Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dept. ( 1992 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 91-4709
Summary Calendar
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HARRY LEE JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
CITY OF BEAUMONT POLICE DEPARTMENT,
ET AL.,
Defendants,
DON GORDON, Officer, and
E. R. PACHALL, Officer,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
_____________________________________________________
(April 3, 1992)
Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:
Asserting qualified immunity, police officers Don Gordon and
E. R. Pachall appeal the denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss Harry Lee Jackson's § 1983 claim that he was subjected to
excessive force during an arrest, Jackson having earlier survived
a 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) Spears hearing. This appeal brings to the
fore the differences in the functions of § 1915(d) and Spears
hearings on the one hand and Rule 12(b)(6) on the other. We
REVERSE and REMAND.
I.
In November 1987, Jackson, pro se and in forma pauperis, filed
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the "Beaumont [Texas]
Police Department", asserting several claims concerning his June
1987 arrest for aggravated robbery. Although not included within
the "statement of claim", the complaint also referenced, without
providing any detail, an earlier arrest in 1985, involving Jackson
and officers Gordon and "Pascal".1 A Spears hearing was held in
April 1988, by the magistrate judge. That same day, Jackson filed
a "motion for summary judgment", contending that he was entitled to
judgment because of the Police Department's failure to defend. He
included several documents, which asserted that officers Gordon and
"Pahaw" used excessive force during the 1985 arrest. The
magistrate judge, in July 1988, denied the motion (construed as a
request for default judgment), because the Department had not been
ordered to answer.
Later that month, the magistrate judge recommended that the
excessive force claim be dismissed as frivolous under § 1915(d),
finding that it was time barred. In December 1988, the district
court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the claim. Jackson
appealed. This court reversed and remanded, in January 1990,
finding that "the district court failed to consider whether Texas
tolling provisions for the disability of imprisonment applied ...."
Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police, 894 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1990)
(unpublished opinion).
1
Issues related to the 1987 arrest (which include an excessive
force claim) are not included in this appeal. This opinion
pertains only to the arrest in 1985.
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Following remand, Jackson moved, in March 1990, for permission
to amend his complaint to include, for the first time, officers
Gordon and "Pawhaw" as defendants. Later that month, the district
court, noting that a responsive pleading had not been filed,
granted the motion, but ordered that process not issue pending
review under § 1915(d). A pro se amended complaint was filed in
May 1990, and the magistrate judge held a second Spears hearing
that July.
In January 1991, the magistrate judge issued a report (adopted
by the district judge in April 1991), which noted that the
excessive force claim was "stated in [the] motion for summary
judgment submitted [in 1988] after [Jackson's first] Spears
hearing", and recommended that the claim not be dismissed as
frivolous. Accordingly, the amended complaint was ordered served
on officers Gordon and Pachall.2 They moved, in March 1991, for
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending, inter alia,
that Jackson had not plead facts sufficient to overcome their
qualified immunity defense. In early April 1991, Jackson obtained
counsel. The magistrate judge, in May 1991, recommended that the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion be denied, stating that he had already found
in his January 1991 report that Jackson "had sufficiently alleged
facts for each of the elements of a Fourth Amendment excessive
force claim." In July 1991, noting that Jackson had counsel, the
2
In May 1991, the court entered an order correcting the record
to reflect that "Officer Pawhaw" is Officer E. R. Pachall.
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district court adopted the report and denied the officers' motion
to dismiss. Gordon and Pachall timely appealed.3
II.
A.
A district court's ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is subject
to de novo review. E.g., Barrientos v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 911 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 111 S. Ct. 795 (1991). The motion may be granted "`only if it
appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that
could be proven consistent with the allegations.'" Id. (quoting
Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Jacobs Constructors,
Inc., 804 F.2d 879, 881 (5th Cir. 1986)). Our review is limited
solely to an evaluation of Jackson's amended complaint. E.g.,
Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist. of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921, 935
(5th Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir.
1986).
However, it appears that the magistrate judge, in considering
the motion to dismiss, determined that an excessive force claim was
stated in Jackson's "motion for summary judgment". (Of course,
Gordon and Pachall were not served with this motion, which was
submitted in April 1988, over two years prior to their being made
defendants in May 1990.) "While it is ... appropriate to look
3
"[T]he district court's denial of an immunity defense is an
appealable `final decision' under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, notwithstanding
the absence of a final judgment." Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d
1550, 1552 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511 (1985)). "The reason underlying immediate appealability ... is
that `immunity' in this instance means immunity from suit, not
simply immunity from liability." Id.- 4 -
beyond the pleadings to decide whether summary judgment should be
granted, the converse is true when the question is whether the
pleadings state a claim. It is black-letter law that `[a] motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) is to be evaluated only on the pleadings.'"
Mahone, 836 F.2d at 935 (quoting O'Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605,
608 (5th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, consideration of the Rule
12(b)(6) motion should have been confined to an evaluation of the
amended complaint, which, of course, "supersede[d] the original
[complaint] and render[ed] it of no legal effect". Boelens v.
Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985); see also
Clark v. Tarrant County, Texas, 798 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1986).
The district court's consideration of information outside Jackson's
amended complaint, however, does not affect our de novo review.
Furthermore, in recommending denial of the defendants' motion,
the magistrate judge stated that the argument raised "ha[d] already
been decided" in his January 1991 report. That report, however,
had reviewed Jackson's amended complaint under § 1915(d), after a
second Spears hearing, to determine whether it should be dismissed
as frivolous. The Rule 12(b)(6) motion, on the other hand, raised
the issue of qualified immunity and asserted that Jackson had not
met this circuit's heightened pleading requirements for § 1983
claims where such a defense can be raised. See, e.g., Brown v.
Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1989).
It is well settled that ruling under § 1915(d) is separate and
distinct from that under Rule 12(b)(6). In Neitzke v. Williams,
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490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989), the Court stated that "the failure to
state a claim standard of Rule 12(b)(6) and the frivolousness
standard of § 1915(d) were devised to serve distinctive goals, and
... while the overlap between these two standards is considerable,
it does not follow that a complaint which falls afoul of the former
standard will invariably fall afoul of the latter." Accord Wilson
v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
969 (1989); Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th
Cir. 1989).
The primary function of § 1915(d) is to deter the filing of
baseless lawsuits by in forma pauperis litigants who "would [not
otherwise] be deterred by either the actual cost of litigation or
the imminence of Rule 11 sanctions." Wilson, 878 F.2d at 850.
Therefore,
[t]o the extent that a complaint filed in forma
pauperis which fails to state a claim lacks even an
arguable basis in law, Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(d)
both counsel dismissal. But the considerable
common ground between these standards does not mean
that the one invariably encompasses the other.
When a complaint raises an arguable question of law
which the district court ultimately finds is
correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal
on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is appropriate, but
dismissal on the basis of frivolousness is not.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328 (footnote omitted). Accordingly,
"frivolousness in the § 1915(d) context refers to a more limited
set of claims than does Rule 12(b)(6)[;] ... not all unsuccessful
claims are frivolous." Id.
On the other hand,
[u]nder Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable
claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a pending
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motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and
an opportunity to amend the complaint before the
motion is ruled upon. These procedures alert him
to the legal theory underlying the defendant's
challenge, and enable him meaningfully to respond
by opposing the motion to dismiss on legal grounds
or by clarifying his factual allegations so as to
conform with the requirements of a valid legal
cause of action.
Id. at 329-30 (footnote omitted). Section 1915(d) dismissals
involve no such procedural protections; indeed, they "are often
made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare
prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering
such complaints." Id. at 324, 330.
Accordingly, the district court could not deny the officers'
qualified immunity defense simply on the basis that a § 1915(d)
review had determined that Jackson had raised an arguable claim.4
The officers were served with the amended complaint only after §
1915(d) review, and were not present at the Spears hearings which
are generally held in conjunction with review under § 1915(d).
See, e.g., Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181-82 (5th Cir.
1985), abrogated in part by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319(1989). As such, the qualified immunity issue raised by their Rule
12(b)(6) motion, and the corresponding question of whether Jackson
had met the requisite heightened pleading standard discussed infra,
4
In adopting, in 1991, the magistrate judge's report
recommending denial of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court
noted that "[t]he magistrate judge explained in detail how
[Jackson's] allegations overcome defendants' qualified immunity
defense." However, as noted, the magistrate judge erroneously
considered the April 1988, "motion for summary judgment" in this
regard; the sufficiency vel non of Jackson's amended complaint in
light of this circuit's heightened pleading requirements for claims
of this type was never considered.
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were not considered during, and, indeed, were separate and distinct
from, consideration of the frivolousness vel non of Jackson's
amended complaint. Nevertheless, our de novo review is, again,
unaffected by the district court's failure to consider the Rule
12(b)(6) motion separate and apart from the review of Jackson's
amended complaint under § 1915(d). We now turn to that review.
B.
"Qualified immunity cloaks a police officer from liability if
a reasonably competent law enforcement agent would not have known
that his actions violated clearly established law." James v.
Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1990). "A constitutional right
must be implicated, and `the contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what [he is] doing violates that right.'" Id. (footnote omitted)
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
Qualified immunity is a defense to an excessive use of force claim
under the Fourth Amendment. Brown, 878 F.2d at 873-74.
One of the principal purposes of the qualified immunity
doctrine is to shield officers not only from liability, but also
from defending against a lawsuit. Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, No. 91-1215, slip. op.
2933, 2936 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 1992); see note 3, supra. And,
"questions regarding qualified immunity are resolved on the face of
the pleadings and with limited resort to pre-trial discovery."
James, 909 F.2d at 838. Accordingly, this circuit requires that §
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1983 plaintiffs meet heightened pleading requirements in cases,
such as this, in which an immunity defense can be raised.
We have consistently held that plaintiffs who
invoke § 1983 must plead specific facts that, if
proved, would overcome the individual defendant's
immunity defense; complaints containing conclusory
allegations, absent reference to material facts,
will not survive motions to dismiss. In cases
where government officials assert absolute or
qualified immunity, we have concluded that
"allowing broadly worded complaints ... which
leaves to traditional pretrial depositions,
interrogatories, and requests for admission the
development of the real facts underlying the claim,
effectively eviscerates important functions and
protections of official immunity."
Further, plaintiffs must demonstrate prior to
discovery that their allegations are sufficiently
fact-specific to remove the cloak of protection
afforded by an immunity defense.
Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1553 (5th Cir. 1988) (footnote
omitted) (citing and quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1476,
1479 and n.20 (5th Cir. 1985)).
"Mere conclusory allegations and bold assertions are
insufficient to meet this heightened standard." Streetman v.
Jordan, 918 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir. 1990). Examples of facts
relevant to a qualified immunity defense to an excessive force
claim include "`evidence that the officer harbored ill-will toward
the citizen'[,] ... whether a warrant was employed, whether the
plaintiff resisted arrest or was armed, whether more than one
arrestee or officer was involved, whether the plaintiff was sober,
whether other dangerous or exigent circumstances existed at the
time of arrest, and on what charges plaintiff was arrested".
Brown, 878 F.2d at 874 (citation omitted).
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At the time of the 1985 arrest, Shillingford v. Holmes, 634
F.2d 263 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), stated the clearly established law
in this circuit for use of excessive force by a police officer.5
The conduct must have: (1) caused a severe injury, (2) been
grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the
circumstances, and (3) been inspired by malice rather than mere
carelessness or an unwise excess of zeal. Id. at 265.6
Accordingly, Gordon and Pachall would be "entitled to qualified
immunity if a reasonable peace officer could conclude that the
defendants did not violate [Jackson's] right to be free from
excessive force as that right was understood [at the time of the
5
Although the standard for establishing a § 1983 excessive
force claim was changed by this court's decision in Johnson v.
Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), "the objective
reasonableness of an official's conduct must be measured with
reference to the law as it existed at the time of the conduct in
question." Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th
Cir. 1990).
6
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hudson v. McMillian,
___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992), overruled the "significant
injury" prong of the Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir.
1990), standard applied in excessive force claims made by prisoners
under the Eighth Amendment, which had evolved from Johnson v.
Morel, a Fourth Amendment excessive force case. As discussed in
note 5, supra, Johnson v. Morel changed the standard for Fourth
Amendment excessive force claims, and, among other things,
reformulated Shillingford's "severe injury" prong to "significant
injury". 876 F.2d at 480. Jackson presents a Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim, not a claim by a prisoner arising under the
Eighth Amendment. We are not presented with, nor do we intimate
any view concerning, the question of the effect of Hudson, if any,
on the requirement of a "severe injury" under Shillingford, or a
"significant injury" under Johnson v. Morel, in the Fourth
Amendment excessive force context. Under any circumstance, Jackson
has failed to satisfy the requisite heightened pleading
requirement.
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arrest] in 1985." Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178,
1185 (5th Cir. 1990).
Jackson's pro se amended complaint alleges:
Plaintiff asserts that on May 7, 1985, he was
arrested by Officers Gordon and [Pachall] in
Beaumont For Resisting Arrest and Assulting [sic]
Officer Gordon. Which are False Charges. [sic]
Whereupon Gordon and [Pachall], before and after
handcuffing plaintiff, without justification
brutally assulted [sic] him by repeatly [sic]
stricking [sic] him with nightstick and Flashlight
to his head with such force that plaintiff is still
suffering with severe headaches and ugly scares
[sic] today.
Plaintiff further asserts also that he was
diagnose [sic] as having Sculp [sic] contusions.
And as a result of plaintiff being kicked, and
stumped [sic] by Gordon and [Pachall]. He Suffered
Fractured ribi [sic] from being choked - not being
able to eat nor swallow solid foods because of
severe throat painning, [sic] which lasted a week.
Plaintiff suffered the above injuries as a result
of Gordon and [Pachall's] actions, which were in
bad faith.
Although Jackson's complaint contains some factual detail
concerning injuries allegedly suffered as a result of the arrest,
it contains virtually no facts which would allow determining
whether the officers' conduct was unreasonable in light of
Shillingford. Jackson's only contentions in this regard are that
the assault was "without justification" and in "bad faith" --
conclusory allegations insufficient to overcome the immunity
defense. E.g., Streetman, 918 F.2d at 557. In his amended
complaint, Jackson does not plead any facts regarding his own
conduct during the incident, the reasons given, if any, by the
officers for being called to the scene, or any other factors
relating to the circumstances leading to, and surrounding, his
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arrest and the other alleged actions by the officers. Especially
in light of the heightened pleading requirement, Jackson failed to
plead specific facts sufficient to overcome the officers' qualified
immunity defense.
In Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986),
this court noted that "[o]rdinarily, when a complaint does not
establish a cause of action in a case raising the issue of
immunity, a district court should provide the plaintiff an
opportunity to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements."
However, such a complaint may be dismissed even where only one
opportunity has been afforded, if circumstances demonstrate that
the plaintiff's best case has already been pleaded. Id. at 792-93.
This holds true even for pro se complaints because, despite the
latitude they generally receive, "once given adequate opportunity,
even a pro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its
conclusions." Id. at 793.
As noted, Jackson's pro se amended complaint was filed in May
1990; the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion in March 1991. Jackson
obtained counsel the following month. Although this circuit's
heightened pleading requirements were well known (and were, in any
event, brought to the forefront by the motion to dismiss), the
magistrate judge's recommendation to deny the motion came shortly
after Jackson's counsel filed his appearance. In this light,
therefore, we do not find that Jackson has had the opportunity to
plead his "best case", nor do we find that allowing him to replead
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simply "prolong[s] the inevitable". Id. As such, we reverse and
remand with instructions to permit Jackson to plead further.7
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
7
In their motion, the defendants also raised a limitations
defense, which the district court did not address. In remanding to
allow Jackson to replead, we express no view on the merits of that
issue.
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