Texas Indep Party v. Kirk ( 1998 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 97-50247
________________________
TEXAS INDEPENDENT PARTY, MARTHA BYRAM, LINDA CURTIS, JULIUS DREW,
SR., ROBERT EARL DUBOSE III, GILBERTO (“GIL”) GAMEZ, KEN
HENDERSON, DAVID JONES, JACQUELYN MITCHELL, TERRY MOSER, STEVE
ROSSIGNOL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
RONALD KIRK, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State of
the State of Texas,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas
(A-94-CV-175)
_________________________________________________________________
January 13, 1998
Before DAVIS, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Following this court’s opinion in Texas Independent Party
v. Kirk, 84 F.3d 178 (5th Cir. 1996), the Texas Independent Party,
eight candidates who sought nomination for public office in the
general election of November 8, 1994, and two independent
candidates for public office in that election (collectively
“appellants”) filed a motion in district court for an award of
attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, seeking $26,925 in
1
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
attorneys’ fees and $1,468 in expenses. The district court denied
the motion, and this appeal followed. Finding the district court
improperly denied the appellants’ motion, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
On March 10, 1994, appellants filed a claim against the
Texas Secretary of State, alleging that various provisions of the
Texas election laws, which prescribe deadlines and imposed voter
registration number requirements on nominating petitions for
independent candidates were unconstitutional. The appellants
sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys’ fees
and costs.
Finding no relief in the district court, the appellants
appealed the judgment to this court. This court affirmed the
judgment as it related to the challenged filing deadlines, but
reversed that portion of the district court’s opinion which upheld
the state law requiring that voter registration numbers be included
on independent candidate petitions. See Texas Indep. Party, 84
F.3d at 187.
On remand the appellants moved for attorneys’ fees and
expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that a prevailing
party may collect reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs.
The district court denied the motion, characterizing the
appellants’ appeal as a “limited success,” which represented “only
a tiny fraction of the relief sought,” and which did not afford the
appellants prevailing party status under § 1988.
We review the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees
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for abuse of discretion, see Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d 829, 831
(5th Cir. 1996), but “the discretion afforded district courts to
deny attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs under § 1988 is
exceedingly narrow,” Ellwest Stereo Theatre, Inc. v. Jackson, 653
F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 1981). “Congress has
instructed the courts to award attorneys’ fees as an incentive for
parties who prevail in protecting important constitutional rights
. . . .” Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 546
(5th Cir. 1980). As a result, a prevailing party is entitled to an
award for attorneys’ fees under § 1988 “unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991, 998 (5th Cir. 1983). This has come to mean
that “absent special circumstances, a prevailing plaintiff should
be awarded section 1988 fees as a matter of course.” Id.
Consequently, we must determine (1) if the appellants were the
prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees and
(2) whether special circumstances exists which would render an
award of attorneys’ fees unjust. See Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652
F.2d 458, 464 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981).
“‘The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be
the material alteration of the legal relationship between the
parties.’” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573
(1992) (quoting Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S. Ct. 1486, 1493 (1989)). This
court has held that a party prevails “if the relief obtained,
through judgment or settlement, materially alters the defendants’
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behavior in a way directly benefiting the plaintiff.” Watkins v.
Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1993).
Following their appeal to this court, the appellants were
clearly the prevailing party in one aspect of this case. The
appellants challenged the district court’s decision upholding
Texas’s prescribed deadlines and voter registration number
requirement. This court affirmed the judgment as it related to the
challenged deadlines, but reversed that portion of the district
court’s opinion which upheld the state law requiring that voter
registration numbers be included on independent candidate
petitions. See Texas Indep. Party, 84 F.3d at 187. As a result,
the appellants have succeeded in obtaining at least part of the
relief they sought. Moreover, our opinion altered the legal
relationship between the parties in that the defendant must now
modify its behavior in a way that directly benefits the appellants
in all future elections in the state of Texas. See Farrar, 506
U.S. at 111-12, 113 S. Ct. at 573.
The district court’s order articulated no special
circumstances for denying the appellants’ motion for attorneys’
fees and costs. Even though the issue on which the appellants
prevailed in this case comprised only two pages of a twenty-page
motion for summary judgment and may or may not have required the
appellants to present novel or complex issues of law, “the
prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the
relief obtained.” Id. at 114, 113 S. Ct. at 574. Once “litigation
materially alters the legal relationship between the parties, ‘the
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degree of the [appellants’] overall success goes to the
reasonableness’” of the fee award. Id., 113 S. Ct. at 574 (quoting
Garland, 489 U.S. at 793, 109 S. Ct. at 1494). Furthermore, our
review of the record reveals no special circumstances that would
render an award of attorneys’ fees unjust. See Riddell, 624 F.2d
at 543 (“Section 1988 requires a strong showing of special
circumstances to justify denying an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs to the prevailing party . . . .”).
Thus, the district court’s order is insufficient to
justify a total denial of an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to
the appellants, although the amount will be affected by the limited
extent of appellants’ victory. We REVERSE the district court and
REMAND for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. An
award should include an allowance for fees and costs incurred in
contesting the district court’s order in this appeal.
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