Brown v. Outsource Specialist ( 2001 )


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  •               IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _______________
    m 00-51252
    _______________
    WALTER G. BROWN, JR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    VERSUS
    OUTSOURCE SPECIALIST, INC.;
    CITGO PETROLEUM PIPELINE CORPORATION,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    _________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    (A-00-CV-29)
    _________________________
    September 21, 2001
    Before JONES, SMITH, and                                maintenance and delivery services for Citgo
    EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.                      Products Pipeline Company (“Citgo”) while
    Citgo phased in an automated system. During
    PER CURIAM:*                                            his tenure from 1994 to 1999, Brown, who is
    black, believed OSI and Citgo did not give him
    Outsource Specialist, Inc. (“OSI”), hired             the same privileges as his white co-workers, so
    Walter Brown on a temporary basis to perform            he sued. The district court granted summary
    judgment for OSI and Citgo on the basis that
    *
    Brown had failed to establish either a prima
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
    facie case or pretext for discrimination.
    determined that this opinion should not be published
    and is not precedent except under the limited           Finding no error, we affirm.
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    I.                              v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322-23 (1986).
    Brown provided pipeline operator and de-
    livery services. In 1995, he applied for a me-                               III.
    chanic position, but Citgo filled the opening             We have reviewed the record and conclude
    with a white applicant. Two months before              that the district court correctly entered
    Brown was terminated, he filed a complaint             summary judgment. To establish a prima facie
    with the Equal Employment Opportunity                  case of discrimination with indirect evidence of
    Commission (“EEOC”) and the Texas                      employer animus, a plaintiff must show that he
    Commission on Human Rights (“TCHR”),                   (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) is
    alleging discrimination on the basis of race           qualified for the position; (3) suffered an
    because he had to arrive earlier and document          adverse employment action; and (4) was re-
    his work time in more detail than did white            placed by a member of a non-protected class.
    employees. After receiving a right-to-sue              See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
    letter from the EEOC, Brown sued OSI and               502, 506 (1993).
    Citgo under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
    1964, claiming discrimination and retaliation.            Brown’s various complaints regarding his
    As further evidence of unequal treatment,              work conditions are not actionable under title
    Brown claimed OSI and Citgo required him to            VII. Although his termination does constitute
    work during holidays and family events, forced         an adverse employment action, Brown has not
    him to mow the lawn with a mower that hurt             established a prima facie case, because he has
    his back, provided him with a truck and cell           not demonstrated that non-protected class
    phone later than it provided the same to white         members were treated differently. When OSI
    employees, and verbally threatened his job.            and Citgo downsized, they laid off thirteen
    Citgo began laying off workers in 1997 but did         white workers before Brown and had
    not terminate Brown until March 1999. He               terminated all workers three months later.
    alleges that white employees were retained             Even if he had a prima facie case, an across-
    longer or were allowed to leave their positions        the-board layoff is a legitimate, non-
    earlier with pay.                                      discriminatory reason for termination. See
    EEOC v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 
    100 F.3d II
    .                             1173, 1181 (5th Cir. 1996).
    We review a summary judgment de novo.
    Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 
    158 F.3d 326
    ,               On his failure-to-hire claim, Brown did es-
    328 (5th Cir. 1998). A court may enter                 tablish a prima facie case, but he cannot pre-
    summary judgment if the record, taken as a             vail without showing that he had superior
    whole, “shows that there is no genuine issue as        qualifications. See EEOC v. La. Office of
    to any material fact and that the moving party         Cmty. Servs., 
    47 F.3d 1438
    , 1445 (5th Cir.
    is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”         1995). Because he has not, he cannot
    FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). If a party “fails to make       establish that the defendants’ proffered rea-
    a showing sufficient to establish the existence        son—that the other candidate was more quali-
    of an element essential to that party’s case and       fied—was pretextual.
    on which that party will bear the burden of
    proof at trial,” rule 56(c) mandates summary
    judgment for the opposing side. Celotex Corp.
    2
    IV.
    The defendants’ legitimate reason for
    Brown’s termination defeats his retaliation
    claim. To establish a prima facie case of re-
    taliation under title VII, Brown must show
    that (1) he engaged in protected activity;
    (2) the defendants took adverse employment
    action against him; and (3) a causal connection
    exists between the protected activity and the
    adverse employment action. See Mattern v.
    Eastman Kodak Co., 
    104 F.3d 702
    , 705 (5th
    Cir. 1997). Brown has made a prima facie
    case of retaliation, because he filed TCHR and
    EEOC complaints and was fired shortly
    thereafter. To prevail, however, he must show
    that his protected activity was the “but for”
    cause. See Long v. Eastfield College, 
    88 F.3d 300
    , 304 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996). Brown has not
    offered any additional evidence of a causal
    connection between the filing and firing.
    AFFIRMED.
    3