
before it was admitted in evidence. According to Poulan, this
cleansing obscured the poor maintenance that it believes
contributed to the accident. As the district court correctly
noted, this does not amount to spoliation of evidence.
Significantly, Poulan inspected and dismantled the saw before it
was cleaned. Poulan extensively photographed the saw in its
deteriorated condition. These photographs were admitted in
2
This is indeed a large assumption in the context of
spoliation. See 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 5178, at 153 (1978)
("`Spoliation' is another of the labels that are sometimes
substituted for thought in the resolution of issues of relevance,
and one that is even slippier and more dangerous than those
discussed in the preceding section."); see also Schmid v.
Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
that there is even disagreement as to whether the issue of
spoliation is one of substantive state law or federal evidence
law).
5
evidence. Poulan also had ample opportunity at trial to explore
the differences between the saw as admitted and the saw in the
photographs. Consequently, there is no spoliation of evidence
because the jury clearly had evidence of the prior condition of the
saw. Poulan is unable to demonstrate on these facts that a
spoliation instruction was required.3
EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES
Poulan raises several challenges to the evidentiary rulings of
the district court. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse
of discretion and may be reversed only if the ruling affects a
substantial right. Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 566 (5th
Cir. 1994).
Poulan first challenges the admission of an exemplar saw on
the grounds of undue prejudice and circumvention of the court's
exclusion of post-accident industry standards. While a minute
entry dated more than one year after the trial4 reflects denial of
an ore tenus motion in limine on the exemplar saw, Poulan did not
object to the admission of the saw when it was offered at trial.
Likewise, the minute entry does not reflect the specific grounds on
which the motion was made.5 The general rule in this Circuit is
3
Poulan's cited authority is unhelpful. Neither of Poulan's
two cases relate to the situation present here. See Davidson Oil
Country Supply Co. v. Klockner, Inc., 917 F.2d 185, 186-87 (5th
Cir. 1990) (reviewing effect of excluded evidence tainting jury
findings on usury); Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d
1147, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing contamination of a
blood sample caused by breaks in the chain of custody).
4
The jury verdict was returned June 2, 1994; the minute entry
is dated June 30, 1995.
5
The minute entry was: "To prohibit admission of later model
6
that an overruled motion in limine does not preserve error on
appeal.6 Marcel, 11 F.3d at 567 (5th Cir. 1994). Consequently, we
review the admission of the saw only for plain error.
The district court did not commit plain error in the admission
of the exemplar saw. The exemplar was an used saw manufactured in
1988 equipped with both chain guards and a chain brake.7 The saw
was admitted as demonstrative evidence for the limited purpose of
showing the feasibility of a chain brake and how it would have
prevented the accident. At trial, Poulan admitted that chain
brakes were available and feasible at the time of manufacture of
the saw in controversy. Consequently, there is no undue prejudice
violative of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Likewise, introduction of the exemplar saw does not implicate
the prohibition of subsequent remedial measures contained in
Federal Rule of Evidence 407. The exemplar saw was manufactured
before the accident. As this Court has held, the triggering event
of Rule 407 is the accident itself, not the sale of the product.
Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679, 686 (5th Cir. 1991).
bow saw as demonstrative evidence of deft's knowledge at time of
manufacture of bow saw. Denied - exemplar saw allowed."
6
Poulan argues in its supplemental briefing that the general
rule should not apply because the oral motion was overruled
shortly before voir dire began. Supposedly, this compressed
timeframe somehow relieves Poulan of the burden of objection.
Poulan, however, cites no authority for this proposition.
Similarly, we refuse to craft Poulan an exception where the
record reflects neither when the ruling was made nor the grounds
on which the motion was based.
7
A chain brake is a device designed to stop the movement of
the chain after a kickback.
7
As such, the saw does not reflect subsequent remedial measures.8
Poulan's final challenge to the exemplar saw is that its
presence thwarted the district court's exclusion of industry
standards adopted post-accident. This is equally meritless. While
there was testimony by Turner's expert illustrating safety features
of the exemplar saw, Poulan made no objection at trial.
Additionally, no mention was made of the ANSI industry standards
excluded by the district court. We fail to see plain error in the
admission of the exemplar saw.
In addition to the challenge to the exemplar, Poulan
challenges the admission of testimony from Turner's expert witness,
Kerry Wilcoxon. Initially, Poulan argues that Wilcoxon was not
qualified to testify as an expert because he lacked experience in
the design of chain or bow saws. It is well-settled that a
district court possesses wide discretion in determining the
qualifications of an expert. Dixon v. International Harvester Co.,
754 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1985); Ellis v. K-Lan Co., 695 F.2d
157, 162 (5th Cir. 1983). Personal design experience is
unnecessary to qualify as an expert in a products liability action;
overall knowledge or specialized skill is sufficient. See Dixon,
754 F.2d at 580.
The record reflects that Wilcoxon is a mechanical engineer
working for Benedict Engineering Company, a consulting and design
8
As we stressed in Cates, as a matter of substantive law the
focus of a products liability case is on the dangers inherent in
a product when it leaves the manufacturer. Rule 407, however, is
a rule of evidence and the relevant time is that of the accident.
Cates, 928 F.2d at 686.
8
concern specializing in safety engineering. Wilcoxon had training
in accident reconstruction and was project engineer on several
consumer product safety projects, some involving kickback and
warnings. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in qualifying Wilcoxon as an expert simply because he
lacked experience in the design of chain saws.
Poulan also complains on appeal that Wilcoxon's testimony
concerning chain brakes exceeded the scope of his expert
designation. Turner designated Wilcoxon as an expert witness "in
accordance with his report and such further information and
supplemental reports which may become appropriate." The district
court properly advised counsel that Wilcoxon's testimony would be
limited to matters stated in his report or in his later
supplemental deposition. Wilcoxon's testimony concerning chain
brakes was not objected to by Poulan at trial as deviating from
either his report or deposition. We do not find plain error in the
admission of this testimony.9
Poulan's final evidentiary challenge concerns admission of
examples of similar accidents involving Poulan chain saws.
Poulan's expert, Ronald Loyd, testified that the chain saw in
question "is not capable of producing a kickback that I can't
control under any condition." On cross-examination, Loyd further
testified that any "well-nourished male that has had the exercise
and strength can control [the kickback] on that saw." To impeach
9
Furthermore, this testimony was within the scope of his
expert designation. In recounting his deposition testimony,
Wilcoxon stated: "I was asked about chain brakes. And I was
asked what kind of chain brakes should be on it."
9
this testimony, Turner cross-examined Loyd on two other reported
cases involving kickback accidents caused by Poulan saws.10 The
court admitted this evidence solely for the limited purpose of
showing Poulan's notice or knowledge of kickback.11 It was not an
abuse of the court's discretion to allow the testimony for this
purpose. See Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 579 (5th
Cir. 1993).
VERDICT SIZE
Poulan's final claim is that the $275,000 verdict is so
excessive as to require a new trial or remittitur. A jury's
verdict will not be reversed on grounds of excessiveness except on
the strongest of showings. Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d
1321, 1326 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
Because the size of an award is primarily a question of fact, we
are exceedingly hesitant to overturn the decision of a jury,
especially when the trial judge has approved the award. Id. at
1327. To warrant judicial intervention into a jury's award, the
verdict must be so large as to shock the judicial conscience, so
gross or inordinately large as to be contrary to right reason, or
10
See Perkins v. Emerson Elec. Co., 482 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D.
La. 1980) (involving a kickback accident with a 1977 Poulan 5200
chain saw); Thompson v. Tuggle, 486 So.2d 144 (La. App. 3d Cir.)
(involving a kickback accident with a Poulan 4200 bow saw), writ
denied, 489 So.2d 919 (La. 1986).
11
In ruling on Poulan's objection, the district court
specifically stated: "But as far as that--this line of testimony
having any bearing whatsoever on proof that this particular unit
was--was defective in manufacture or otherwise, I'll sustain the
objection and tell you to disregard it, but I'll allow it in for
the limited narrow purpose of showing any notice or knowledge on
the part of this defendant."
10
clearly exceed the amount any reasonable man could feel the
claimant is entitled to. Id.; Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983). These circumstances do not
exist in this case.
Turner's left arm was severely lacerated; part of the bone had
been chewed out by the saw. He bled profusely. He was unable to
be treated at a county hospital and had to be transported to
Mobile, Alabama where Turner underwent emergency surgery and was
hospitalized for five days. He testified that he still experiences
physical pain regularly. His left arm in now shorter than his
right. Medical testimony reflected that Turner's arm was almost
cut off and that he has a permanent disability and permanent
scarring. Additional surgery is necessary which will create
additional scars. Turner also testified to his fear of death and
continued mental anguish from the trauma. The district court did
not find the verdict excessive and we do not hestiate to conclude
that the verdict is not so excessive as to warrant judicial
intervention.
CONCLUSION
Poulan's complaints concerning the jury instructions,
evidentiary rulings, and size of the verdict present no reversible
error. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
11