Gorden v. Jackson State Univ ( 1996 )


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  •                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _______________________
    No. 95-60505
    Summary Calendar
    _______________________
    W C GORDEN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JACKSON   STATE   UNIVERSITY;  BOARD   OF   TRUSTEES   OF
    INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING; JAMES E LYONS, SR,
    Individually and in his official capacity as President of
    Jackson State University; EVALEE BANKS, Individually and
    in her official capacity as Vice President of Jackson
    State University; ALL DEFENDANTS,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    (3:95-CV-89)
    _________________________________________________________________
    April 18, 1996
    Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    W.C. Gorden appeals the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment dismissing his claims against defendants following his
    termination as Athletic Director at Jackson State University and
    his assignment to the Department of Health, Physical Education, and
    Recreation. For the reasons that follow, which are essentially the
    same as those stated by the district court, we AFFIRM.
    *
    Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
    set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On July 1, 1994, W.C. Gorden entered into a one-year
    written contract with the Board of Trustees of State Institutions
    of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi concerning his
    employment at Jackson State University.      Prior to entering into
    this contract, Gorden had been employed at Jackson State for over
    twenty-six years, serving in a variety of positions within the
    Health    and   Physical   Education   Department   and   within   the
    University’s Athletic Administration.
    The employment contract signed by Gorden was simple and
    straightforward. Page one of the contract provided that Gorden was
    to be employed as an “Instructor of Health” and as “Director of
    Athletics” within the Department of Health, Physical Education, and
    Recreation, and the Department of Athletics Administration.        The
    term of the contract was for one year, beginning July 1, 1994 and
    ending June 30, 1995, at a stated salary.     Page two provided that
    Gorden would serve as Jackson State’s “Director of Athletics.”
    Page three discussed possible sanctions if Gorden committed certain
    infractions and also outlined Jackson State’s right to reassign
    Gorden.   In full, page three provided:
    Athletics (NCAA Violations and Change of Duties)
    The employee acknowledges that involvement in a
    deliberate and serious violation of any law, regulation,
    rule, by-law, policy or constitutional provision of the
    State of Mississippi, the Board, the NCAA, conference or
    any other governing authority may result in suspension
    without pay and/or termination of this contract.      In
    addition, the University reserves the right to assign
    duties, to transfer, reassign, or otherwise change the
    duties of the Employee during the term of this contract.
    2
    On December 19, 1994, Evalee Banks, Vice-President of
    Jackson State, summoned Gorden into her office and delivered to him
    a letter signed by Jackson State President James Lyons. The letter
    informed   Gorden    that     effective     immediately     his   employment    as
    Director of Athletics was terminated, and that he had been detailed
    to the Department of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation.1
    The letter further provided that Gorden would continue to receive
    his current salary until June 30, 1995, at which time his salary
    would be adjusted to reflect the salary paid instructors in the
    Department of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation.
    The local media broadcast and published news of Gorden’s
    termination, including statements by Vice-President Banks that
    Gorden claims publicly disparaged his management capabilities, his
    ability to raise money, his ability to gain support from alumni,
    and his ability to enhance the athletic program. The day following
    his   reassignment,     a    security   officer      was   posted    outside   the
    Athletic Director’s office and local news crews filmed Gorden as he
    removed personal items from the office.
    Following       his   termination   as    Athletic      Director   and
    assignment to the Department of Health, Physical Education, and
    Recreation, Gorden retained counsel and sent a letter to President
    Lyons requesting both written reasons for his termination as
    1
    The letter originally given to Gorden stated that his termination as
    Athletic Director was effective January 19, 1995, and that his assignment to the
    Department of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation was effective January
    20, 1995. That evening, however, Jackson State security personnel delivered a
    corrected letter to Gorden’s home in which the dates had been changed to December
    19, 1994 and December 20, 1994.
    3
    Athletic Director and a hearing. President Lyons responded by
    letter addressed to Gorden’s counsel stating:
    Jackson State University chose to exercise its right to
    make an administrative change in the Department of
    Athletics by reassigning Mr. Gorden from part-time
    administration and part-time teaching responsibilities to
    full-time teaching responsibilities. . . . The University
    reassigned Mr. Gorden’s duties pursuant to his contract,
    and did not violate any of his statutory and
    constitutional rights.
    Thereafter,   on    January    31,   1995,    Gorden    filed     suit
    against   Jackson      State    University,     the   Board    of     Trustees     of
    Institutions of Higher Learning, James E. Lyons, Sr., individually
    and in his official capacity, and Evalee Banks, individually and in
    her official capacity (defendants).            Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. §
    1983, Gorden alleged that his termination and reassignment violated
    his liberty and property interests protected by the Fifth and
    Fourteenth Amendments.            Additionally, Gorden asserted state law
    claims of wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotional
    distress, breach of contract, ultra vires termination, as well as
    denial    of    due   process     under   Article     3,    Section    14   of    the
    Mississippi Constitution.
    On March 1, 1995, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss,
    or alternatively, for summary judgment, as well as a motion to hold
    discovery in abeyance pending a decision on the qualified immunity
    defense asserted by President Lyons and Vice-President Banks.                     The
    court granted defendants’ motion to hold discovery in abeyance and
    eventually granted summary judgment and dismissed all claims with
    prejudice.       Gorden timely appeals.
    4
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of Review
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    de novo, using the same standard as applied by the district court.
    Vera v. Tue, 
    73 F.3d 604
    , 607 (5th Cir. 1996).                 Summary judgment
    should be granted if the record discloses “that there is no genuine
    issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).                  Although
    all inferences are to be drawn in favor of the nonmovant, “[i]f the
    record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
    for the nonmovant, then there is no genuine issue for trial.” 
    Vera, 73 F.3d at 607
    .
    B. Constitutional Claims
    Gorden    contends    that      the    district    court    erred   in
    concluding that he did not have a property interest in continued
    employment as Athletic Director for the term of the contract, and
    in holding that he had failed to present a genuine issue of
    material fact as to his liberty interest claim.               Gorden argues that
    the   employment     contract    is   ambiguous,     and    that   he   presented
    evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding
    whether Lyons and Banks made false and defamatory statements
    regarding   Gorden’s    performance         as   Athletic   Director    and   also
    orchestrated his discharge in such a manner as to communicate that
    Gorden had been involved in misconduct.              We disagree.
    The employment contract in question is unambiguous in
    that it grants Jackson State the right to “transfer, reassign, or
    5
    otherwise change the duties” of Gorden during the term of the
    contract. See Simmons v. Bank of Mississippi, 
    593 So. 2d 40
    , 42-43
    (Miss. 1992)(court must determine the meaning of the language used
    in the contract, not ascertain some unexpressed intention of the
    parties); Cherry v. Anthony, Gibbs, Sage, 
    501 So. 2d 416
    , 419
    (Miss. 1987)(when construing provisions of a contract, the court
    must look to the document as a whole).                     Based on the contract,
    Gorden    has   failed    to   establish      a     constitutionally        protected
    property interest in serving as Athletic Director for Jackson
    State.     Board of Regents v. Roth, 
    408 U.S. 564
    , 577, 
    92 S. Ct. 2701
    ,    2709   (1972)(mere    expectation          does    not    create   protected
    property interest).        Additionally, even if a property interest
    exists, it      is   undisputed   that       when    Gorden       was   terminated   as
    Athletic    Director     and   assigned      to     the    Department     of   Health,
    Physical Education, and Recreation, he continued to receive the
    contracted for salary contained in the July 1, 1994 employment
    contract and has therefore suffered no compensable damage as a
    result of his reassignment. Davis v. Mann, 
    882 F.2d 967
    , 973 (5th
    Cir. 1989); see Robinson v. Boyer, 
    825 F.2d 64
    , 67 (5th Cir. 1987).
    The district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to
    Gorden’s property interest claim.
    Concerning Gorden’s liberty interest claim, the fact that
    Gorden continued as an employee with Jackson State following his
    termination as Athletic Director negates his liberty interest
    claim.    As explained in Moore v. Otero, 
    557 F.2d 435
    , 438 (5th Cir.
    1977):
    6
    When an employee retains his position even after being
    defamed by a public official, the only claim of stigma he
    has derives from the injury to his reputation, an
    interest that [Paul v. Davis, 
    424 U.S. 693
    , 
    96 S. Ct. 1155
    (1976)] reveals does not rise to the level of a
    liberty interest. The internal transfer of an employee,
    unless it constitutes such a change of status as to be
    regarded essentially as a loss of employment, does not
    provide the additional loss of a tangible interest
    necessary to give rise to a liberty interest meriting
    protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth
    amendment.
    
    Id. at 438,
    see Schultea v. Wood, 
    27 F.3d 1112
    , 1117-18 (5th Cir.
    1994), modified on reh’g en banc, 
    47 F.3d 1427
    (5th Cir. 1995).
    The assignment of Gorden as a full-time health instructor did not
    amount to “essentially a loss of employment” under Moore.             The
    district court properly found that Gorden has not been deprived of
    a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
    C. State Law Claims
    The district court properly granted summary judgment as
    to   Gorden’s   state    law    claims.     The   employment    contract
    unambiguously provides that Jackson State may “transfer, reassign,
    or otherwise change the duties” of Gorden during the term of the
    contract.     The University did not breach Gorden’s employment
    contract by removing him as Athletic Director and assigning him, at
    the same pay, to the Department of Health, Physical Education, and
    Recreation, nor does the University’s conduct give rise to a claim
    of wrongful discharge since Gorden was merely assigned to another
    position    identified   by    his   employment   contract   within   the
    University. Additionally, Gorden’s claim of intentional infliction
    of emotional distress fails because the University’s assignment of
    Gorden pursuant to the contract to full-time teaching without loss
    7
    of pay was not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
    degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” White v.
    Walker, 
    950 F.2d 972
    , 978 (5th Cir. 1991)(Mississippi law)(citation
    omitted). Lastly, Gorden’s due process claim under the Mississippi
    Constitution    fails    for   the    same     reasons    Gorden’s    Federal
    Constitutional claims failed.         Walters v. Blackledge, 
    71 So. 2d 433
    , 444 (Miss. 1954)(federal “due process” is the same as state
    “due process").
    D. Discovery
    Gorden argues that the district court erred in granting
    summary judgment without affording him the benefit of discovery.
    Specifically, Gorden contends that there is an issue regarding the
    meaning of the employment contract and that to grant summary
    judgment without allowing him to depose and examine agents of the
    University regarding their understanding of the contract was an
    abuse of discretion.     We disagree.
    The focus of Gorden’s claim centers on the interpretation
    of   the   employment   contract     between   Gorden    and   the   Board   of
    Trustees. The interpretation of written contracts is a question of
    law decided by the court. Hall v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
    
    937 F.2d 210
    , 213 (5th Cir. 1991); Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey,
    
    801 F.2d 773
    , 780 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
    481 U.S. 1015
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 1892
    (1987).      We agree with the district court that the
    contract is unambiguous in that it grants Jackson State the right
    “to assign duties, to transfer, reassign, or otherwise change the
    duties of [Gorden] during the term of [the] contract.”                Jackson
    8
    State exercised this right by assigning Gorden to the Department of
    Health, Physical Education, and Recreation within the University.
    Gorden continued to receive the contracted for salary.   Gorden has
    “failed to point to any issue of material fact that could preclude
    summary judgment.” NGS American, Inc. v. Barnes, 
    998 F.2d 296
    , 300
    (5th Cir. 1993); see King v. Dogan, 
    31 F.3d 344
    , 346 (5th Cir.
    1994). The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
    prior to discovery.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
    court is AFFIRMED.
    9