Reyes-Sanchez v. Gonzales ( 2006 )


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  •                                                              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FIFTH CIRCUIT                          December 21, 2005
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-61006
    Summary Calendar
    LILIA REYES-SANCHEZ,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    ALBERTO R. GONZALEZ, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (A70 879 903)
    Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Lilia Reyes-Sanchez seeks review of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals’ (BIA) 21 October 2004 final removal order, in which the
    BIA reversed its earlier affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (IJ)
    cancellation of removal.
    In 1989, Reyes-Sanchez entered the United States illegally
    from Mexico.     She has lived in the United States since then, but
    returned to     Mexico   on   three   separate   occasions   to    visit    ill
    relatives.     Upon each re-entry, she was asked to name her country
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    of citizenship; she falsely stated she was a United States citizen.
    Reyes-Sanchez was prepared to support this false assertion with
    falsified documents; she had obtained a Texas identification card
    and driver’s license, using her sister-in-law’s birth certificate
    and social security number (she changed the last two digits of this
    number).   Although she was never asked to produce these documents
    upon re-entry, she did utilize them to obtain employment and at
    other times when the need arose.
    On 28 March 2001, removal proceedings were initiated against
    Reyes-Sanchez.   She was charged with being removable because:     she
    possessed neither a valid, unexpired immigration visa, nor any
    other recognized document, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A); and she
    falsely represented herself as a United States citizen, 
    id. § 1227(a)(3)(D).
    Reyes-Sanchez admitted these allegations but denied
    being removable; the IJ found her removable.
    Reyes-Sanchez then sought cancellation of removal as a non-
    permanent resident alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1); she later
    added that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A), removal should also be
    cancelled because she was a battered spouse.         The IJ found her
    eligible as a battered spouse.         On appeal, the BIA affirmed the
    IJ’s decision without a written opinion.
    The former Immigration and Nationalization Service moved for
    reconsideration; the BIA’s resulting 21 October 2004 final order
    granted this motion, set aside its earlier affirmance of the IJ’s
    cancellation of removal, and ordered Reyes-Sanchez removed from the
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    United States.        Reyes-Sanchez moved to reopen and reconsider, but
    the BIA denied this motion.
    The    BIA’s    factual     findings         are   reviewed       for    substantial
    evidence; its legal conclusions, de novo. Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft,
    
    263 F.3d 442
    , 444 (5th Cir. 2001).                  In reaching its decisions, the
    BIA need not refer to specific evidence upon which it relies, or
    provide a lengthy discussion of its reasoning.                          See Osuchukwu v.
    INS, 
    744 F.2d 1136
    , 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[The BIA] has no duty
    to write an exegesis on every contention.                        What is required is
    merely that      it    consider    the    issues         raised,    and       announce    its
    decision in      terms     sufficient         to    enable   a   reviewing        court    to
    perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.”).
    Respondent       challenges       the       sufficiency      of    Reyes-Sanchez’s
    brief.      Her cursory arguments are barely sufficient.
    Reyes-Sanchez maintains:            the BIA lacked statutory authority
    to order removal; instead, it should have remanded her case to the
    IJ.   She fails, however, to provide any authority supporting her
    assertion.      Reyes-Sanchez repeatedly references a Ninth Circuit
    habeas removal case, Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 
    335 F.3d 874
    (9th
    Cir. 2003).      It is not on point.               Unlike the IJ in Noriega-Lopez,
    the IJ here had already found Reyes-Sanchez removable.
    The BIA concluded correctly that Reyes-Sanchez was ineligible
    for cancellation of removal as a battered spouse under 8 U.S.C. §
    1229b(b)(2) because she did not meet each of its five requirements.
    Reyes-Sanchez        did   not   meet    the       fourth    requirement:          she    is
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    deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv) for falsely claiming
    to be a United States citizen.       See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D)(i)
    (Supp. 2005) (“Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely
    represented, himself to be a citizen of the United States for any
    purpose or benefit under this chapter ... or any Federal or State
    law is deportable.”).
    DENIED
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