Looney v. Van Zandt County ( 2002 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 01-40671
Summary Calendar
VICKI LOONEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
VAN ZANDT COUNTY, TEXAS; and NANCY HROBAR,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(6:00-CV-482)
February 4, 2002
Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Given that no judge in regular active service has requested
that the court be polled on rehearing en banc, we will treat Nancy
Hrobar’s petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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rehearing. Treating her petition as a petition for panel
rehearing, the petition is GRANTED. The panel’s opinion filed
January 8, 2002 is withdrawn and the following opinion is
substituted therefor.
Vicki Looney sued her former employer, Van Zandt County, Texas
(“the County”), and her former supervisor, Nancy Hrobar, for
breaching her employment contract and for firing her in violation
of the First and Fifth Amendments. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the appellees, finding that Ms. Hrobar
was entitled to qualified immunity and that Ms. Looney failed to
carry her evidentiary burden with regard to any of her claims.
Because we find material issues of fact regarding (1) Ms. Looney’s
First Amendment claim against Ms. Hrobar and (2) Ms. Hrobar’s
qualified immunity defense, we reverse and remand in part for
further proceedings.
I.
Vicki Looney had worked for the Van Zandt County Tax
Assessor’s Office from 1987 until June 2, 2000, when Nancy Hrobar,
the Interim Tax Assessor, fired her. At the time of her firing,
Ms. Hrobar and Ms. Looney were opponents in the November 2000
County Tax Assessor’s election.
There is a history of bad blood between Ms. Looney and Ms.
Hrobar. When the County Tax Assessor resigned in late 1999, she
left the office vacant. The Van Zandt County Commissioners’ Court
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considered two people to fill the interim vacancy: Looney and
Hrobar. At the time, Ms. Looney was the Chief Deputy in the
Assessor/Collector’s office. Notwithstanding Looney’s experience
at the Assessor’s office, the County Commissioners’ Court voted
along party lines to have Ms. Hrobar serve as Interim Assessor.
Ms. Hrobar thus became Ms. Looney’s interim supervisor.
Ms. Looney and Ms. Hrobar’s working relationship was
contentious from day one. Ms. Looney submits that during Ms.
Hrobar’s first week as supervisor, Ms. Hrobar gave her the
ultimatum of withdrawing from the 2000 tax assessor race or losing
her job. She also presents evidence that Ms. Hrobar made it known
to employees of the Tax Assessor’s office and the community-at-
large that she was looking for reasons to fire Looney. On May 22,
2000, Ms. Hrobar demoted Ms. Looney from Chief Deputy to Deputy and
on June 2, 2000, Ms. Hrobar fired her from the tax assessor’s
office. Ms. Looney contends that Ms. Hrobar demoted and fired her
because of her membership in the Democratic party and her decision
to remain a candidate in the 2000 tax assessor race.
Ms. Hrobar denies that Ms. Looney’s political opposition to
her bid for the 2000 tax assessor race had anything to do with her
decision to demote and later fire Looney. Rather, she argues that
she fired Ms. Looney because she was insubordinate, rude, and
uncooperative. Ms. Hrobar cites several instances of Ms. Looney’s
insubordination and submits third party affidavits to corroborate
her claim that Looney was unprofessional.
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II.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standards that governed the district court’s ruling. Conner
v. Lavaca Hosp. Dist., 267 F.3d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 2001). We view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.
See Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2001); Auguster
v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 2001).
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
III.
Mt. Healthy v. City School Dist. Bd. of Education, 429 U.S.
274 (1977), provides the appropriate framework for analyzing a
plaintiff’s claim that her employer fired her for exercising her
First Amendment right to free expression. Under Mt. Healthy, the
plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating (1) that she
suffered from an adverse employment decision; (2) that her conduct
was protected by the First Amendment; and (3) that this conduct was
a “substantial” or motivating factor in her discharge. Id. at 287.
If the plaintiff meets this threshold, the burden shifts to her
employer to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a legitimate
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reason for firing her even in the absence of this protected
conduct. The plaintiff can then refute her employer’s explanation
by showing that it is merely pretexual. See id.; Click v.
Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 113 (5th Cir. 1992). The parties do not
dispute that Ms. Looney satisfied the first two prongs. Thus, the
issue on appeal is whether there is a material issue of fact over
whether Ms. Looney’s political opposition to Ms. Hrobar was a
motivating factor in her discharge.
The record reflects the following evidence in support of Ms.
Looney’s First Amendment claim. Her deposition testimony states
that shortly after Ms. Hrobar became the Interim Tax
Assessor/Collector, Ms. Hrobar told her that if she wanted to keep
her job, she would have to withdraw from the political race.
Affidavits from several of the tax assessor’s customers state that
she was always professional and polite in her dealings. Ms. Looney
also submitted affidavits from current and former employees of the
tax assessor’s office confirming that she acted professionally and
that she was congenial and cooperative with her co-workers.
The affidavit of Chyrrel Taylor, one of Ms. Looney’s co-
workers, also suggests that Ms. Hrobar had improper motives. Ms.
Taylor states that Ms. Hrobar actively solicited tax-assessor
customers and employees for reasons to fire Looney. Ms. Taylor’s
affidavit even states that Ms. Hrobar brought her attorneys into
the office and encouraged her employees to sign grievance
affidavits against Ms. Looney. According to Ms. Taylor, Ms. Hrobar
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told her employees what type of grievances they should make and
promised job security in exchange for providing evidence against
Ms. Looney. When Ms. Taylor refused file a grievance, an employee
from another office asked her why she had not offered an affidavit
against Ms. Looney.
Despite this evidence, the district court found that Ms.
Looney failed to establish a causal connection between her
constitutionally protected political viewpoint and her discharge.
Because Ms. Looney had not refuted all of Ms. Hrobar’s evidence of
her insubordination and unprofessional demeanor, the court found
that Ms. Looney had not sufficiently rebutted Ms. Hrobar’s
legitimate explanation for Ms. Looney’s firing. We respectfully
disagree with that finding. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Ms. Looney, we find a material issue of fact as to
whether Ms. Looney’s political activity was a motivating factor in
her discharge. “While [Ms. Looney] must ultimately prove that her
political activity was the motivating reason for [her] discharge,
the determination of that issue turns on a genuine dispute of
material fact, and is a proper issue for trial, not for resolution
by summary judgment.” Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187,
193 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Click, 970 F.2d at 113 (“Whether an
employee’s protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor
in an employer’s decision to take action against the employee is a
question of fact, ordinarily rendering summary disposition
inappropriate.”). We also find a material issue of fact over
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whether Ms. Hrobar “would have reached the same decision as to [Ms.
Looney’s employment] even in the absence of [her] protected
conduct.” Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. Based upon the evidence
that Ms. Hrobar gave Ms. Looney the ultimatum of quitting or
withdrawing from the race and that she promised job security to any
employee who provided disparaging affidavits against Ms. Looney, we
believe that reasonable jurors could find that Ms. Hrobar would not
have fired Ms. Looney had she not been Hrobar’s political opponent.
See Click, 970 F.2d at 114.
IV.
We also find a material issue of fact regarding whether Ms.
Hrobar was entitled to qualified immunity. We apply a two-step
analysis to determine whether a public official is entitled to
qualified immunity. “First, we must examine whether the plaintiff
has alleged a violation of a clearly established right.” Goodson
v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000).
“Second, we must ask whether the defendants’ conduct was
objectively reasonable in light of ‘clearly established’ law at the
time of the alleged violation.” Id. The district court found that
even if Ms. Looney had established that her speech motivated Ms.
Hrobar’s conduct, Ms. Hrobar’s decision to fire her was not
objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence that Ms. Looney
had acted unprofessionally. We disagree.
To determine objective reasonableness for qualified immunity,
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we consider whether a reasonable interim tax assessor would have
believed that her conduct was lawful in light of the clearly
established law involving viewpoint discrimination. See Chiu v.
Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 354 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). As
discussed above, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Ms. Looney, there is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Ms.
Hrobar’s actions were directed at suppressing Ms. Looney’s
political viewpoint. “The law requires that qualified immunity be
denied officials who transgress those rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). We believe that a reasonable person serving
in Ms. Hrobar’s position would know that the First Amendment
forbids her from firing or demoting Ms. Looney on the basis of her
political viewpoint. Thus, because we find a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether Ms. Hrobar was entitled to
qualified immunity, we reverse summary judgment on that point. See
id. at 342.
V.
Ms. Looney does not challenge the district court’s rulings
with regards to (1) the County’s liability for maintaining an
unconstitutional demotion or termination policy; (2) her breach of
contract claims; or (3) her due process claims. Those claims are
therefore waived. Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1315-16 (5th
Cir. 1997).
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VI.
Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms.
Looney, we hold that there is a genuine issue of fact regarding
whether her political activity motivated Ms. Hrobar to demote and
fire her. We also hold that a reasonable jury could find that Ms.
Hrobar had failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
she would have fired Ms. Looney even in the absence of her
political activity. In light of the evidence, summary judgment was
inappropriate as to (1) Ms. Looney’s First Amendment retaliation
claim against Ms. Hrobar and (2) the issue of Ms. Hrobar’s
qualified immunity. We therefore REVERSE and REMAND the district
court’s summary judgment on these two issues and AFFIRM on the
remaining grounds.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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