United States v. Odelakon , 150 F. App'x 374 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                 October 20, 2005
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-20180
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    HAEEIU ADEYEME ODELAKON, also known as Alliu Yemi Adelakun,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:03-CR-23-1
    --------------------
    Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Haeeiu Adeyeme Odelakon, also known as Alliu Yemi Adelakun,
    appeals his jury-trial conviction for unlawful procurement of
    citizenship, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(b).
    Odelakon argues, for the first time on appeal, that the
    Government constructively amended his indictment by introducing
    facts at trial that were not presented to the grand jury and that
    were not alleged in the indictment.    In particular, he takes
    issue with the testimony of Officer Saldivar and his introduction
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 04-20180
    -2-
    into evidence of a set of fingerprints Saldivar had recently
    taken from Okelakon.   He contends that, instead of being tried
    for falsifying information on his citizenship application, he was
    tried for fraud.
    “Where a claim of constructive amendment is raised for the
    first time on appeal, review is for plain error.”    United States
    v. Bieganowski, 
    313 F.3d 264
    , 287 (5th Cir. 2002).
    There was no constructive amendment of the indictment in
    this case.   The indictment charged that Odelakon had obtained
    citizenship by knowingly providing false information in his
    citizenship application, aware that the truth would render him
    ineligible for citizenship.   Saldivar compared fingerprints from
    Okelakon’s A26 386 119 file and his A70 524 550 file.   He
    testified that the prints matched.   Odelakon gives no explanation
    how Saldivar’s identification of the fingerprints, which showed
    that Odelakon’s challenged statements were belied by his
    immigration records, constitutes evidence of fraud rather than
    false statement.   See United States v. Millet, 
    123 F.3d 268
    , 272
    (5th Cir. 1997).   The evidence, in fact, was necessary to show
    that the challenged statements were false.   Accordingly, this
    claim is meritless.
    Asserting alternative legal theories, Odelakon contends that
    his instant convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
    because (1) he previously was prosecuted for the instant offenses
    in 1998; and (2) they were used as evidence to secure his 1998
    No. 04-20180
    -3-
    convictions for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, possession of
    counterfeit securities, and aiding and abetting the possession of
    counterfeit securities, were listed in the PSR for the 1998
    convictions, and were considered in assessing his punishment.
    This court reviews a claim that a conviction violates the
    Double Jeopardy Clause de novo.    United States v. Cihak, 
    137 F.3d 252
    , 257 (5th Cir. 1998).
    To prove a § 1425(b) offense, the Government must show
    beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) the defendant . . . obtained
    . . . naturalization or citizenship; (2) the defendant is not
    entitled naturalization or citizenship; and (3) the defendant
    knows that he or she is not entitled to naturalization or
    citizenship.”    United States v. Moses, 
    94 F.3d 182
    , 184 (5th Cir.
    1996).    Odelakon’s 1998 convictions were for conspiracy to commit
    bank fraud, possession of counterfeit securities, and aiding and
    abetting the possession of counterfeit securities.   The offense
    of conspiracy to commit bank fraud requires a showing that
    Odelakon agreed with others to place a financial institution at
    risk of civil liability or financial loss and that the bank was
    insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.    United
    States v. McCauley, 
    253 F.3d 815
    , 820 (5th Cir. 2001); 18 U.S.C.
    § 1344.   To prove possession of counterfeit securities, the
    Government must show that the defendant made, uttered, or
    possessed a counterfeited or forged security of a State or
    organization, with intent to deceive another person,
    No. 04-20180
    -4-
    organization, or government.   18 U.S.C. § 513(a).   Bank fraud and
    possession of counterfeit securities each require additional
    elements of proof not required to establish unlawful procurement
    of citizenship.    See United States v. Delgado, 
    256 F.3d 264
    , 272
    (5th Cir. 2001).   As such, Odelakon cannot show that he has been
    previously prosecuted for unlawful procurement of citizenship.
    As for his argument that evidence underlying the instant offenses
    was used to secure his 1998 guilty-plea conviction, was mentioned
    in the PSR for his prior offenses, or was used to enhance his
    prior sentence, the Fifth Amendment “does not bar admission of
    the same evidence.”   United States v. Morris, 
    46 F.3d 410
    , 420
    (5th Cir. 1995).
    Odelakon’s assertion that his convictions are the result of
    prosecutorial misconduct are vague and conclusory.   He has failed
    to identify, in the record, any evidence that supports his claim
    and he has failed to brief the issue raised.   Accordingly, the
    issues are deemed waived.   See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    ,
    224-25 (5th Cir. 1993) (issues must be briefed, even by prisoners
    proceeding pro se, to be preserved on appeal).
    Odelakon argues that the district court erred by failing to
    follow the proper procedure for revoking his citizenship pursuant
    to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).   His argument focuses on the court’s
    failure to comply with the various procedural requirements of
    denaturalization procedures such as those set out in 8 U.S.C.
    § 1451(a) and (b) and 8 C.F.R. 340.1-.8.
    No. 04-20180
    -5-
    Section 1451(e) provides that, upon a conviction under 18
    U.S.C. § 1425 for knowingly procuring naturalization in violation
    of law,
    the court in which such conviction is had
    shall thereupon revoke, set aside, and
    declare void the final order admitting such
    person to citizenship, and shall declare the
    certificate of naturalization of such person
    to be canceled. Jurisdiction is conferred on
    the courts having jurisdiction of the trial
    of such offense to make such adjudication.
    8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).    The trial court has no discretion in
    applying the statute.    See 
    Moses, 94 F.3d at 187-88
    .   Section
    1451(e) has none of the requirements set out in §§ 1451(a) and
    (b).    Odelakon’s reference to 8 C.F.R. 340.1 is unavailing; those
    sections refer to the procedures set out in § 340(h) of the
    Immigration and Naturalization Act, which is codified at 8 U.S.C.
    § 1451(h).    As Odelakon’s procedural arguments are irrelevant to
    the revocation of his citizenship under § 1451(e), this issue is
    meritless.    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Odelakon’s motion for reconsideration of our denial of his
    request to unseal documents related to his 1998 conviction is
    DENIED.