Tomas Vizcarra v. Kenneth Reagans , 600 F. App'x 942 ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 11-50672      Document: 00513025177         Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/29/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 11-50672                              FILED
    April 29, 2015
    Lyle W. Cayce
    TOMAS VIZCARRA,                                                                 Clerk
    Petitioner-Appellant
    v.
    KENNETH REAGANS, Warden,
    Respondent-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:10-CV-159
    Before DENNIS, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    On February 6, 1997, Tomas Vizcarra, Texas prisoner # 779968, was
    convicted by jury verdict of murder and sentenced to 99 years of imprisonment.
    He now seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) from this court in order to
    appeal from the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    application as time barred. We may not grant a COA unless Vizcarra makes
    “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2). When a § 2254 application is dismissed on procedural grounds,
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 11-50672    Document: 00513025177     Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/29/2015
    No. 11-50672
    such as limitations, the court should issue a COA “when the prisoner shows,
    at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
    states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of
    reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
    procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000).
    In his COA motion, Vizcarra argues that (1) despite his failure to file a
    state post-conviction application before the limitations period expired, the
    limitations period was tolled until his state post-conviction application was
    resolved; (2) his claim of actual innocence equitably tolled the limitations
    period; and (3) the limitations period violates the separation of powers
    doctrine, the Supremacy Clause, and the Suspension Clause.               As his
    constitutional challenges are raised for the first time in this COA motion, we
    decline to consider them. See Henderson v. Cockrell, 
    333 F.3d 592
    , 605 (5th
    Cir. 2003).
    In light of McQuiggin v. Perkins, 
    133 S. Ct. 1924
    , 1931-36 (2013), jurists
    of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
    holding that that there was no actual-innocence exception to the limitations
    period.   To the extent that Vizcarra’s underlying claims challenge the
    procedural adequacy of state post-conviction proceedings, he fails to raise a
    cognizable issue under § 2254 because “infirmities in state habeas proceedings
    do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief.” Duff-Smith v. Collins, 
    973 F.2d 1175
    , 1182 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 
    502 U.S. 62
    , 67-68
    (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-
    court determinations on state-law questions.”). We therefore deny his motion
    for a COA as to those state-law challenges. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 
    132 S. Ct. 641
    , 648 (2012); Houser v. Dretke, 
    395 F.3d 560
    , 562 (5th Cir. 2004). As to his
    claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we grant his motion for a COA as to
    2
    Case: 11-50672    Document: 00513025177     Page: 3   Date Filed: 04/29/2015
    No. 11-50672
    those claims, vacate in part the dismissal of his § 2254 application, and remand
    those claims for further proceedings in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
    Perkins.
    COA MOTION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
    VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
    3