Jose Romero-Ramirez v. William Barr, U. S. Atty Ge ( 2019 )


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  •      Case: 18-60098      Document: 00514904835         Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/05/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 18-60098                               FILED
    April 5, 2019
    Lyle W. Cayce
    JOSE JAVIER ROMERO-RAMIREZ,                                                      Clerk
    Petitioner
    v.
    WILLIAM P. BARR, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A028 890 409
    Before JOLLY, COSTA, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    The Board of Immigration Appeals denied Jose Javier Romero-Ramirez’s
    motion to reopen his deportation proceedings.               Romero-Ramirez appeals,
    arguing that he did not receive actual notice of his original deportation hearing
    because he moved without informing immigration officials. Because we find
    that the Board acted within its discretion in denying Romero-Ramirez’s motion
    to reopen, we AFFIRM.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 18-60098    Document: 00514904835    Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/05/2019
    No. 18-60098
    I.
    Jose Javier Romero-Ramirez, a native of Honduras, entered the United
    States in 1990 without inspection. Soon after he entered the country, the
    Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) apprehended him and issued an
    order to show cause (OSC). The OSC alleged that Romero-Ramirez was eligible
    to be deported because his entry was unauthorized and ordered him to appear
    before an Immigration Judge (IJ) at a date and time “to be scheduled.” This
    OSC further warned Romero-Ramirez that failure to attend the hearing may
    result in a determination being made in his absence. On April 25, 1990, the
    OSC was personally served on Romero-Ramirez and listed the address he
    provided to the INS, “110 E. La. Chappelle, San Antonio, Texas 78204.” Two
    weeks later, on May 10, 1990, a notice of master calendar hearing (NTA or
    “hearing notice”) was sent to the San Antonio address listed on the OSC
    informing Romero-Ramirez that his hearing was scheduled for June 8, 1990 at
    8:00 A.M. at 727 E. Durango Blvd Rm A-513 San Antonio, TX 78206. This
    notice was not returned as undeliverable or otherwise not properly received.
    Romero-Ramirez did not show up for his June 8, 1990 hearing and the
    IJ held an in absentia deportation hearing and found Romero-Ramirez
    deportable as charged. The immigration court mailed the deportation order to
    the San Antonio address Romero-Ramirez provided on the OSC but the order
    was returned—“return to sender . . . attempted — not known.”
    Twenty-six years later, in 2016, Romero-Ramirez filed a motion to
    reopen his deportation proceedings, stay deportation, and rescind the in
    absentia deportation order.    In this motion, Romero-Ramirez argues that
    reopening was warranted because he did not receive notice of the 1990
    deportation hearing. He concedes that the sole reason he did not receive notice
    was that he had moved from the San Antonio address within a week of
    receiving the OSC. He also concedes that he did not recall informing the
    2
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    immigration court of his change of address but argues that this was excusable
    because he was not informed of his obligation to do so. The IJ denied the
    motion to reopen because he found that Romero-Ramirez’s lack of notice was
    due to his failure to inform the immigration officials of his change of address
    as required by federal law and regulation. Therefore, Romero-Ramirez failed
    to overcome the presumption that the hearing notice was delivered. The IJ
    denied Romero-Ramirez’s motion to reconsider, at which point Romero-
    Ramirez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
    The BIA found that the IJ erred in applying the modern statutory
    standard governing motions to reopen rather than the reasonable cause
    standard of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), which applies to cases, like Romero-Ramirez’s,
    that occurred before 1992. 1 The BIA remanded to the IJ to determine whether
    there was reasonable cause for Romero-Ramirez’s absence from his deportation
    hearing.
    On remand, Romero-Ramirez filed an affidavit attesting that he had not
    been told of his responsibility to inform the INS of his change of address. He
    also asserted that he had no contact with the friend he stayed with at the San
    Antonio address listed on the OSC after moving nor did his friend forward him
    any mail sent to him at that address. Romero-Ramirez’s primary argument
    was that he did not receive actual notice of the hearing. He states in his
    affidavit that he “didn’t get the hearing notice because [he] changed
    addresses.”    Applying the correct statutory standard, the IJ again denied
    Romero-Ramirez’s motion to reopen. The IJ acknowledged that the OSC did
    1Immigration proceedings conducted prior to June 13, 1992, are governed by the since
    amended 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). See Williams-Igwonobe v. Gonzales, 
    437 F.3d 453
    , 455 n.1 (5th
    Cir. 2006) (citing In re Cruz-Garcia, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1155, 1156, n.1 (BIA 1999)). Former
    § 1252(b)(1) required that an alien “shall be given notice, reasonable under all the
    circumstances, of the nature of the charges against him and of the time and place at which
    the proceedings will be held.”
    3
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    not advise Romero-Ramirez of his obligation to notify immigration officials of
    any change of address. The IJ further found, however, that the effective
    regulations at the time placed the responsibility squarely upon the alien to
    keep the government informed of his current address.            Because Romero-
    Ramirez did not comply with his duty to keep his address up to date, he did
    not establish reasonable cause excusing his failure to attend his hearing.
    Romero-Ramirez again appealed to the BIA.
    This time the BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of Romero-Ramirez’s motion to
    reopen. The BIA noted that Romero-Ramirez was personally served with the
    OSC, which indicated that Romero-Ramirez’s address was “110 E. La
    Chappelle, San Antonio, TX 78204.” Fifteen days after Romero-Ramirez was
    successfully served the OSC, the Immigration Court mailed the notice of
    hearing to the same address. 2 Therefore, notice was accomplished by routine
    service, “mailing a copy by ordinary mail address to the person at his last
    known address.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(1) (1990). The Board held that Romero-
    Ramirez’s failure to receive actual notice was not a reasonable basis to miss
    his hearing because his failure to receive the NTA “was due to his own conduct
    in failing to provide a valid address and failing to contact the Immigration
    Court to inquire about the status of his deportation proceedings for many
    years.” See United States v. Estrada-Trochez, 
    66 F.3d 733
    , 736 (5th Cir. 1995);
    Galo-Martinez v. Holder, 413 F. App’x 694, 696 (5th Cir. 2011). Romero-
    Ramirez timely appealed the BIA’s decision.
    2 The BIA makes a factual error when it mentions that the NTA was returned as
    “Attempted — Not Known.” The deportation notice was returned as “Attempted — Not
    Known,” the NTA was not returned in such a manner. As discussed below, this error is
    harmless.
    4
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    II.
    On appeal Romero-Ramirez argues that his failure to appear was
    reasonable because the government did not inform him of his obligation to keep
    his address current with immigration authorities. To support his argument,
    Romero-Ramirez relies heavily upon the Ninth Circuit’s holding that under
    the former § 1252(b) “there is reasonable cause for failure to appear when an
    alien has not received notice of the time and place of the hearing due to a
    change of address, and the alien was not informed of a requirement to advise
    the INS of any change of address.” See Urbina-Osejo v. INS, 
    124 F.3d 1314
    ,
    1317 (9th Cir. 1997). Romero-Ramirez also argues for the broader due process
    proposition “that it is simply unfair to deport an alien for failing to provide the
    agency with an updated address when they are not given fair notice of such a
    requirement.”
    The government responds that Romero-Ramirez’s failure to receive
    actual notice of his deportation hearing was due to his failure to update the
    INS of his address change, which does not constitute reasonable cause for his
    absence under this court’s precedent. The government asserts that the BIA
    was correct to note that notice was properly accomplished by “mailing a copy
    [of the NTA] by ordinary mail addressed to the person at his last known
    address.” See 8 C.F.R. § 103a(a)(1) (1990); Galo-Martinez, 413 F. App’x at 696.
    The government further contends that this court should not apply a Ninth
    Circuit rule that conflicts with this circuit’s precedent. The government’s
    argument is centered on three Fifth Circuit cases that it asserts are
    substantively indistinguishable—none of which found good cause for failure to
    appear under § 1252(b) when the government sent an NTA to the alien’s last
    5
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    known address. 3 See Estrada-Trochez, 
    66 F.3d 733
    ; Escobar-Landaverde v.
    Holder, 428 F. App’x 332 (5th Cir. 2011); Galo-Martinez, 413 F. App’x 694.
    III.
    This court reviews the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen under “a highly
    deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Lara v. Trominski, 
    216 F.3d 487
    ,
    496 (5th Cir. 2000). We will affirm the BIA’s decision so long as it is “not
    capricious, without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so irrational that
    it is arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible rational approach.”
    Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 
    560 F.3d 354
    , 358 (5th Cir. 2009). Romero-Ramirez
    bears the burden of demonstrating “reasonable cause” for his failure to appear
    at his deportation proceeding.          8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1990).         Since Romero-
    Ramirez’s deportation proceeding was conducted prior to June 13, 1992, the
    former § 1252(b) governs this case. See 
    Williams-Igwonobe, 437 F.3d at 455
    n.1 (citing In re Cruz-Garcia, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1156, n.1). Section 1252(b)(1)
    required that an alien “shall be given notice, reasonable under all the
    circumstances, of the nature of the charges against him and of the time and
    place at which the proceedings will be held.” Furthermore, it was the alien’s
    responsibility to “notify the Attorney General in writing of each change of
    address and new address within ten days from the date of such change.” 8
    U.S.C. § 1305; 
    Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d at 736
    (noting that this provision is
    3 The government also argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over several of Romero-
    Ramirez’s arguments because he failed to exhaust them before the BIA. We find that the
    government’s argument is without merit except with regard to Romero-Ramirez’s claim that
    the OSC was required to contain a Spanish language notice of his obligation to update his
    address with the government. Romero-Ramirez’s remaining arguments were adequately
    raised to the BIA. See Vazquez v. Sessions, 
    885 F.3d 862
    , 868 (5th Cir. 2018) (An alien must
    “raise, present, or mention an issue to the BIA to satisfy exhaustion” (internal quotation
    marks omitted)). Furthermore, his constitutional due process arguments are not subject to
    the exhaustion requirement. See Roy v. Ashcroft, 
    389 F.3d 132
    , 137 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Claims
    of due process violations, except for procedural errors that are correctable by the BIA, are
    generally not subject to the exhaustion requirement.”).
    6
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    “essential to the administration of the INS”). Additionally, § 1252(b) “did not
    prescribe the method by which service of the OSC or the hearing notice must
    be made, nor did it require that immigration officials notify aliens of their
    obligation to update their addresses.” Escobar-Landaverde, 428 F. App’x at
    333. Delivery of notice to the alien’s last known address constitutes reasonable
    notice for purposes of constitutional due process and former § 1252(b). See
    
    Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d at 736
    ; Escobar-Landaverde, 428 F. App’x at 334;
    Galo-Martinez, 413 F. App’x at 696.
    The government is right that our precedent makes this a straightforward
    case. 4 Estrada-Trochez is worth quoting at length:
    We hold that the notice sent to Appellant satisfies the
    requirements of constitutional due process. The INS mailed the
    notice of the deportation hearing to the last address that Estrada-
    Trochez provided to the INS. Estrada-Trochez did not receive this
    notice, however, because he had moved without informing the
    government of his change of address, as required by 8 U.S.C.
    § 1305. . . . Although the INS is certainly to blame for its abysmal
    handling of Estrada-Trochez’s deportation, the ultimate fault lies
    with the Appellant for his failure to comply with a law that is
    essential to the administration of the INS. . . . Therefore, Estrada-
    4  As noted above, the BIA erroneously stated that the NTA was returned as
    “Attempted – Not Known.” It was the notice of deportation that was returned. This is a
    harmless error because this mistaken characterization of the facts is at worst neutral and at
    best helps Romero-Ramirez’s case—that the notice of hearing was returned as undeliverable
    (as the BIA thought) helps Romero-Ramirez’s argument that he did not receive adequate
    notice of the hearing more than the actual facts, that only the notice of deportation was
    returned as undeliverable. In any event, Romero-Ramirez never argues that the NTA was
    not sent to the address he listed. He only argues that he did not receive it at that address
    because he had moved without informing the government. Thus, this factual error is
    harmless as it is not relevant to the contested legal issue of this case.
    7
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    Trochez had a reasonable opportunity to be present at his
    deportation hearing and failed to attend without reasonable cause.
    
    Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d at 736
    .
    Thus, this court has already held that an alien has a reasonable opportunity
    to attend his deportation hearing even if he does not receive actual notice when
    the failure to receive notice is a result of his moving without complying with
    his statutory and regulatory duty to update his address with immigration
    officials. 5 See 
    Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d at 736
    ; see also Galo-Martinez, 413 F.
    App’x at 696; Escobar-Landaverde, 428 F. App’x at 334. Romero-Ramirez’s
    arguments seeking to avoid the conclusion that Estrada-Trochez controls in his
    case are not persuasive.
    Romero-Ramirez does not dispute that notice was sent to his last known
    address. Instead, he argues that he never actually received the notice because
    he moved without informing the government and did not know of his obligation
    to inform the government of his current address. This circuit has never held
    that, under former § 1252(b), an OSC is required to advise an alien of his
    obligation to keep the government informed of his current address. Compare
    
    Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d at 736
    (“[T]he ultimate fault lies with the Appellant
    for his failure to comply with a law that is essential to the administration of
    the INS.”) and Escobar-Landaverde, 428 F. App’x at 333 (Section 1252(b) did
    not “require that immigration officials notify aliens of their obligation to
    update their addresses”), with 
    Urbina-Osejo, 124 F.3d at 1317
    (“We conclude
    that there is reasonable cause for failure to appear when an alien has not
    received notice of the time and place of the hearing due to a change of address,
    5 It is not clear from the facts of Estrada-Trochez if the alien was informed of his
    obligation to update his address through an OSC or orally and the court did not seem to
    consider this relevant to the inquiry. Furthermore, in Escobar-Landaverde, we explicitly
    held that § 1252(b) does not “require that immigration officials notify aliens of their obligation
    to update their addresses.” 428 F. App’x at 333.
    8
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    and the alien was not informed of a requirement to advise the INS of any
    change of address.”). 6 Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s Urbina-Osejo holding that
    Romero-Ramirez primarily relies upon, in the Fifth Circuit, under former
    § 1252(b), the alien has the sole responsibility to keep the government informed
    of his current address and the government’s failure to inform the alien of this
    obligation does not constitute reasonable cause for failure to attend.                        See
    
    Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d at 736
    (“[T]he ultimate fault lies with the
    Appellant.”); Galo-Martinez, 413 F. App’x at 697 (“Galo-Martinez’s alleged
    failure to receive actual notice of the deportation hearing was due to
    circumstances of his own making.”).
    Romero-Ramirez’s lack of actual notice was his own fault—he knew of
    the pending deportation hearing but made no attempt to update immigration
    authorities of his changed address or inquire about the specific date and time
    of the hearing. 7 Therefore, Estrada-Trochez controls and the BIA did not abuse
    its discretion in denying Romero-Ramirez’s motion to reopen.
    6 Indeed, the concurrence/dissent in Urbina-Osejo notes that the majority’s holding
    contravenes the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Estrada-Trochez, as well as other circuits’
    decisions. See 
    Urbina-Osejo, 124 F.3d at 1320
    (Rymer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
    part).
    7 Romero-Ramirez also places great weight on the fact that the BIA effectively rejected
    his affidavit without addressing its credibility. Such arguments have no bearing on the
    outcome of this case. The cases he cites all involve situations where the alien disputes that
    delivery to the last known address was properly executed—“[T]he alien’s statement that he
    or she did not receive the correspondence is sufficient evidence that mail delivery failed.”
    Settin v. Gonzales, 171 F. App’x 436, 437 (5th Cir. 2006). Romero-Ramirez never argues that
    delivery failed and he explicitly states in his brief that this is not a case of improper delivery.
    Rather he concedes that he did not receive the NTA because he moved and makes the legal
    argument that this was reasonable cause for his failure to appear. The IJ and BIA concluded
    as a legal matter that an alien’s failure to receive notice because he has moved without
    informing the government is not reasonable cause for missing his hearing.
    9
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    IV.
    Because we hold that the Board acted within its discretion, its denial of
    Romero-Ramirez’s motion to reopen his deportation proceeding is AFFIRMED.
    10