Khan v. Holder , 334 F. App'x 655 ( 2009 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 22, 2009
    No. 08-60784
    Summary Calendar                    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    MUHAMMAD WASEEM KHAN
    Petitioner
    v.
    ERIC H HOLDER, JR, U S ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A79 008 125
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Muhammad Waseem Khan, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitions for
    review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order denying his motion to
    reopen his removal proceeding.
    Following a July 2005 hearing, the immigration judge (IJ) denied Khan’s
    application for withholding of removal. The BIA denied Khan’s appeal in June
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 08-60784
    2006; and, in December 2006, it denied his motion to reopen the proceeding. In
    November 2007, our court denied Khan’s motion to remand to the BIA for
    reconsideration and dismissed his petition for review. See Khan v. Keisler, 253
    F. App’x 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
    In January 2008, more than a year after our denial of his petition for
    review, Khan filed a second motion with the BIA to reopen his removal
    proceeding. Khan conceded untimeliness, but claimed exceptional circumstances
    justified reopening his proceeding. The BIA denied that motion as untimely, its
    having been filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s prior order denying relief;
    and, it declined to reopen Khan’s removal proceeding sua sponte.
    Khan claims his removal proceeding should have been reopened, despite
    the untimeliness of his motion, because new facts exist that were not available
    at the time of his hearing before the IJ.          According to Khan: his I-140
    (employment-based immigrant visa) labor certification had been erroneously
    denied by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS); he,
    therefore, had not had an opportunity to present his application to adjust status
    under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1255
    (i) to the IJ; and CIS delayed more than 18 months in
    forwarding a notice of appeal to its administrative appeals office. He claims CIS’
    delay caused him to be ordered removed.
    Khan’s exceptional-circumstances assertion fails because he did not satisfy
    the conjunctive requirement that the motion to reopen be filed within 180 days
    of the removal order. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (b)(4)(ii) (establishing the 180-day
    filing period); see also 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
     (providing that the section’s 90-day filing
    period (for motions to reopen removal proceedings in the BIA) does not apply to
    motions brought pursuant to § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii)).             Claimed exceptional
    circumstances need not be addressed if the accompanying motion is not filed
    within the period established by law.
    Because Khan’s motion was untimely, reopening depended entirely on the
    BIA’s choosing to do so sua sponte. See Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 
    543 F.3d 216
    ,
    2
    No. 08-60784
    220 (5th Cir. 2008). Because the regulation governing sua sponte reopening
    vests the BIA with complete discretion to deny untimely motions to reopen, our
    court “has no legal standard by which to judge the . . . ruling, and
    therefore . . . lacks jurisdiction”. Id.; see also 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (a).
    Nor may Khan create jurisdiction under the guise of due process. Neither
    the filing nor the granting of an application for labor certification affects “the
    discretionary removal relief” provided by statute. Ahmed v. Gonzales, 
    447 F.3d 433
    , 438-39 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2006). Because “the failure to receive relief . . . is
    purely discretionary in nature”, it “does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty
    interest”. Assaad v. Ashcroft, 
    378 F.3d 471
    , 475 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mejia
    Rodriguez v. Reno, 
    178 F.3d 1139
    , 1146 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Manzano-
    Garcia v. Gonzales, 
    413 F.3d 462
    , 471 (5th Cir. 2005). Because he has no
    protected liberty interest in a motion to reopen, Khan is unable to demonstrate
    a due process violation. See Altamirano-Lopez v. Gonzales, 
    435 F.3d 547
    , 551
    (5th Cir. 2006).
    DENIED.
    3