Assadi v. Osherow ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 22-50452        Document: 00516584612             Page: 1      Date Filed: 12/20/2022
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 22-50452
    Summary Calendar                                 FILED
    December 20, 2022
    Lyle W. Cayce
    In the Matter of Mohammed Reza Assadi,                                            Clerk
    Debtor,
    Mohammad Reza Assadi, Debtor,
    Appellant,
    versus
    Randolph N. Osherow, Trustee; Amir Batoei, Creditor,
    Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:21-CV-489
    Before Jones, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Debtor Mohammed Assadi, proceeding pro se, appeals from the
    district court’s review of several final orders of the bankruptcy court.
    *
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 22-50452      Document: 00516584612          Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/20/2022
    No. 22-50452
    Namely, Assadi argues the bankruptcy court (1) violated his due process
    rights, (2) erred in granting Trustee Randolph Osherow’s motion to
    compromise and settle claims with Creditor Amir Batoei, (3) erred in denying
    Assadi’s motion to disqualify the bankruptcy judge, and (4) erred in
    sustaining in part and denying in part Assadi’s objections to Batoei’s claims.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (d). “When reviewing a
    district court order that itself reviews a bankruptcy court order, an appellate
    court applies the same standard of review as did the district court.” In re
    Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak, & Winchell LLP, 
    592 F.3d 664
    , 668 (5th Cir.
    2009). So like the district court, we review the bankruptcy court’s denial of
    Assadi’s recusal motion and grant of Osherow’s motion to compromise for
    abuse of discretion. United States v. Anderson, 
    160 F.3d 231
    , 233 (5th Cir.
    1998) (recusal motion); In re Emerald Oil Co., 
    807 F.2d 1234
    , 1239 (5th Cir.
    1987) (motion to compromise). Further, we review legal conclusions de novo,
    while findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. In re San Patricio Cnty.
    Cmty. Action Agency, 
    575 F.3d 553
    , 557 (5th Cir. 2009).
    Assadi’s first and second arguments stem from the bankruptcy court’s
    order approving Osherow’s motion to compromise with Batoei pursuant to
    Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. Assadi claims the bankruptcy
    court violated his due process rights when considering the Rule 9019 motion.
    Assadi, however, had adequate notice of the Rule 9019 hearing, filed
    evidence and arguments in response to Osherow’s motion, and had the
    opportunity to present his arguments at the hearing. That is more than
    sufficient. See In re Reagor-Dykes Motors, LP, 
    613 B.R. 878
    , 885–86 (Bankr.
    N.D. Tex. 2020) (“Generally, for a party to be bound to orders issued by the
    bankruptcy court, the party must receive adequate notice of the proceedings
    for due process reasons. The Code provides for due process protection for
    settlements under Rule 9019(a) by requiring that a debtor in possession give
    creditors and parties in interest ‘adequate notice and opportunity to be heard
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    No. 22-50452
    before their interests may be adversely affected.’” (quotation omitted)).
    Assadi also claims the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in
    granting Osherow’s Rule 9019 motion instead of requiring Osherow to appeal
    the state court judgment in favor of Creditor Batoei. Although the bankruptcy
    judge has broad discretion to approve a settlement agreement, the agreement
    must be “fair, equitable[,] and in the best interest of the estate.” In re Jackson
    Brewing Co., 
    624 F.2d 605
    , 608 (5th Cir. 1980).
    Five factors inform the “fair and equitable” analysis: (1) the
    probability of success in the litigation, with due consideration
    for the uncertainty in fact and law; (2) the complexity and likely
    duration of the litigation and any attendant expense,
    inconvenience, and delay, including the difficulties, if any, to
    be encountered in the matter of collection; (3) the paramount
    interest of the creditors and a proper deference to their
    respective views; (4) the extent to which the settlement is truly
    the product of arm’s-length bargaining and not fraud or
    collusion; and (5) all other factors bearing on the wisdom of the
    compromise.
    In re Moore, 
    608 F.3d 253
    , 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
    Here, the bankruptcy court’s evaluation of Assadi’s probability of
    success on appeal was reasonable in light of the state’s courts consideration
    of the issue, the evidence in the record, and the exacting standard of review
    that would apply on appeal. The bankruptcy court also reasonably concluded
    that litigation would take considerable time and effort and might result in an
    increase in Batoei’s claims against the estate. Finally, the bankruptcy court
    was within its discretion to conclude that the arm’s-length settlement was in
    the best interest of the creditors because it “would allow the Trustee to pay
    all claims against the estate in full.”
    Next, Assadi claims the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when
    it denied Assadi’s motion to recuse the bankruptcy judge. “Any justice,
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    No. 22-50452
    judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
    proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 455
    (a); see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5004(a) (“A bankruptcy judge
    shall be governed by 
    28 U.S.C. § 455
    , and disqualified from presiding over
    the proceeding or contested matter in which the disqualifying circumstances
    arises[.]”). Although the bankruptcy court ruled against many of Assadi’s
    motions, that by itself is insufficient to trigger § 455. Liteky v. United States,
    
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994) (“Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
    introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or
    of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion
    unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make
    fair judgment impossible.”). Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that
    the bankruptcy court treated Assadi unfairly.
    Finally, Assadi argues that the bankruptcy court erred in sustaining in
    part and denying in part Assadi’s objections to claims filed by Baroei. But as
    the district court correctly held, Assadi abandoned this issue by inadequately
    briefing it before the district court. Ramirez v. Escajeda, 
    921 F.3d 497
    , 500
    (5th Cir. 2019).
    AFFIRMED.
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