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Qualls v. Apfel ( 2000 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-41398
Summary Calendar
EBB QUALLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KENNETH S. APFEL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
- - - - - - - - - -
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:99-CV-73
- - - - - - - - - -
September 22, 2000
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ebb Qualls appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.    Qualls’
application is based on allegations that he suffers from pain in
his right knee, left ankle, back, and neck.   On appeal, Qualls
argues the following: (1) the administrative law judge (ALJ)
erred when he failed to determine whether Qualls possessed
“highly marketable skills;” (2) the ALJ did not properly evaluate
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-41398
-2-
the medical evidence regarding Qualls’ limitations; and (3) the
ALJ did not properly evaluate Qualls’ complaints of pain.
The ALJ did not err when he made no findings regarding
whether Qualls possessed highly marketable skills pursuant to
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1563
    (d).   Such a finding only occurs at the fifth
step in the sequential review process.    See McQueen v. Apfel,
    168 F.3d 152
    , 154-56 (5th Cir. 1999); Social Security Ruling 99-3(5).
In the instant case, the ALJ determined at the fourth step in the
evaluation process that Qualls was not disabled because he could
perform past relevant work as a taxi cab driver; therefore, it
was unnecessary for the ALJ to consider whether Qualls possessed
transferrable skills.   See Wren v. Sullivan,
    925 F.2d 123
    , 125-26
(5th Cir. 1991)(holding that a finding that the claimant is not
disabled at any point terminates the sequential evaluation).
Qualls next argues that the ALJ did not evaluate the medical
evidence properly.   First, he contends that the ALJ failed to
discuss the applicability of listing 1.03.   The medical expert,
Dr. George Weilepp, testified that Qualls had no impairment which
met the criteria of any of the listed impairments.    Thus,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.    Qualls also
contends that the ALJ erred when he rejected the conclusion made
by Dr. T. W. Bywaters, the consulting orthopedist, that Qualls
suffered from a severe impairment.   The ALJ is entitled to weigh
conflicting medical evidence.   See Martinez v. Chater,
    64 F.3d 172
    , 175 (5th Cir. 1995); Greenspan v. Shalala,
    38 F.3d 232
    , 237
(5th Cir. 1994).   This court need not reweigh the evidence or try
No. 99-41398
-3-
the issues de novo, as such conflicts are for the ALJ and not for
the court to resolve.     See Selders v. Sullivan,
    914 F.2d 614
    , 617
(5th Cir. 1990).   Substantial evidence, in the form of Dr.
Weilepp’s testimony, supports the conclusion that Qualls was able
to perform a full range of light work.       See Richardson v.
Perales,
    402 U.S. 389
    , 401 (1971).
Qualls next argues that the ALJ did not evaluate his pain
complaints properly.    He points to Dr. Bywaters’ report as
objective medical evidence that would support Qualls pain
complaints and suggests that the ALJ should have addressed
specifically each of the factors listed at 20 C.F.R. 404.1529©
for evaluating subjective complaints.       This court has rejected
the sort of formalistic approach urged by Qualls on appeal.       See
Falco v. Shalala,
    27 F.3d 160
    , 163-64 (5th Cir. 1994).       The ALJ
did not find Qualls’ complaints credible based on Qualls’
demeanor and description of activities and life style, as well as
discrepancies between his assertions and information in the
documentary reports.     See Newton v. Apfel,
    209 F.3d 448
    , 459 (5th
Cir. 2000); Harrell v. Bowen,
    862 F.2d 471
    , 480 (5th Cir. 1988).
Qualls has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ applied the
wrong legal standard or that substantial evidence did not support
the ALJ’s findings.     See Ripley v. Chater,
    67 F.3d 552
    , 555 (5th
Cir. 1995).   Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.