Glenn Ford v. District Attorney Caddo Parish, et a ( 2019 )


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  •      Case: 18-30126    Document: 00514867978      Page: 1   Date Filed: 03/11/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 18-30126                        March 11, 2019
    Lyle W. Cayce
    ANDREA ARMSTRONG, Executrix of the Estate of Glen Ford,                     Clerk
    Plaintiff–Appellee
    v.
    DON ASHLEY; GARY ALDERMAN; GARY PITTMAN; EVERETT T.
    RUSHING; BILLY LOCKWOOD, wrongly identified as Estate of Billy
    Lockwood; FRANK DATCHER; GLYNN MITCHELL; RODNEY PRICE,
    Defendants–Appellants
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    Before SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
    KURT D. ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judge:
    Glenn Ford was wrongly convicted of murder and spent 30 years in
    solitary confinement on death row before being fully exonerated, with all
    charges dropped. Ford sued the Defendants-Appellants 1 (as well as other
    defendants not included in this appeal), all of whom were law enforcement
    officials at the time of Ford’s wrongful conviction, alleging suppression of
    1Don Ashley, Gary Alderman, Gary Pittman, Everett T. Rushing, Billy Lockwood,
    Frank Datcher, Glynn Mitchell, and Rodney Price.
    Case: 18-30126       Document: 00514867978          Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/11/2019
    No. 18-30126
    evidence, fabrication of witness statements, withholding of exculpatory
    evidence, and other violations.
    Ford filed suit in March 2015. The operative First Amended Complaint
    was filed on September 8, 2015. Appellants answered the complaint on
    December 3, 2015, while other defendants in the initial lawsuit chose to
    instead move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).
    Approximately three months later, on March 16, 2016, the Appellants filed a
    Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim.
    Alternatively, they moved for the Appellee to add details to the allegations
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a).
    The district court denied the Rule 12(b)(6) motion for being untimely on
    December 28, 2017. 2 The court also denied the alternative relief under Rule
    7(a). The Appellants appealed the dismissal of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion on
    January 23, 2018.
    I.
    The first, and determinative, issue is that of appellate jurisdiction. The
    case comes before this court on interlocutory appeal. In deference to the district
    court and to district judges’ responsibility to manage trials, interlocutory
    appeals are only allowed in limited circumstances because they disrupt the
    progress of a trial. Johnson v. Jones, 
    515 U.S. 304
    , 309 (1995). Therefore,
    “interlocutory appeals–appeals before the end of district court proceedings–are
    the exception, not the rule.” 
    Id. “[A] decision
    . . . is appealable if it falls within ‘that small class which
    finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
    asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent
    2 In contrast, the district court ruled on the merits for the Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed
    in a timely manner by the other defendants.
    2
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    No. 18-30126
    of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
    whole case is adjudicated.’” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    , 524–25 (1985)
    (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
    337 U.S. 541
    , 546 (1949)).
    Accordingly, Mitchell held that “a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified
    immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final
    decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence
    of a final judgment.”    
    Id. at 530
    (emphasis added). For a decision to be
    considered final, and therefore appealable, it must fulfill three conditions laid
    out in Mitchell. 
    Id. at 527.
    First, it must be “effectively unreviewable on appeal
    from a final judgment.” 
    Id. Second, it
    must “conclusively determine the
    disputed question.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    Finally, the question at issue must
    be a “clai[m] of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
    action.” 
    Id. (alteration in
    original) (citation omitted). The appellate court does
    not have jurisdiction to evaluate factual disputes. Winfrey v. Pikett, 
    872 F.3d 640
    , 643–44 (5th Cir. 2017).
    A decision on qualified immunity can be an appealable final decision,
    “but only to the extent that the appeal concerns the purely legal question
    whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the facts[.]”
    Kinney v. Weaver, 
    367 F.3d 337
    , 347 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Typically, this
    determination is a decision on “whether the federal right allegedly infringed
    was clearly established.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 
    516 U.S. 299
    , 313 (1996) (internal
    quotation omitted). If the district court declined to rule on qualified immunity
    when it was so obligated, that may also be considered an appealable final
    decision. See Helton v. Clements, 
    787 F.2d 1016
    , 1017 (5th Cir. 1986). However,
    “where the district court refuses to rule on a claim of immunity because it has
    not been timely presented to the court, Mitchell does not provide for appellate
    jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Brazoria Cty., No. 93-2525, 
    1994 WL 171620
    , at *2
    3
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    No. 18-30126
    (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished but precedential); see also
    Edwards v. Cass Cty., Tex., 
    919 F.2d 273
    , 275 (5th Cir. 1990).
    II.
    The Appellants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss that included an
    assertion of qualified immunity. The Appellants argue that in denying the Rule
    12(b)(6) motion, the district court made an appealable final legal decision on
    qualified immunity. The Appellants base this argument on a statement made
    by the district court regarding a possible alternative argument that the
    defendants did not raise in their motion – that the Rule 12(b)(6) motion should
    instead be considered a Rule 12(c) motion. 3 The district court, in declining to
    consider the motion under Rule 12(c), stated that “there are material facts in
    dispute and at this stage of the litigation, the Law Enforcement Defendants
    are not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Based on this statement,
    the Appellants aver that the district court essentially made a final legal
    determination that the Appellants were not entitled to qualified immunity.
    This final legal determination must be appealable, Appellants maintain,
    because the purpose of qualified immunity is to protect the officers from trial,
    not only from liability. Mitchell, 
    472 U.S. 511
    , 526-27.
    However, the district court specifically stated that it was making the
    decision on procedural grounds, rather than legal grounds: “Accordingly, the
    Law Enforcement Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as
    untimely.” The decision therefore is not based on a legal evaluation of the
    Appellants’ entitlement to qualified immunity. We take the district court at its
    word and decline to hold that the district court inadvertently made a final legal
    determination as to whether the Appellants are entitled to qualified immunity.
    3  District courts may consider untimely Rule 12(b)(6) motions as Rule 12(c) motions
    (indeed they are sometimes encouraged to do so). See Delhomme v. Caremark Rx Inc., 
    232 F.R.D. 573
    , 576 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
    4
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    Accordingly, we note that nothing in the district court’s order bars the
    Appellants from asserting qualified immunity by appropriate, timely
    procedural vehicle in the future. See Kiser v. Garrett, 
    67 F.3d 1166
    , 1169 (5th
    Cir. 1995) (“It would be anomalous to conclude that a defendant waives a
    qualified immunity defense by dismissing as moot an interlocutory appeal that
    the defendant was not required to take in the first place.”).
    III.
    Because the district court’s decision on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion was
    based on timing rather than a substantive legal disposition regarding qualified
    immunity, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal at this
    time. Therefore, we do not find it necessary to consider the alternative
    arguments presented by the Appellants. We DISMISS this appeal for lack of
    appellate jurisdiction.
    5