Cantu v. Jones ( 2002 )

REVISED JULY 1, 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 01-50905
EUGENE CANTU,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
MATHEW JONES, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants,
MATHEW JONES, Correctional Officer; RICHARD WALTERSDORF,
Correctional Officer; JOHN BEAIRD, Correctional Officer,
Defendants-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
June 11, 2002
Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
Eugene Cantu filed a civil rights lawsuit on July 3, 2000,
accusing Mathew Jones, John Beaird, Richard Waltersdorf, Gary
Johnson, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division (“TDCJ-ID”) of violating his constitutional
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment after he was
attacked by another inmate with a razor blade. Cantu based his
claim on the theory that the defendants allowed Carlos Hernandez to
escape from his cell and attack Cantu. Defendants denied Cantu’s
allegations and asserted the defense of qualified immunity.
A jury trial began on July 3, 2001, and Cantu elected to
proceed against only Jones, Waltersdorf and Beaird on his
constitutional deliberate indifference claim. The jury returned a
verdict for Cantu, finding that the defendants had violated Cantu’s
constitutional rights and were not entitled to qualified immunity,
and awarding Cantu $22,500 in compensatory damages. Defendants now
appeal, claiming there was insufficient evidence for the jury to
find for Cantu, and, in the alternative, that they are entitled to
qualified immunity.
BACKGROUND
Cantu entered TDCJ-ID in 1981 and joined a group known as the
Mexican Mafia prison gang in 1984. Cantu declared himself to be an
ex-gang member in 1994, but TDCJ-ID continued to classify him as a
member of the Mexican Mafia. On February 24, 1999, Carlos
Hernandez, another inmate who was a member of the Mexican Mafia,
escaped from his cell and attacked Cantu with a razor blade.
Though the appellants contend that this was part of the Mexican
Mafia’s “blood-out” policy of murdering ex-gang members, Cantu
believes that the assault was orchestrated by officers at TDCJ-ID.
2
On the day of the attack, both Cantu and Hernandez were housed
in the same maximum-security area of the Connally Unit in Kenedy,
Texas. The area they were housed in is known as the F-Pod of
administrative segregation. Offenders incarcerated in
administrative segregation remain alone in their cells for 23 hours
a day and are allowed out of their cells for only one hour of
recreation each day followed by a shower. Most of the offenders
placed in administrative segregation are there because of gang
membership.
Every time an administrative segregation offender comes out of
his cell, TDCJ-ID policy requires that he be under the control of
two correctional officers known as “rovers.” The rovers stand
outside the cell, search and handcuff the offender in the cell, and
then signal to a third correctional officer stationed in the picket
to open the cell door. The picket officer opens the cell door
electronically by pushing a button on a control panel. This picket
officer is responsible for operating all of the locks and doors in
the six sections of F-Pod.
On the day Cantu was attacked, Waltersdorf was a rover, and
Jones was the picket officer in F-Pod. Beaird was not in F-Pod on
the day Cantu was attacked. The only other correctional officer in
F-Pod was Mark Simecek, another rover. At this time, the Connally
Unit was understaffed, so Waltersdorf and Simecek split up and
escorted offenders to recreation by themselves, in violation of
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TDCJ-ID policy. Each took half of F-Pod, with Waltersdorf covering
the sections containing Cantu and Hernandez. On the day of the
attack, Cantu was housed downstairs in Section C, Cell 34, and
Hernandez was housed upstairs in Section B, Cell 25. A wall
separates Section B from Section C, with the only opening being a
door between the sections located on the second floor. This door
is supposed to be locked at all times and can only be opened by the
picket officer. Sections B and C are structured so that persons in
Section B cannot see into Section C and vice versa. Similarly,
inmates in one section of F-Pod cannot hear sounds from the other
sections of F-Pod.
On the day of the attack, Waltersdorf, working his third or
fourth day as a shift rover,1 removed Hernandez from his cell.
Following recreation and a shower, Waltersdorf strip-searched
Hernandez and placed him back in his cell. Though Waltersdorf
claims to have then closed the cell door and pulled on it to make
sure it was locked, the door was not secure. The appellants claim
that Hernandez was able to manipulate the door with a piece of
string and toilet paper so as to make the top lock not become
completely secure. The appellants claim that Hernandez was then
able to lift the door up out of its bottom lock to escape.
1
It appears that Waltersdorf was previously working a shift at
TDCJ-ID that did not require him to escort inmates from their
cells.
4
After placing Hernandez in his cell, Waltersdorf then walked
down the second row of cells and went through the door separating
Section B from Section C. Waltersdorf claims that he then slammed
the door shut behind him but did not check to make sure it was
locked as it was supposed to lock automatically and electronically
when it closes. The door, however, was not locked. Jones, the
picket officer, claimed that he was watching the rovers at this
time and did not notice that the section door was unlocked. Though
there are picket lights that indicate whether a door is secure or
not, Jones claims that he was not facing the picket lights.
After shutting the section door, Waltersdorf proceeded down a
flight of stairs to the first row in Section C. Though
administrative inmates are escorted to their one hour of recreation
according to a set schedule, for some reason, Waltersdorf took
Cantu for recreation out of turn on the day of the attack,
escorting him immediately after Hernandez.2 Waltersdorf testified
that it took him approximately three minutes to walk down to
Cantu’s cell and let him out after returning Hernandez to his cell.
Waltersdorf searched and handcuffed Cantu and then Jones unlocked
Cantu’s door from the picket. Cantu then stepped out of his cell
and began to walk with Waltersdorf toward the crash-gate leading to
the recreation area. As this was happening, however, Hernandez was
2
The appellants do not explain why Cantu was taken out of turn
that day, but only offer up possibilities as to why any inmate
might be taken out of turn.
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escaping from his cell. Hernandez opened his cell door and then
passed through the unlocked section gate. Jones claims that it was
at this point that he first noticed Hernandez had escaped and
called the main desk in administrative segregation for backup, and
notified Simecek that Waltersdorf needed help.3 Jones was unable
to do anything more, however, as TDCJ-ID policy forbids the picket
officer from leaving the picket for any reason, including a
disturbance.
After passing through the section door, Hernandez went down
the stairs toward Cantu and Waltersdorf. Hernandez then attacked
Cantu from behind, knocking him down and then slashing his face and
neck with a razor blade. Though correctional officers are
forbidden by TDCJ-ID policy from getting involved in an inmate on
inmate attack until other officers arrive on the scene, Waltersdorf
claims that he grabbed Hernandez’s wrist, but Hernandez jerked his
hand away. Waltersdorf claims that it was at this point that he
realized that Hernandez had a razor blade and so he stepped back
with a food tray bar raised above his head. Waltersdorf claims
that he then instructed Hernandez to get off of Cantu at which time
he claims Hernandez ceased. Cantu’s testimony does not confirm
3
Though Jones testified that he did not notice that the door
was unlocked, he authored a handwritten statement after the attack,
stating that he noticed the door was unlocked but did not notify
Waltersdorf of this fact. Appellants claim that this letter is not
an admission of intentionally leaving the door unlocked, but that
it merely admits that Jones could not get Waltersdorf’s attention
about the unsecured door.
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Waltersdorf’s version. Cantu did not testify to seeing Waltersdorf
attempting to help and claims that the only thing Waltersdorf said
was, “Stop that, you are going to get us into trouble.” Cantu also
testified that the attack did not cease until Simecek arrived.
Simecek testified that he was notified of the attack while
escorting inmates to recreation in another area. When he arrived
at the crash-gate, he saw Waltersdorf holding an object that looked
like a riot baton and yelling at Hernandez. Simecek then went
around the picket to get to Section C, and when he came into view
of the attack he yelled “stop.” He testified that it was at this
point that Hernandez stopped cutting Cantu and ran back into
Section C, closing the door behind him.
After the attack, Cantu walked to the infirmary, where he
required 52 stitches. Captain Beaird had Cantu brought into his
office the next day. Cantu claims that Beaird asked him if he was
feeling any better and then told him, “You know what? I don’t like
a snitch. Consider yourself lucky that you are still alive.”
Cantu responded by stating that he wanted criminal charges filed
against Hernandez and by warning Beaird that he was going to file
a lawsuit.
A few months before the attack, Cantu began having problems
with several correctional officers on the Connally Unit. These
officers worked a schedule known as card B.4 From December 25,
4
Officers Waltersdorf and Jones worked card A, which was a
separate shift. Apparently, card A and card B officers work on
7
1998, through January 1999, Cantu wrote twelve letters to various
TDCJ-ID officials complaining that Officers Gomez, Nieto, Alvarado
and Carnesalas, all card B officers, were mistreating him and
threatening him. Three of the twelve letters were sent to Beaird,
who was the captain in charge of administrative segregation, and
who was, therefore, also in charge of the officers identified in
Cantu’s letters as well as Jones and Waltersdorf. In his letters,
Cantu complained specifically that Officer Gomez had threatened to
have him assaulted and that Cantu felt his life was in danger.
Cantu also expressed concern that officers could let inmates out of
their cells to attack him and that Officer Gomez was discussing
Cantu with some members of the Mexican Mafia. Beaird testified
that he did not recall ever seeing any letters from Cantu, but this
is contested by Cantu’s testimony that Beaird told him after the
attack that he did not like a “snitch.”
Cantu filed a civil rights lawsuit pro se on July 3, 2000,
accusing Mathew Jones, John Beaird, Richard Waltersdorf, Gary
Johnson, and TDCJ-ID of violating his constitutional right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment after he was attacked by
another inmate with a razor blade. Cantu’s appointed lawyer later
added a claim for negligence. Cantu based his claim on the theory
that the defendants allowed Carlos Hernandez to escape from his
cell and attack Cantu. Defendants Beaird, Waltersdorf and Johnson
different days and are not at the prison at the same time.
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denied Cantu’s allegations and asserted the defense of qualified
immunity on September 5, 2000. Jones answered and asserted
qualified immunity on September 15, 2000.
TDCJ-ID filed a motion to dismiss on March 1, 2001, claiming
that it was an improper party to a § 1983 lawsuit, and that it was
immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.
The trial court dismissed the § 1983 claim on March 13, 2001, and
the negligence claim on March 29, 2001.
A jury trial began on July 3, 2001, and Cantu elected to
proceed against only Jones, Waltersdorf and Beaird on his
constitutional deliberate indifference claim. Cantu alleged that
Beaird, after seeing Cantu’s letters, conspired with Waltersdorf
and Jones to allow an inmate to escape so that he would be
attacked. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law at the close of Cantu’s case and again
at the end of the presentation of the evidence. The jury returned
a verdict for Cantu, finding that the defendants had violated
Cantu’s constitutional rights and were not entitled to qualified
immunity, and awarding Cantu $22,500 in compensatory damages.
Final judgment was entered on July 17, 2001, and Jones, Waltersdorf
and Beaird filed their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law on July 26, 2001. The district court denied the renewed motion
on August 8, 2001. Jones, Waltersdorf, and Beaird now appeal.
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DISCUSSION
Did the district court err by not granting the appellants’ motion
for judgment as a matter of law in light of the evidence presented
at trial?
The appellants contend that there is absolutely no evidence
that any of them were aware of any risk of harm to Cantu until the
attack began and that they acted reasonably at all times.
Appellants point to the lack of any direct evidence that Jones,
Waltersdorf or Beaird were aware of Cantu’s letters as well as to
the lack of any direct evidence that this was anything more than a
colossal coincidence. Appellants claim that, at most, the proof
could only show negligence, which is below the standard needed for
deliberate indifference.
This Court conducts a de novo review of a district court’s
denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Mota v. Univ.
of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir.
2001). In reviewing the motion, this Court should review all of
the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). “[I]f there is substantial
evidence...of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-
minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach
different conclusions, the motion[] should be denied.” Boeing Co.
v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruled
in part on other grounds, Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107
10
F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc). However, a mere scintilla of
evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. Id.
The Supreme Court has held that the treatment a prisoner
receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined
are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Specifically, prison officials
have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of
other prisoners. Id. at 833. “[A] prison official may be held
liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of
confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk
of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. In other words, the
prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind,
which, in prison-conditions cases, is one of “deliberate
indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. at 834. To find
that an official is deliberately indifferent, it must be proven
that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at
837.
Though the present case involves an extraordinary set of
circumstances, we do not believe that there was insufficient
evidence on which the jury could base its decision. The jury was
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offered more than a scintilla of evidence and was free to make
credibility determinations based on that evidence. The appellants
claim that this case was nothing more than a colossal coincidence,
however, the jury obviously disagreed. We hold that the district
court did not err in denying the appellants’ motion.
Did the district court err by not granting the Appellants’ motion
for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified immunity?
In reviewing a claim of qualified immunity, this Court must
determine: “(1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a
clearly established constitutional right; and, (2) if so, whether
the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in the light
of the clearly established law at the time of the incident.” Hare
v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998). The
appellants do not contest that the constitutional right of
offenders to be protected from harm was clearly established at the
time of the attack. The appellants do contest, however, the
finding that they acted in an objectively unreasonable fashion.
All of the appellants’ arguments on this point rely on the
assumption that the appellants were never aware that the attack was
going to happen and that they acted reasonably after the events
started to unfold. This argument ignores, however, that the claim
against them involves deliberate indifference on their part. The
jury found that the appellants essentially orchestrated the attack.
This is in no way reasonable behavior for a prison official.
Therefore, we conclude that the resolution of the first issue in
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this case is determinative and that the appellants are not entitled
to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Having carefully reviewed the record of this case and the
parties’ respective briefing and for the reasons set forth above,
we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the
appellants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and that the
jury’s verdict should remain undisturbed. We also conclude that
the district court did not err in denying appellants’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity. We
therefore AFFIRM the district court’s decision.
AFFIRMED.
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