United States v. Aguinaga-Juarez ( 2001 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 00-50421
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    BIVIANO AGUINAGA-JUAREZ, also known
    as Agiunaga Viviano Juarez, also
    known as Agiunaga Juarez, also known
    as Viviano Aginga, also known as
    Viviano Aguinaga-Juarez,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. SA-99-CR-449-1-FB
    --------------------
    October 11, 2001
    Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Biviano Aguinaga-Juarez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry of
    the United States after removal, a violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    .
    Aguinaga-Juarez’s offense level was enhanced 16 levels pursuant
    to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) based on his Texas felony driving-
    while-intoxicated (“DWI”) conviction, which was characterized as
    an aggravated felony.   The district court sentenced Aguinaga-
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 00-50421
    -2-
    Juarez to 70 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.
    Aguinaga-Juarez avers first that under the plain language of
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (a)(5), which provides that a prior order of
    removal may be “reinstated from its original date,” the date of
    his deportation was 1997.   Therefore, Aguinaga-Juarez contends
    that the district court erred in imposing the 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(2) enhancement because his removal would not have been
    subsequent to his 1999 DWI conviction.      Aguinaga-Juarez also
    argues that any ambiguity in 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (a)(5) should be
    construed in his favor in accordance with the rule of lenity.
    Aguinaga-Juarez’s argument is foreclosed by this court’s
    decision in United States v. Nava-Perez, 
    242 F.3d 277
     (5th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    121 S. Ct. 2537
     (2001).      In Nava-Perez, this court
    held that when two removals are based on the same order, with the
    subsequent removal based on the order’s reinstatement, they are
    nevertheless separate removals.   
    Id. at 279
    .     If, as is the case
    here, an alien is convicted of a felony prior to the second
    removal, he qualifies for 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(2)’s penalty
    enhancement.   
    Id.
    Aguinaga-Juarez argues for the first time on appeal that a
    prior felony conviction is an element of the offense of illegal
    reentry following deportation and that his indictment was
    defective because it did not allege a prior felony conviction.
    Aguinaga-Juarez concedes that his argument is foreclosed by
    United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 
    523 U.S. 224
     (1998).
    Aguinaga-Juarez contends, however, that Apprendi v. New Jersey,
    No. 00-50421
    -3-
    
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000), casts doubt on Almendarez-Torres and that he
    is raising the argument to preserve it for Supreme Court review.
    Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres.      See Apprendi,
    
    530 U.S. at 489-90
    ; see also United States v. Dabeit, 
    231 F.3d 979
    , 984 (5th Cir. 2000)(noting that the Supreme Court in
    Apprendi expressly declined to overrule Almendarez-Torres),
    cert. denied, 
    121 S. Ct. 1214
     (2001).      This court must therefore
    follow the precedent set in Almendarez-Torres “unless and until
    the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.”      Dabeit, 
    231 F.3d at 984
     (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
    also Nava-Perez, 
    242 F.3d at 279
    .
    Aguinaga-Juarez argues that the district court erred by
    increasing his offense level by 16 levels under U.S.S.G.
    § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because his prior Texas felony conviction for
    DWI is not an aggravated felony.    This court conducts a de novo
    review of a district court’s application of the guidelines.
    United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 
    207 F.3d 261
    , 263 (5th Cir.
    2000).
    A Texas felony DWI conviction is not a “crime of violence”
    as defined in 
    18 U.S.C. § 16
     and thus is not an aggravated felony
    for the purpose of a U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) 16-level
    enhancement.    United States v. Chapa-Garza, 
    243 F.3d 921
    , 927
    (5th Cir. 2001).   Thus, the district court committed error by
    increasing Aguinaga-Juarez’s offense level by 16 levels for his
    Texas felony DWI conviction.   Accordingly, Aguinaga-Juarez’s
    sentence is VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED for
    resentencing.