Strong v. City of Dallas ( 2002 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-10162
FREDERICK STRONG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
CITY OF DALLAS; ET AL,
Defendants,
CITY OF DALLAS; BENNIE CLICK, in his personal capacity; MICHAEL
DOERINGSFELD, in his personal capacity; DORA ALICIA SAUCEDO
FALLS, in her personal capacity; RANDY HAMPTON, in his personal
capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(00-CV-1532)
December 11, 2002
Before JOLLY and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
Plaintiff Frederick Strong appeals the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, the City of Dallas, in his
*
F.A. Little, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge, Western District
of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Title VII and § 1983 suit for wrongful termination. Because the
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
statistical evidence at issue in this appeal, we affirm the grant
of summary judgment.
I.
This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. Patel
v. Midland Memorial Hospital and Medical Center, 298 F.3d 333, 339
(5th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving
party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
II.
Frederick Strong was employed by the City of Dallas as a
police officer. Prior to, and during his employment as a police
officer, Strong worked for and assisted his brother’s used car
sales business, which appears to have engaged in unscrupulous and
possibly fraudulent practices. After a complaint from a fellow
officer, the Public Integrity Unit commenced an investigation of
Strong. That investigation revealed ten allegations of wrongdoing
against Strong, including purchasing cars from auto auctions
without payment, selling a motor vehicle acquired by theft, passing
a forged document to obtain a certified copy of a vehicle title,
failing to submit a request to the City for outside employment,
wearing his uniform while conducting personal business and
attending a civil court proceeding, giving inconsistent statements
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about his ownership of a vehicle, making untruthful statements
about compensation from the sale of a vehicle, and using his
position as a police officer for private gain. These acts violated
the Dallas Police Department Code of Conduct. After a disciplinary
hearing, Strong was terminated. While the United States Attorney
was investigating his actions, he filed this suit, alleging racial
discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment
because it found Strong was unable to demonstrate that the adverse
employment action was the result of racial discrimination.
Strong argues on appeal that the district court abused its
great discretion by excluding statistical evidence that had been
obtained from the Dallas Police Department’s public records
database. Strong alleges that this evidence shows black officers
were statistically more likely to be disciplined than white
officers. Evidentiary decisions by the district court are reviewed
for abuse of discretion. St. Romain v. Industrial Fabrication, 203
F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2000). The district court excluded this
evidence because it was unauthenticated under Rule 901 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. This ruling was correct. There is no
indication of the validity or authenticity of the information
contained in the database on which the statistical analysis is
based. Further, because of the unknown validity of the underlying
data, this evidence cannot be proper summary evidence under Rule
1006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as Strong urges.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
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exclusion of this evidence.
Even if this evidence were reliable and accepted by the
district court, Strong is unable to survive summary judgment
because this evidence is inadequate to establish that his
individual discharge was racially discriminatory. Even if he were
able to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), ultimately he is unable to
demonstrate that the proffered non-discriminatory reasons for
discharge were untrue. See Wallace v. Methodist Hospital System,
271 F.3d 212, 219-220 (5th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, he has
offered no evidence that the documented reasons were somehow a
pretext for racial discrimination, a showing he must make by a
preponderance of the evidence. McDaniel v. Temple Independent
School District, 770 F.2d 1340, 1346 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly,
summary judgment was appropriate in this case.
III.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.
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