Maurice Clark, Jr. v. William Punshon , 516 F. App'x 97 ( 2013 )


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  • GLD-157                                                    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 12-4357
    ___________
    MAURICE J. CLARK, JR.,
    Appellant
    v.
    WILLIAM WAYNE PUNSHON, ESQ.;
    JOHN J. CAPUZZI, JUDGE, INDIVIDUALLY
    AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-06403)
    District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    March 14, 2013
    Before: FUENTES, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: March 19, 2013)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    1
    Pro Se Appellant Maurice J. Clark, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his complaint
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 
    229 F.3d 220
    , 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Because the appeal does not present a substantial question,
    we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
    I.O.P. 10.6.
    Clark filed this civil rights action against Defendants William Wayne Punshon, his
    court-appointed attorney, and Judge John Capuzzi, the presiding judge in his criminal
    proceeding in state court, alleging deprivations of his rights under the Fourteenth
    Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . In his
    complaint, Clark alleged that in the course of the criminal proceedings, he sought to
    represent himself. As a result, Judge Capuzzi, ordered a mental health evaluation and the
    psychiatrist diagnosed him as a paranoid schizophrenic and concluded that he was
    incompetent to represent himself and possibly incapable of cooperating with his attorney.
    Punshon filed a petition for involuntary commitment. Judge Capuzzi granted the petition
    and committed Clark to Norristown State Hospital. Clark alleged that Punshon made
    false statements in his petition, that he was not informed that the petition would be filed,
    and that he was not given a proper hearing. Clark also alleged that Judge Capuzzi
    ordered his commitment to pressure him to plead guilty. Clark sought a declaration that
    his constitutional rights were violated, an injunction terminating Punshon as his counsel,
    2
    an injunction directing Judge Capuzzi to vacate the commitment order, and $15,000 in
    punitive damages from Punshon.
    The District Court granted Clark’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. The
    District Court then dismissed the complaint, sua sponte, pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
    (e)(2)(B) (ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The
    Court held that Clark did not state a claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against the Defendants
    because Attorney Punshon was not a state actor and Judge Capuzzi was entitled to
    absolute judicial immunity. The Court concluded that any amendment would be futile
    and thus dismissed the complaint without providing leave to amend. Clark appealed.
    We agree with the District Court’s determination that Clark’s complaint fails to
    state a claim against Attorney Punshon and Judge Capuzzi and that any leave to amend
    would be futile. A § 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the conduct complained
    of must be “committed by a person acting under color of state law”; and (2) this conduct
    must “deprive[] a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
    or laws of the United States.” Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 
    1 F.3d 176
    , 184 (3d Cir. 1993)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Attorney Punshon is clearly a private party.
    While a private party can qualify as a state actor when “he is a willful participant in joint
    action with the State or its agents,” Dennis v. Sparks, 
    449 U.S. 24
    , 27-28 (1980), Clark
    3
    has alleged no such facts here.1 Clark has thus not stated a viable claim against Attorney
    Punshon.
    With respect to Clark’s claims against Judge Capuzzi, we agree with the District
    Court that absolute judicial immunity precludes Clark’s claims for injunctive relief. See
    Azubuko v. Royal, 
    443 F.3d 302
    , 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    precludes injunctive relief based on actions taken in a judge’s judicial capacity).
    Moreover, to the extent that Clark sought declaratory relief against Judge Capuzzi, that
    claim was also properly dismissed. See Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 
    201 F.3d 194
     (3d Cir. 2000) (noting the impropriety of declaratory relief in a § 1983 suit
    against a judge where a judge acts as an adjudicator).
    Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, and we
    will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    1
    Clark filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that Attorney Punshon acted
    jointly with the Commonwealth. However, the District Court properly denied the
    motion.
    4