Chukwuemeka Ezekwo v. Christopher Quirk ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                   NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 18-2061
    _____________
    CHUKWUEMEKA EZEKWO; IFEOMA EZEKWO,
    Appellants
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER QUIRK; MICHAEL CHRISTIANSEN;
    THORNTON WHITE; CITY OF ENGLEWOOD, NEW JERSEY
    ______________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-03167)
    District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
    ______________
    Argued: March 7, 2019
    ______________
    Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: September 9, 2019)
    ______________
    OPINION*
    ______________
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
    does not constitute binding precedent.
    Joshua Moskovitz [ARGUED]
    Lance A. Clarke
    Bernstein Clarke & Moskovitz
    11 Park Place
    Suite 914
    New York, NY 10007
    Counsel for Appellants
    Brenda A. Coppola Cuba
    Law Offices of Brenda Coppola Cuba
    1164 Springfield Avenue
    Mountainside, NJ 07092
    Counsel for Appellee Michael Christiansen
    Thomas B. Hanrahan
    David J. Pack
    Suite 2
    80 Grand Avenue
    River Edge, NJ 07661
    Counsel for Appellee Thornton White
    Alan J. Baratz [ARGUED]
    Donald A. Klein
    Weiner Law Group
    629 Parsippany Road
    P.O. Box 438
    Parsippany, NJ 07054
    Counsel for Appellee City of Englewood
    Ian C. Doris
    Keenan & Doris
    71 Union Avenue
    Suite 105
    Rutherford, NJ 07070
    Counsel for Appellee Christopher Quirk
    RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
    This case comes before us with an unusual posture. After sustaining injuries from
    an altercation with local law enforcement in Englewood, New Jersey, the plaintiffs in the
    2
    underlying matter appeared to enter into a settlement with the City. They later refused to
    follow the terms of the settlement, alleging that their counsel did not adequately convey
    the terms and therefore there had not been a meeting of the minds. Because of the unusual
    circumstances of this case, we will remand for the limited purpose of allowing the plaintiffs
    an opportunity to be heard before the District Court.
    I.
    We presume the parties’ familiarity with this case and set out only the facts needed
    for the discussion below. Appellants Chukwuemeka Ezekwo and Ifeoma Ezekwo were
    involved in a physical altercation with three City of Englewood police officers at
    Englewood Hospital in New Jersey, where they suffered serious injuries. Based on that
    altercation, the Ezekwos filed a complaint against the police officers and the City of
    Englewood alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and the
    Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
    The parties concluded settlement negotiations on March 30, 2017, when counsel for
    all parties jointly telephoned the District Court to report that they had reached a settlement.
    As part of that settlement agreement (the Agreement), the Ezekwos would receive a
    payment of $1,000,000 for agreeing to release all defendants from liability for the claims
    asserted in the complaint and for signing release forms to that effect. The Court entered an
    Order Administratively Terminating Action the next day.
    The Ezekwos did not sign the releases, and the City filed a Motion to Enforce
    Settlement. The Ezekwos filed a pro se opposition to the motion, in which they stated they
    had never seen the actual Agreement and would not agree to the terms as set out in the
    3
    releases. Further, they refused to enter into any settlement that did not include as a term the
    City’s agreement to prosecute the police officers named in their complaint.
    The Magistrate Judge, after receiving extensive motion practice on a range of issues
    and confirming with the Ezekwos that they desired to proceed pro se, scheduled an
    evidentiary hearing on November 6, 2017. Her order instructed both parties to file with the
    court all witnesses and exhibits upon which they intended to rely. At the hearing, the
    Ezekwos’ former counsel testified on behalf of the City, and it moved into evidence two
    emails—one each from counsel on each side—confirming the settlement amount and the
    Ezekwos’ approval. The Ezekwos, however, declined to testify. Instead, they requested the
    opportunity to return to testify once they obtained counsel. They also requested permission
    to submit documents after the hearing. Both requests were denied, and the evidentiary
    hearing was closed.
    The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) concluding
    that, absent contrary evidence from the Ezekwos, the City’s Motion to Enforce Settlement
    should be granted. After the District Court adopted the R&R, the Ezekwos filed counseled
    objections in accordance with Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They
    disputed, inter alia, the Magistrate Judge’s finding that there had been a meeting of the
    minds on all essential terms of the Agreement.1 They also requested an evidentiary hearing
    before the District Court. It declined to hold do so. Instead, in a well-reasoned order, the
    1
    In their Rule 72 objections, the Ezekwos asserted that the Agreement excluded
    multiple non-monetary terms they had told counsel were essential to settlement, including
    a cease-and-desist provision, the retraction of a certain City press statement they believed
    to be false, and the prosecution of the police officers involved in the altercation.
    4
    Court addressed the Ezekwos’ objections and ultimately decided to maintain its adoption
    of the Magistrate Judge’s R&R.
    The Ezekwos now appeal that decision on substantive and procedural grounds. They
    believe the District Court erred by determining that there existed an enforceable settlement
    and abused its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing before ruling on their
    Rule 72 objections.
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    III.
    We first discuss the issue of the evidentiary hearing, as its disposition bears on the
    other issue on appeal. Where a party files Rule 72 objections to an R&R, a district court is
    required to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
    proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
    The court is not required to conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing as part of that
    determination. United States v. Raddatz, 
    447 U.S. 667
    , 674 (1980) (exploring the
    legislative intent behind Section 636 and concluding that de novo hearings are not
    required). Rather, it may use its “sound judicial discretion” in making its determinations.
    
    Id. at 676,
    see also D.N.J. Local Civ. R. 72.1(c)(2) (A district judge “may consider the
    record developed before the Magistrate Judge, making his or her own determination on the
    basis of that record.”) We review the Court’s determinations in response to Rule 72
    objections for abuse of discretion. See 
    Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 674
    .
    5
    Our review is tempered by the fact that the Ezekwos were not represented by counsel
    when challenging the Agreement before the Magistrate Judge. As a general matter, our
    Court “tend[s] to be flexible when applying procedural rules to pro se litigants, especially
    when interpreting their pleadings.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 
    704 F.3d 239
    , 244
    (3d Cir. 2013). We recognize that the Ezekwos’ circumstances were by their own design,
    as they had multiple opportunities—even prompts—to obtain counsel and still did not do
    so. Regardless, our Court will not forego our traditional flexibility when reviewing the
    actions of pro se litigants.
    We are of the opinion that the District Court admirably fulfilled its duties under Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 72. We take no issue with its response to the Ezekwos’ Rule 72 objections.
    However, the latitude that our Court grants to pro se litigants, coupled with the possibility
    of the Ezekwos’ testimony introducing a disputed issue of material fact, compel us to
    remand this case for the limited purpose of (1) allowing the Ezekwos one final chance to
    submit their testimony on the record and (2) allowing the City to cross-examine them on
    that testimony.
    We offer no opinion as to the existence of an enforceable settlement agreement. We
    leave that determination to the able District Court.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be vacated and
    the case will be remanded for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on
    whether the parties formed an enforceable settlement agreement.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-2061

Filed Date: 9/9/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/9/2019