United States v. Hawkins , 142 F. App'x 812 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                  August 2, 2005
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-31006
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ERIC WAYNE HAWKINS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:03-CR-194-1
    --------------------
    Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Eric Wayne Hawkins appeals his drug-related convictions and
    sentences for violating 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a).   He argues that his
    sentences violated United States v. Booker, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    (2005), that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to
    recall a Government witness, that the district court erred in
    enhancing his sentence based upon a prior 1993 state conviction
    in which the state judge also served as a prosecutor, and that 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a), (b) are unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 04-31006
    -2-
    New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000).    As Hawkins concedes, his last
    argument is foreclosed by United States v. Slaughter, 
    238 F.3d 580
     (5th Cir. 2000), but he nevertheless raises the issue to
    preserve it for further review.
    In violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a), Hawkins was convicted of
    one count of distributing 50 grams or more of cocaine base and a
    substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine (Count 2 of
    the indictment) and one count of distributing five grams or more
    but less than 50 grams of cocaine base (Count 3 of the
    indictment).    With respect to Count 2 of the indictment, he
    received a mandatory life sentence under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)
    because the Government had shown, pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
    (a),
    that he had two prior convictions for felony drug offenses.     The
    life sentence imposed was therefore not made pursuant to the
    federal sentencing guidelines and, pursuant to Almendarez-Torres
    v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235 (1998), and Booker, 125
    S. Ct. at 756, prior convictions are considered sentencing
    factors that need not be proven to a jury or admitted by the
    defendant.     Accordingly, there was no Sixth Amendment violation
    with respect to Hawkins’s sentence for Count 2.
    With respect to Count 3, it was error to determine Hawkins’s
    base offense level based upon additional drug amounts that were
    not proven to the jury or admitted by him.     Booker, 125 S. Ct. at
    756.    The error was harmless, however, because Hawkins’s total
    offense level was ultimately determined based upon the jury’s
    No. 04-31006
    -3-
    determination that he had distributed five or more but less than
    50 grams of cocaine base and the district court’s determination
    that he had two prior convictions for felony drug offenses,
    which, pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B), exposed him to a
    maximum term of life imprisonment, and, pursuant to United States
    Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1, made him a career offender and
    subject to a base offense level of 37.    Because his sentence was
    ultimately based upon his prior convictions, which, pursuant to
    Almendarez-Torres, did not violate Booker, and a determination
    that he was a career offender, which, pursuant to United States
    v. Guevera, 
    408 F.3d 252
    , 261 (5th Cir. 2005), did not violate
    Booker, any error in calculating his original base offense level
    based upon drug amounts not proven to the jury or admitted by
    Hawkins was harmless.   See United States v. Akpan, 
    407 F.3d 360
    ,
    377 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pineiro, ___ F.3d ___,
    No. 03-30437, 
    2005 WL 1189713
     at *2 (5th Cir. May 20, 2005).
    Given that Hawkins had ample opportunity and time to impeach
    the Government witness during his cross-examination of that
    witness, he has not shown that the district court abused its
    discretion in not allowing him to recall the witness in his case-
    in-chief.   See United States v. James, 
    510 F.2d 546
    , 551 (5th
    Cir. 1975); United States v. Masat, 
    948 F.2d 923
    , 933 (5th Cir.
    1992).   Finally, Hawkins cannot challenge the 1993 state
    conviction that was alleged in an information filed by the
    Government pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
    (a) and used to enhance his
    No. 04-31006
    -4-
    federal sentence because the prior conviction occurred more than
    five years before the date of the information filed by the
    Government.   See 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
    (e); United States v. Gonzales,
    
    79 F.3d 413
    , 426-27 (5th Cir. 1996).
    AFFIRMED.